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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores relationships between refugee host and origin states,
as well as conditions within these countries, to help explain host government be-
havior in the context of hosting refugees and when refugees are more likely to
return to their country of origin. This project highlights the necessity to expand
the scope of our studies of refugee displacement and return by considering con-
texts in both the origin and host nations, as well as the relationship between the
two states.
I investigate these relationships and contexts in three essays. In the first, I
argue the interstate relationship between the host and origin state helps explain
variation in host government behavior upon the arrival of forcibly displaced pop-
ulations. Host states engaged in a strategic rivalry with refugees’ country of
origin have an incentive to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled
population of their adversary. The host state’s willing cooperation with humani-
tarian organizations to provide for refugees is expected to also help increase the
country’s overall respect for human rights. In the absence of a strategic rivalry,
host governments do not have an incentive to support refugee populations. In-
stead, the lack of cooperation with humanitarian organizations and accounts of
mistreatment of refugee communities will be perceived unfavorably by the inter-
national human rights community. This leads to an overall decrease in respect for
15
human rights. I generally find support for these expectations.
In the second essay, I investigate how conditions in the host and origin state
influence refugee return patterns. Adopting a push and pull framework from
other studies of voluntary and forced displacement, I derive three hypotheses
anticipating refugees are pushed to return when political, economic, and physical
security in the host state is negative and pulled toward their country of origin
when these factors are positive. The findings suggest conditions in the host and
origin state must be included in theoretical and empirical models attempting to
explain refugee return. Additionally, physical security seems to supersede the
explanatory power over political and economic variables by serving as a strong
push and pull factor for return.
A counter-intuitive finding from the second essay shows refugees are pre-
dicted to return in larger numbers during conflict compared to the post-conflict
period in their country of origin. Building upon this relationship, I identify leader
turnover as a factor that can motivate refugee return, even in the context of on-
going conflict. In the third essay, I argue leader transitions demonstrating policy
change from the previous leader, stability, and legitimacy will provide updated
information to observers (such as refugees, host governments, and humanitarian
organizations) about safety in the country of origin. The findings show leader
turnovers that signal forecasted policy change, that happen in accordance with
established conventions of the state, and do not involve foreign assistance are as-
sociated with more refugees returning to their country of origin. The findings
suggest a high profile political event like leader change is useful information for
16
actors monitoring the situation to gauge whether the country of origin has im-
proved enough to encourage refugees to return.
Taken together, this dissertation illustrates the importance of considering both
origin and host states to explain government behavior in the context of hosting
and returning refugees. By systematically assessing conditions refugees are living
through at the host and origin state level, relationships and trends emerge on what
motivates refugee movement. This is useful to academics and policymakers who
want to support refugee populations by understanding the dynamics in which
refugees are operating in while in exile.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, there were approximately 62 million individuals that fled their homes
because of violence and persecution. About one third of these individuals were
refugees, or people located externally from their country of origin and recognized
and protected by by international human rights treaties.1 Formally, refugees are
defined as “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, us unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it” (UNHCR 1967). The number of people who have been forcibly
displaced has grown astronomically, especially since the end of the Cold War led
into a period featuring the onset or escalation of several civil wars that displaced
millions. In addition to “new” civil wars that are producing even more refugees
in the 2010s, including the conflicts in Syria and South Sudan, refugees displaced
by earlier wars remain in a state of protracted displacement where they continue
to stay in their host countries, such as refugees from Afghanistan and Somalia.
1The other two-thirds are internally displaced persons and asylum-seekers.
18
What solutions are there to forced displacement, particularly given so many
individuals are affected and will continue to be a pressing global issue for the
years to come? Existing scholarship and policymakers tend to make normative
assumptions about how we treat refugee populations. There is a tendency to
treat refugees as a vulnerable population without much agency in their ability to
make decisions. While refugees certainly can be living in and face sub-optimal
conditions while in their host state, refugees are capable of making decisions on
their own. Individuals and organizations advocating for refugees and displaced
populations should be able to listen to and believe in what refugees want to do
in their own life, even if their assumptions or perceptions, especially of safety, do
not hold for the refugees themselves.
This dissertation takes a step toward this direction by contributing to our
knowledge of refugee situations by exploring how interstate relationships, specif-
ically between host and origin states, improve our understanding of domestic
political consequences of refugee movements, as well as shifting the focus toward
what many consider to be the next step of a refugee’s journey: return to their
country of origin. In this introduction, I first provide background information on
the international refugee regime and proposed solutions to forced displacement.
Next, I briefly discuss gaps in the academic literature on forced displacement and
refugee return. I then provide an overview of the dissertation chapters and how
this project furthers our insight into refugee movements cross-nationally.
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1.1 The Contemporary International Refugee Regime
The United High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 to
manage the millions of European refugees generated after World War II. A year
later, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was created as a multi-
lateral treaty that defined who is a refugee, determined what rights should be
granted to individuals qualified for asylum status, and outlined the responsibili-
ties of states hosting refugee populations. This document builds upon Article 14
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of per-
sons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. This initial treaty was re-
stricted to refugees in Europe that had been displaced as a result of World War II.
In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees entered into international
law, expanding the temporal and geographical range of the 1951 Convention by
not limiting refugee protections to European refugees, but to all persons globally.
The international community identifies three solutions to refugee situations:
(1) host state integration, (2) third-country resettlement, and (3) repatriation to
the country of origin. After World War II, refugees were mostly resettled in a
third country or integrated into the host nation. Most individuals who applied
and were granted refugee status were fleeing political persecution in Communist
states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). These refugees did not want to return to
their country of origin and preferred to be integrated into their asylum country.
By the 1980s, the number of refugees rose, with most fleeing civil wars in their
country of origin, with this pattern continuing to the present day. States hosting
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these refugees were overwhelmed and under-resourced to accommodate the de-
mand. Many of these states are developing themselves and cannot support their
own citizens, let alone refugee populations. By 2016, ten countries hosted half
of the world’s refugees, yet accounted for just 2.5% of the global economy (Al
Jazeera 2016). Moreover, some of these refugees did not want to be naturalized
into another state, with many preferring to return to their country of origin at
some point.
Third-country resettlement has always become the least likely option for
refugees, with states offering this protection mostly being developed Western
states with extreme vetting processes. In 2016, only 0.8% of refugees were re-
settled (Ferris 2018). The process of applying for resettlement can take months or
years and separate families if some are granted resettlement when others are not.
The durable solution, repatriation, has become the preferred policy solution
to refugee situations since the 1990s (Hammerstad 2000). This is seen as being
reasonable given most refugees want to return when conditions in the country
of origin are sufficient enough. Additionally, refugee return and reintegration
into their country of origin is considered a critical step in the post-conflict recon-
struction period (Black and Gent 2006; Stefanovic and Loizides 2011). Yet, most
refugees are staying in their host state rather than returning to their country of
origin, with 2.5% of refugees in 2016 opting to return to their origin state (Ferris
2018). If refugees express preferences to return home (Koser 1997; Berlin Social
Science Center 2015; Bohnet 2016; Alsharabati and Nammour 2017), this begs the
following question: what facilitates or inhibits refugee return?
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In the academic and policy spheres, there are many critics of repatriation pro-
cesses as observed in practice. First, by international law (UNHCR 1967), the
repatriation of refugees requires four preconditions: (1) a fundamental change of
circumstances in the origin state; (2) the decision to return by refugees is volun-
tary in nature; (3) a tripartite agreement is signed by the origin state, host country,
and the UNHCR; and (4) the return process happens in safety and dignity. In real-
ity, refugee returns do not meet all of these requirements. Moreover, repatriation
as the preferred solution is heavily criticized for eroding rights for refugees since
it allows host states to maintain temporary protection of displaced populations,
rather than incentivizing host governments to channel resources toward integra-
tion (Barnett 2001a; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011).
I provide definitions for how the term repatriation and return are used
throughout this dissertation, especially since others outlets may use the terms
synonymously. Beyond the four conditions addressed above for repatriation pro-
cesses to start, there is also the assumption that with repatriation, refugees will
begin rebuilding their lives upon their return to their country of origin. Addi-
tionally, there is an implicit assumption that the return is voluntary, or that the
refugees themselves made the decision without being influenced by other actors,
and that conditions in the country of origin are safe. For policymakers, inter-
national organizations, and scholarship on repatriation, “safe” conditions in the
country of origin typically refers to the termination of armed conflict in the coun-
try of origin.
The next term that is occasionally used interchangeably with repatriation is
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refugee return. Return more broadly captures refugee populations who make
the journey back to their country of origin, whether or not this was of their own
volition. Distinct from repatriation, there are no claims or assumption about the
voluntariness of return in these contexts. Refugees could have been forced to go
back to their country of origin or brought to a point where they felt they had
no better option. The term “return,” as I use it here, does not make claims or
assumptions about whether the refugees are assisted in rebuilding their lives in
their country of origin. Oftentimes, refugees who return to their country of origin
become internally displaced, as they might not be able to return to their home
municipality, their could have been property was taken over by other internally
displaced populations, or their home was completely destroyed by the war. There
is also less of a temporal scope imposed on the process of refugee return—conflict
does not necessarily have to have ended for refugees to return home. Rather, they
may be returning while conflict is still ongoing.
Critics demonstrate how most “repatriation” processes do not meet standards
of international law. Instead, we are simply observing refugee return or refoule-
ment, the unlawful return of refugees to their country of origin by the host state.
While many such commentaries rightfully point out these issues associated with
repatriation to unsafe environments, there is a lack of understanding of the gen-
eral conditions driving the timing and degree of refugee return processes. While
there is vast scholarship on general determinants of forced displacement, why
we observe forced displacement, and influences of refugee flows on domestic
politics, there is less systematic research on refugee return. Most studies on repa-
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triation and return study single cases, only focus on those who return, or limit
the temporal scope to returns after conflict terminates in the country of origin. As
refugee flows and settlements are constantly connected to national security risks
in the host state (Adamson 2006; Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016; Polo andWucherpfennig
2018), refugees are becoming increasingly vulnerable in their host state. Living
in exile is not necessarily a safe haven, with host states restricting refugee rights
(Verdirame 1999; Knudsen 2009; Zeus 2011), allowing or even forcing refugees
to live in destitute conditions (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013), and leaving
them vulnerable to violent attacks (Bencˇek and Strasheim 2016; Savun and Gineste
2019).
1.2 Gaps in the Literature on Forced Displacement
This dissertation contributes to several under-explored areas I have identified in
the literature on forced displacement, briefly discussed here. Each chapter will
discuss relevant facets in more depth. First, studies on host state policies toward
refugees tend to focus entirely on domestic factors that influence government be-
havior, with little to no attention paid to the ways in which international factors
condition the impacts of hosting refugees. There is a lot of discussion regard-
ing the compatibility of incoming refugee populations on host societies, such as
whether incoming refugees will change the domestic balance of power of politi-
cal and ethnic groups in a state (Koser 2000; Cederman et al. 2013; Zhou 2018).
Moreover, there is also work linking refugee flows to domestic issues, such as
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armed groups exploiting refugee routes (Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch
2006) and how refugee populations test a state’s capacity to respond to their ar-
rival (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Yet, there is small,
but compelling, literature on the conditional nature of interstate relations between
the host and origin state. While some have examined these the effects of these
relationships in the context of refugee hosting, the dependent variable of these
studies tends to be violence (Whitaker 2003; Salehyan 2008ba). From these stud-
ies, it is unclear if other political factors, such as respect for human rights, are also
influenced by the arrival of refugees.
Given the breadth of studies on the domestic concerns of hosting refugee pop-
ulations, the question of when and why refugees stay in their host state, rather
than return, is comparatively unaddressed. Existing scholarship on refugee return
either critically evaluates the process of repatriation (Chimni 1993; Barnett 2001b;
Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011), investigates what hap-
pens domestically upon their return (Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Fransen,
Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017; Schwartz Forthcoming), focuses on a single case
(Eastmond and O¨jendal 1999; Janzen 2004; Stefanovic and Loizides 2011; Joire-
man, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012), and/or limits the temporal scope to focus on
dynamics of return in the post-conflict period only (Kibreab 2002; Black and Gent
2006; Eastmond 2006). There are few studies that highlight how refugees are re-
turning at all points of the conflict in their country of origin (Stein and Cuny
1994; Stein 1997). Moreover, surveys of refugees demonstrate that the majority do
want to return at some point, though it is unclear when or what circumstances
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would make return more likely (Berlin Social Science Center 2015; Bohnet 2016;
Alsharabati and Nammour 2017). Therefore, we are left with some gaps in the
literature regarding general trends and patterns of refugee return, irrespective of
whether the return was voluntary and under what conditions are refugees more
or less likely to return.
Given this gap, we also lack a clear understanding of the beliefs and prefer-
ences of actors that influence patterns of refugee return. Host states, refugees, and
international humanitarian organizations are expected to play a role in these pro-
cesses (Gerver 2016), but less attention has been paid to the interaction of their
preferences, how they overlap, and how they differ. Additionally, it is unclear
which actors have the most or least agency in refugee return patterns. Until there
is some baseline understanding of when and where these processes of return are
likely to be undertaken, policies of how to best serve refugee populations may
be limited to preexisting assumptions that are made about each of these actors’
intentions.
Relatedly, there continues to be a normative belief that refugees should only
return once conflict officially terminates in the country of origin. However, it is
unclear, given the lack of a broad systematic overview of refugee return patterns,
whether this is true in practice. While there are reports that refugees do return
while conflict is ongoing or the situation in the country of origin, it is less clear
how often this happens (Stein and Cuny 1994; Stein 1997; Human Rights Watch
2002; Amnesty International 2005; Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017; Amnesty Inter-
national 2018; Bassam 2018). Given most refugees do want to return at some
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point in time, there is a question of as to whether there are other dynamics in
the country of origin that might promote return beyond, and even before, conflict
termination. Moreover, developing a general understanding of when refugees re-
turn allows us to offer a better set of policy prescriptions for refugees and their
return to countries of origin.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is comprised of three essays pertaining to the movement and
hosting of refugees, and the necessity of understanding dynamics within and be-
tween the host and origin countries. The first essay, Chapter 2, investigates how
the relationship between host and origin states conditions human rights prac-
tices in refugee-hosting countries. I develop an argument suggesting the presence
of a strategic rivalry motivates host states to promote inclusive good-will action
toward the exiled population of their enemy. This self-promotion and willing co-
operation with international organizations serving displaced populations is trans-
lated into greater overall respect for human rights in the host state. Without the
presence of a strategic rivalry, refugees are linked to national security issues in
the host state and reluctantly cooperate with humanitarian organizations. This
is associated with an overall decrease in respect for human rights. Using global
data on refugee populations, strategic rivalries, and respect for human rights, I
find states hosting refugees from a rival country experience increased respect for
human rights, especially if the enemy state is their neighbor. On the other hand,
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hosting refugees from a non-rival state is associated with decreased respect for
human rights.
As Chapter 2 highlights, circumstances in the host state can be quite hostile
toward refugee populations. This raises the question of why some refugees would
want to stay in such an environment, while others might be motivated to leave
the host state and return home. Chapter 3 starts to explore under what condi-
tions refugees are returning to their country of origin. I adopt a push and pull
framework used in a variety of studies on voluntary and forced migration to gen-
erate broad hypotheses concerning when refugees are more likely to return to
their country of origin, motivated by macro-level factors of political, economic,
and physical security. Using data on returnees collected by the UNHCR and
macro-level information on host and origin states, results elucidate several inter-
esting findings. First, I find that certain political, economic, and physical security
considerations are important predictors of return and must be taken into when
explaining such return occurs and at what magnitude. Second, host and origin
countries cannot be treated equivalently, as host states tend to score more pos-
itively on macro-level indicators of security than origin states. Finally, physical
security tends to supersede political and economic circumstances as a predictor
of refugee return.
If refugees are returning while civil conflict is ongoing in their country of ori-
gin, are there other contexts or cues from the origin state that leads to refugee
return? In Chapter 4, I examine how leader turnover provides refugees, host
governments, and humanitarian observers with updated information about con-
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ditions in the refugees’ country of origin. I argue leader turnovers are a useful
heuristic providing signals of policy change from the predecessor, stability, and
legitimacy of the new leader’s rise to power. With these signals, there is a re-
evaluation of whether circumstances in the country of origin are conducive to
encourage refugee return. I expect refugees to return in larger numbers when
leader changes are associated with forecasted policy change, in accordance with
established rules in the state, and without foreign assistance. Using the same data
on returnees from Chapter 3 and data on leader changes, I generally find support
for these expectations.
I close the dissertation with a chapter summarizing the findings of the three
essays and encouraging future work that builds upon the results and limitations
of this current project. Taken together, my dissertation provide insights into the
challenges facing refugees in their host states and how these and other factors
influence when refugees are more likely to return to their country of origin. Fur-
thermore, I challenge normative assumptions by academics and policymakers of
what is considered safe enough for refugees. As forced displacement continues to
be a major global issue, understanding the conditions and contexts that refugee
processes operate is a major step in helping find a more humane and sustainable
solution to these crises.
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Chapter 2
HOSTING REFUGEES FROM A RIVAL STATE AND
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
2.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates over 340 million people around the world are or
have been refugees (UNHCR 2018b). In other words, a high volume of individu-
als crossed international borders because of war or human rights abuses in their
country of origin and settled in another state. How host countries receive the
arrival of refugees vary, ranging from accepting and a desire to grant refugees a
better life, to more hostile exclusionary actions, such as deportations and securi-
tization of borders.
For instance, over six million Syrians displaced by the civil war sought safe
haven in another country. While most traveled to neighboring states, approxi-
mately 10-15% looked for asylum in Europe. There were a variety of responses
from European countries due to the larger than average number of individuals
hoping to gain access and sanctuary. The outlier was Germany, who accepted a
substantial number of refugees compared to other countries in the region. Ger-
many likely did this for a variety of reasons, including the legacy of its own
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citizens seeking refuge at the end of World War II, a desire to boost their econ-
omy, having more resources to host than developing states, and a motivation to
portray itself as a humanitarian safe haven within the European Union. Most of
the other governments took a xenophobic approach and refused to take in many
asylum seekers. Some states, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, went a step further
by erecting border fencing and walls to deter asylum seekers from entering their
borders. Overall, the range of responses and reasons behind why a state behaves
in a certain way cannot solely be explained by domestic factors. Rather, another
piece of the puzzle is the relationship between other states and how a particu-
lar host wishes to be viewed by the international community, such as Germany’s
desire to project a humanitarian image and believing an open door policy would
facilitate other foreign policy objectives.
Academic scholarship investigating the link between refugees and host coun-
try security tend to pool sending countries together. Yet, there is variation in the
relationship between host and origin countries of refugees that can impact the
ways refugees and asylum seekers are framed by governments. In this chapter,
I argue when a state takes in refugees from their strategic rival, there is an in-
centive to promote and boast of their humanitarian good-will action toward the
exiled population because it will undermine the legitimacy of their rival for not
protecting their own citizens, while also painting a picture that the state is willing
to expend resources to help this population. This, in turn, will be associated with
an increase in respect for human rights in the host country.1
1In this chapter, “less respect for human rights” is used synonymously with “more repression”
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On the other hand, refugees from a non-rival are excluded from the host coun-
try because of the symbolic threat immigrants are believed to pose to the fabric of
the host nation. Particularly since refugees are associated with negative security
externalities of the country they fled, host states are wary of accepting this pop-
ulation into their borders. The in-humanitarian nature of the host state’s stance
toward refugees is expected to be associated with a decrease in respect for human
rights generally.
One such example is the responses to Syrian refugees by the governments
of Turkey and Lebanon. There are three and a half million registered Syrian
refugees in Turkey and approximately one million in Lebanon. Both states are
neighbors to Syria, yet, the framing of hosting Syrian refugees at the onset of the
civil war differed. While there are several explanations, one, in particular, has
been overlooked—the relationship between the host and home countries. Specif-
ically, in the context of a strategic interstate rivalry, where there is competition
between a pair of states, a perception of threat, and a belief that the other is an
enemy, may lead to a a more conciliatory response by the host state.
Turkey and Syria are involved in such a rivalry. Their history includes a se-
ries of water disputes, supporting terrorist organizations targeting their rival, and
competing to be the region’s superpower. At the onset of the Syrian civil war in
2011, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an claimed the Syrian government,
especially President Bashar al-Assad, were not acting humanely toward its citi-
zens, and that their actions were constituted as “savagery” (Al Jazeera 2011). In
and “more respect for human rights” is interchangeable with “less repression.”
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turn, Turkey initially maintained a policy of creating an inclusive environment
overall and opened a pathway for refugees to gain Turkish citizenship, under the
guise of demonstrating to Syria that the Turkish government can treat both its
citizens and non-citizen refugees in a manner that was superior to the actions of
the Syrian government (Smith 2018). In the 2012 U.S. State Department Report on
Human Rights Practices in Turkey, the Turkish government “responded robustly
to the humanitarian needs of displaced Syrians, spending over an estimated one
billion dollars on aid and assistance, primarily for the construction and adminis-
tration of 14 camps in southeastern Turkey. In most cases, the level of assistance
was acknowledged to be above international standards” (U.S. State Department
2012b).
In spite of their own contentious history, Lebanon and Syria are not considered
interstate rivals by the definitions used in political science. The Lebanese govern-
ment has been relatively inhospitable toward displaced Syrians in Lebanon by
blocking pathways for refugees to become permanent residents (UNHCR 2018a),
restricting the UNHCR’s operations (Amensty International 2016), promoting
repatriation (Bassam 2018), evicting Syrians from camps (Human Rights Watch
2018a), and framing their hosting of Syrian refugees as a threat to national secu-
rity (Chehayeb 2017). In the 2012 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights
Practices in Lebanon, it stated that “The government does not officially recognize
these [Syrians] as refugees, and it limits the freedom of movement for individu-
als who entered the country illegally....There were no refugee camps for Syrians”
(U.S. State Department 2012a). Unlike Turkey, there is no incentive for Lebanon to
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be cooperative with humanitarian organizations serving refugees or project them-
selves as a willing host to Syrians. Rather, Syrian refugees trigger the government
of Lebanon to present their arrival as a threat to national stability and security
I argue that hosting refugees in the context of a strategic rivalry should be
associated with greater respect for human rights in the host state, compared to
in host countries without such a relationship with the origin country. I test my
expectations using a global dataset of all countries from 1990-2010. I find sta-
tistical support for these expectations. The results suggest rivalrous interstate
relations with refugee-sending countries provide an incentive to for host states to
treat refugees benevolently and to cooperate with the UNHCR, which ultimately
corresponds to improved overall human rights in the country.
2.2 How Immigrants and Refugees are Framed in Host Countries
Current policy debates on immigration tend to revolve around the question of
whether newly arrived groups should be integrated or excluded from the fabric of
the country.2 These discussions regarding integration and assimilation intersect
with other aspects of the nation, such as economic growth, political power, na-
tional identity, and physical security. With respect to immigration, political elites
are in charge of promoting certain narratives over others and initiating strategies
accordingly. While public opinion certainly plays a role in the process of policy
formation and change, as well as which narratives become more salient, those in
2In this chapter, “immigrant” is defined as an individual who crosses an international border
to settle in a different country.
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positions of political power make the ultimate decision when crafting a specific
policy regarding immigration.
The inflow of refugees, particularly in large numbers, often leads to questions
about border security and the inability to keep unwanted individuals or violent
actors out of a country. Research investigating whether hosting has positive or
detrimental effects on the country are mixed. Some studies find hosting refugees
have beneficial impacts domestically (Jacobsen 2002; Taylor et al. 2016) and can
even surpass progress of voluntary economic immigrants who arrive at the same
time (Cortes 2004). Alternatively, other studies find the arrival of refugees leads
to resource scarcity (Martin 2005) and take a social and economic toll on host
states (Akar and Erdog˘du 2018; Hynie 2018; Jackson and Atkinson 2018). Eco-
nomic costs include the financial burden of properly supporting infrastructure
and livelihood needs for refugees and economic capacity to provide jobs (Demp-
ster and Hargrave 2017), as well as potential risks to national security if their
arrival prompts a security debate (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013).
Previous studies show how permeable borders make it easier for rebel groups
to infiltrate the path of refugees and allow them foreign sanctuary (Salehyan
2008b) and a chance to harness their resources to increase their bargaining power
(Bapat 2012). Governments respond in a variety of ways to securitize their bor-
ders and regulate cross-border flows. States construct physical barriers (Carter
and Poast 2017), promote non-assistance of migrants traveling “illegally” (such as
refusing to help migrants who fled by boat to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea)
(Heller and Pezzani 2016), and participate in peacekeeping missions to stabilize
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conflict areas to stem refugee flows (Uzonyi 2015).
Upon the arrival of refugees, two narratives emerge about how they fit into
their host societies. An “inclusion narrative” typically frames immigrants as ben-
eficial for destination societies. An example of a government promoting inte-
gration comes from Malaysia, where Filipinos are encouraged to immigrate in
order to change demographic and political control toward Malay-Muslim parties
(Sadiq 2005). Another is the return migration of Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian
refugees, with hopes to rebuild trust after the civil wars. The “exclusion narrative
”argues immigrants are invading, will degrade the nation, and expose the coun-
try to violent instability. This narrative tries to invoke fear to promote pessimistic
assessments of immigration in order to prioritize security (Pearlman 2013). Ex-
amples include some discussions of Mexican and Central American immigrants
in the United States, Somali refugees in Kenya, Syrian and North African asylum-
seekers in European states, and the Rohingya in Bangladesh.
More often than not, inclusion and exclusion narratives occur simultaneously
within a country, with ongoing debates on how to deal with immigrants being
a contentious issue. For instance, Blacks and Latinos are more likely than White
Americans to think American “identity” is defined by assimilation while still be-
ing allowed to maintain ancestral cultural traditions (Schildkraut 2011). Returning
to the example of Germany that was mentioned in the introduction, awarding over
a million Syrians asylum status was not a popular decision with many German
citizens. Rather, it was Chancellor Angela Merkel and the majority of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union party’s decision to grant displaced Syrians with refugee
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status by framing the response as a humanitarian policy.
Regardless of the narratives being used by governments and publics alike, im-
migrants generally face adversity when integrating into their host country, mainly
due to discriminatory policies (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). The crafting of refugee
narratives tends to grow out of government debate while also being bolstered by
how the general population perceives migrants. Studies argue this is often driven
by reliefs regarding a “symbolic threat” immigrants pose to the fabric of a na-
tion because as foreigners, they are inherently perceived as an out-group (Citrin,
Reingold, and Green 1990; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The “threat” trans-
lates to a higher propensity for domestic populations to discriminate against im-
migrants economically, politically, and socially (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016;
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013). The media promotes the “threat” by portray-
ing immigrants as undocumented illegals, or even aliens, detainees, and engaged
in low-skilled activities even though that is often inconsistent with actual immi-
grant demographics (Farris and Mohamed 2018).
The case of forced migrants, in particular refugees, adds a wrinkle into this
debate of exclusion. Refugees, a subset of immigrants, are defined as “A person
who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
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to it” (UNHCR 1967). Being a refugee is inherently “othering,” since they hold
citizenship from another country yet exist in a host nation as an out-group, often
requiring aid and assistance (Zetter 2007). Permanent residents of the host state
may be more willing to tolerate refugees because they are “deserving” of assis-
tance and sanctuary since they are fleeing violence and persecution (Sales 2002;
van Oorschot 2006; Petersen 2012).
From a normative perspective, countries often feel obligated to accept refugees
in order to comply with international human rights norms and laws (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998). While some governments ratify human rights treaties only
as a front for compliance, the legitimacy of human rights regimes is reinforced
with strong global civil society (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Murdie and
Bhasin 2011). Taking in refugees falls under this broader normative support for
the legitimacy of the international human rights regime. While the ratification of
human rights treaties has been found to have no effect on changing respect for
physical integrity rights (Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005), accepting refugees is
one way states can espouse adherence to the human rights norm.
Domestic populations are more likely to support hosting refugees if they share
ethnic ties (Kaufman 2015; Getmansky, Sınmazdemir, and Zeitzoff 2018), have
close contact with refugees (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019), or empathize
with their situation by previously experiencing conflict and displacement (Hart-
man and Morse 2018). Powerful images invoking emotion lead individuals to
boost their support for refugees, though this tends to be a short-lived effect (Feld-
man et al. 2017). As refugees remain in host countries for a long time, public
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attitudes toward hosting them become more likely to sour, with citizens resenting
refugees for overstaying their welcome. This is the case in Lebanon, where Syrian
refugees were at first welcomed but, over time, the Lebanese have become less
hospitable (Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). Thus, while refugees are often seen as
an out-group in a host state, domestic populations are capable of being inclusive
due to the plight of the situation, at least for a short period of time.
While the experiences of refugees invoke empathy toward their situation,
refugees fleeing civil wars, specifically, are sometimes understood to open the
pathway for negative security externalities to become associated with the arrival
in a host state (Whitaker 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Non-state actors,
such as terrorist organizations and rebel groups, can infiltrate refugee routes and
find entry into host countries (Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016; Braithwaite and Chu 2018).
Rebels engage in cross-border raids, which infringe on the sovereignty of the
host state (Salehyan 2008a) and generate negative attitudes among citizens to-
ward hosting these vulnerable populations (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019).
While refugees themselves are almost never the perpetrators of violence, they are
often scapegoated as the reason behind violence and insecurity in the host state
(Savun and Gineste 2019). Right-wing and anti-immigration parties are known to
capitalize on this association and politicize the issue of hosting refugees as one of
national security.
When refugees are negatively linked to national security, some political elites
and parts of the domestic population are less sympathetic to the necessity of
providing sanctuary for refugees and are more inclined to change their attitudes
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toward being exclusionary. In an experimental survey of U.S. citizens, Adida,
Lo, and Platas (2017) find the influence of an “empathy” frame fosters positive
attitudes toward refugees but is heavily mediated by partisanship. Attacks and
protests against refugees by host state residents escalate when refugees are linked
to security issues (Bencˇek and Strasheim 2016). This could push moderate po-
litical elites to change their view about providing sanctuary for asylum seekers.
Even though refugees are forcibly displaced from their homes, they are often
characterized by political elites as only slightly more positively than a voluntary
migrant. This is especially the case when the terms “refugees,” “asylum seekers,”
and “(im)migrants,” are conflated and when, regardless of the circumstances, im-
migrants are labeled as entering “illegally.” Such was the case with reports about
the asylum seeker caravan of individuals from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Sal-
vador attempting to enter the United States (Schrank 2018).
Another context in which citizens greater harbor resentment toward refugees,
and subsequently pressure political actors to change refugee policy, concerns eco-
nomic crises in the host country. Under these conditions, citizens of the host
country develop grievances concnering refugees because of increased competition
for scarce resources (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Refugees
can create or exacerbate scarcity problems because of the need to house and feed
these additional people, which accelerates competition in areas that already have
limited access to resources (Martin 2005). Resources provided to refugees can
also include welfare assistance, often a system already under pressure, which
becomes even more strained when taking in refugees (McCarty 2013). In Su-
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dan, refugees were seen as a burden following an economic recession and relief
agencies were criticized for prioritizing refugees over citizens of the host country
(Ek and Karadawi 1991). However, when host countries are relatively wealthy
and lack economic problems, refugees are less likely to be perceived as a bur-
den (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Even though refugees can have many positive
benefits for the host country (Jacobsen 2002; Adamson 2006), refugees and asy-
lum seekers are often viewed as threats to economic and national security, rather
than a vulnerable population deserving of assistance from host governments and
populations (Messari and van der Klaauw 2010).
Existing scholarship on refugees and their association with instability tends to
treat all refugee populations as being equivalent and failing to consider whether
variation in the characteristics of refugees might impact how a host government
reacts. Most studies focus on characteristics of the host country and its ability
to finance the infrastructure needed to house refugees in order to negate any ill-
will fostered among citizens who want to exclude refugees (Wright and Moorthy
2018). Other work focused on host state characteristics considers the permeability
of borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). On the other hand, characteristics of
the sending country, and especially the relationship between the host and origin
countries, is less explored. In particular, the context of hostility produced by an
interstate rivalry provides certain incentives for host states to find a way to embar-
rass their rival. The next section explores potential impacts of these relationships
further by using strategic interstate rivalries as a framework for how the host-
ing and treatment of refugees can be received and leveraged differently in host
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countries.
2.3 Strategic Interstate Rivalry, Foreign Policy Objectives, and
National Security
Interstate rivalries are defined by a longstanding competition between a pair of
states that are linked with a series of conflicts (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) or
perceived tensions and hostilities (Thompson 2001; Thompson and Dreyer 2011).3
In the context of a strategic rivalry, decision-makers in both states single out the
other as an enemy that poses an actual or potential military threat.4 Three con-
ditions are necessary for a strategic rivalry to exist: there must competition be-
tween the states, a perception of threat, and a beliefby each side that the other is
an enemy (Thompson 2001; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007).5 Due to the
perceived and actual enmity between the two states, there is a higher propensity
for strategic rivals to resort to military action to achieve their goals against one
another and they are less likely to be able to resolve their disputes at all because
of the heightened levels of mistrust.
Domestic political actors maintain rivalries by advocating for tougher stances
against their rival and punishing leaders who take a dovish position against them
3Prominent examples of strategic rivals are India and Pakistan, North and South Korea,
Ecuador and Peru, and Turkey and Greece.
4Another way to conceptualize rivalries is through a dispute-density method, where pairs of
states are considered rivals if they fight many times over a period of time (Bennett 1997; Diehl
and Goertz 2000). I utilize the strategic rivalry conceptualization because it takes into account that
states perceive the other as an enemy.
5For example, while Germany and France compete with one another for leadership in the
European Union, they do not perceive the other as a threat to their security.
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(Tir and Diehl 2002; Colaresi 2005). Beyond the observable militarized relation-
ship between the two countries, states involved in a strategic rivalry assume neg-
ative behavioral attributes towards the other, such as feelings of hostility toward
their counterpart that feeds into a “culture” of rivalry and shapes their inter-
actions (Thies 2001). The desire for vengeance clouds rational decision-making
processes and can lead to protract problems between state rivals (Colaresi, Rasler,
and Thompson 2007).
The context of a strategic rivalry heightens the awareness in both states of a
hostile “us” versus “them” dynamic. Strategic rivalries are viewed as a back-
ground condition shaping how these states interact with each other. Immigration
and refugee flows should be no exception in the context of a strategic rivalry,
meaning that relationships between host and origin countries matter heavily in
how migrants will be received at their destination country. For example, the nar-
rative of Cuban refugees in the United States centers around providing safe haven
for people suffering from an abusive, Communist regime (Barnett and Finnemore
2004; Bier 2016). In the United States, Cuban immigrants are often able to start
anew in a supportive and democratic environment free of persecution. Alterna-
tively, asylum seekers fleeing violence in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala
who end up in the United States are barraged with a media campaign high-
lighting the risk involved with accepting immigrants and the resultant promotion
and implementation of an “aggressive deterrence strategy” that involved building
more detention centers and an upsurge of deportations (Hiskey et al. 2016). Fur-
thermore, refugees fleeing violence in Central America are often framed as illegal
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immigrants that are taking over employment opportunities from United States cit-
izens and threatens national security, rather than asylum seekers hoping to find
international protection in the United States (Winders 2007; Camarota 2015).
Another group in the United States juxtaposed with Cubans are Haitians. Dur-
ing the violence and unrest in Haiti in the 1990s, many sought asylum in the
United States yet most were turned away. Again, this is in contrast with Cuban
refugees, who are overwhelmingly welcomed in the United States. Additionally,
Haitians entering the United States were framed as economic migrants, rather
than fleeing political persecution, making it more difficult for them to integrate
because they were seen as posing a threat to economic security. Due to the strate-
gic rivalry between the United States and Cuba, Cuban refugees are welcomed.
Refugees from other states, however, are excluded.
Therefore, strategic rivalries provides a useful frame to potentially cast immi-
grants or refugees from a rival country in a better light. With regard to refugees,
Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) find host countries receive more refugees from a
rival country than a non-rival. They argue accepting refugees from a rival is a
proxy mechanism by which rival states can undermine the enemy regime. How-
ever, they do not explore the consequences for domestic policies and practices
upon the arrival of refugees. I argue accepting refugees from a rival country pro-
vides an opportunity for host countries to make their adversary look bad by being
hospitable to the exiled population. This benevolent treatment of refugees is likely
to correspond to an overall improvement in human rights practices in the country
as the host government seeks to further cements its superiority relative to their
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rival. The next section further explores on how receiving refugees changes gov-
ernment behavior and how this effect may be conditional upon whether refugees
arrive from a rival.
2.4 Relationship Between Refugees from Rival Countries and
Changes in Respect for Human Rights
In general, a rise in perceived domestic challenges encourages governments to
use repressive action to counter or eliminate a threat to the status quo (Davenport
2007). Repression is defined as “the actual or threatened use of physical sanc-
tions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of
the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring
specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to the government’s
personnel, practices, or institutions” (Davenport 2007). While the general public is
assumed to prefer the state to use other means besides repressive action in efforts
to address challenges and challengers (Ferejohn 1986; McFarland and Mathews
2005), this assumption does not always hold depending on domestic issues at the
time (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). Particularly, when citizens are intolerant toward
a certain group, they are more likely to support the suppression of (Hutchinson
2013). For example, American citizens support the government’s use of torture
when it is directed at individuals perceived to be guilty of committing crimes of
terrorism (Conrad et al. 2018). The context of the crisis linked to immigration
issues influences how the public ultimately evaluates the situation (Tomz 2007;
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Davies and Johns 2013). Citizens may also elect right-wing, anti-immigration par-
ties, who are more likely to be restrictive. For instance, the right-wing Alternative
for Germany (AFD) party made strong gains in German state elections in 2016
after Merkel announced Germany would take in a larger proportion of refugees
compared to other states in the European Union.
A response by the government toward immigration issues intensifies when
refugee issues are politically salient and when their arrival is associated with
security issues in the state (Warziniack 2013; Zimmerer 2014). For example, Pak-
istani officials increasingly extorted and harassed Afghan refugees ever since the
terrorist group Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (the “Pakistani Taliban”) attacked an
Army Public School in Peshawar at the end of 2014 (Human Rights Watch 2015b).
However, this could have been an opportunity to re-frame the domestic issues sur-
rounding the lack of freedom and fairness in the 2013 elections because Islamic
terrorist organizations, such as Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, that instilled fear in
the electorate (Jalal 2014). As domestic unrest tends to breed repression by the
government (Moore 2000; Carey 2006; Davenport 2007; Franklin 2008; Pierskalla
2010), the arrival of refugees is often seen as a threat by domestic populations
and pressure mounts on the government to take action. Indeed, as the number
of refugees grows, the government is more likely to decrease respect for human
rights (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Wright and Moorthy 2018).
However, we might expect that the relationship between governments of the
host and the origin country of refugees alters the likelihood that host govern-
ments will engage in repression. Domestic audiences oppose governments coop-
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erating with the state’s rival (Colaresi 2004). Therefore, hosting refugees from a
rival allows host governments behave uncooperatively against their rival by ac-
knowledging individuals are fleeing an abusive regime, and that the host is more
capable of providing secure conditions. In turn, an overall improvement in re-
spect for human rights is expected since the host country wants to be seen as
being hospitable to its rival–and perhaps to the broader international community
as well, to improve its reputation and further discredit its rival in the international
system. In other words, the arrival of refugees from a rival country provides an
opportunity for the host state to use improved human rights practices as a way to
achieve foreign policy goals against their interstate adversary.
Increasing respect for human rights is not the only policy option governments
adopt to undermine their rival. Salehyan (2009) discusses how states involved
with a rival experiencing civil conflict are likely to host refugees produced by the
conflict, foster an alliance and grant external support to the rebel group fighting
their enemy, and provide safe havens for rebels within their territories so the rival
state cannot access them easily. Salehyan argues rivals adopt these militariza-
tion activities to pursue the foreign policy goal of destabilizing their opponents
without engaging in direct militarized conflict.
There are other options besyond indirect military action that are open to gov-
ernments who are in a strategic rivalry situation. A host government will alter
actions domestically as a means to embarrass their rivals in a form of “soft power”
foreign policy action (Nye 2004). Broadly speaking, there is a substitution of direct
military action against their rival for soft policy action that helps the state achieve
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their goals (Most and Starr 1984; Morgan and Palmer 2000). Essentially, accepting
refugees from their rival is a “soft power” policy where the host is acknowledg-
ing their adversary is engaging in oppressive behavior. The host government’s
willingness to provide sanctuary to those fleeing highlights the failure of their
rival government to legitimately protect and provide a safe environment for its
citizens (Haddad 2008). The public nature of refugee flows also makes it easy
for governments to openly discredit their rival regime (Teitelbaum 1984; Loescher
1994).
Therefore, when a country takes in refugees from a rival country, the host state
will seek to promote hospitable policies and minimize repressive actions, which
should also e received well by the international human rights community. This
will be observable as a boost in respect for human rights.6
As an example of this logic, Ethiopia takes in many refugees from rival Eritrea.
The history between the two states is riddled with turmoil, rooted in the history
of decades of conflict with Eritrean rebels fighting to secede from Ethiopia. In
spite of this violent history, the Ethiopian government started self-sufficiency and
skill-building programs for Eritrean refugees within its borders (Fleming 2013).
The government’s actions toward Eritrean refugees were praised by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Anto´nio Guterres. Such practices have corresponded
6These practices are captured in The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. State
Department and The State of the World’s Human Rights Reports by Amnesty International, both
published annually. These reports have a section on refugee and migrant rights in these states,
which is then quantified in overall respect for human rights scores. Therefore, these reports do
indeed reflect how refugees and migrants are treated within the country and will accordingly
be reflected in the overall score. See (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014) for information on how
the latent variable model was developed and (Fariss 2018) for detailed information on how these
reports are used to generate the latent variable.
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to improved respect for human rights in Ethiopia more broadly. These efforts and
the government’s willingness to cooperate with the UNHCR was documented
in the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in
Ethiopia: “The government generally cooperated with the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees...During the year the government, in cooperation with UNHCR, opened
two new refugee camps: Sheder, northeast of the town of Jijiga and My Ayni,
in Tigray National Regional State, to accommodate up to 10,000 new Eritrean
refugees.” (U.S. State Department 2008). This leads to the following expectation:
Hypothesis 1 A state is more likely to increase respect for human rights upon accepting
refugees from a rival country.
Conversely, the arrival of refugees from a non-rival state is expected to be
associated with more abusive behavior by the host government. This is because
the absence of a strategic rivalry does not provide a context where the host state
has incentives to respect human rights as a way to help achieve a foreign policy
objective. As discussed earlier, the presence of refugees increases the likelihood
of resource scarcity, can be associated with political instability such as civil war
and terrorism, and therefore can inspire feelings of fear and increased nationalism
among the domestic populace. Even if refugees garner some empathy from host
state citizens, the rise and political salience of refugee issues will likely prompt
individuals to be less accepting toward refugees (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2017). This
fosters xenophobic attitudes by domestic populations because of the perceived
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threat associated with the arrival of refugees (Zhou 2018). Political intolerance
reinforces support for the suppression of rights (Hutchinson 2013). This promotes
nationalism, which subsequently augments human rights violations, especially in
partial democracies (Yazici 2018). With refugees from rivals, the strides taken
by host countries to accommodate the displaced are converted to an increase in
respect for rights. On the other hand, refugees from non-rivals lead to more
xenophobic behavior and promotion of support for the suppression of rights.
An example comes from refugee crises in Kenya and Somalia, who are not
considered strategic rivals.7 The Dadaab Refugee Camp located in Dadaab,
Kenya was one of several refugee camps established in the 1990s to house So-
mali refugees. Kenya took in many Somali refugees with few returning home
because of continued violence in their home country (Hujale 2016). Subsequently,
an uptick in terrorist attacks in Kenya was linked to the inflow of refugees, which
lead the Kenyan government to close the Kenya-Somali border as a security mea-
sure (Kiama and Karanja 2013). The heightened insecurity experienced in Kenya
associated with refugee flows created a political shock and an elevation in abuses
of human rights. Physical integrity rights of refugees were repeatedly violated
due to killings and rape by government security forces and police officers (U.S.
State Department 2010). The same report also documented “The refugee influx
and security threats emanating from Somalia, particularly those associated with
the Dadaab refugee camps, severely strained the government’s ability to provide
7While Kenya is dealing with violence from Somalia, the perpetrators are non-state actors.
Thus, Kenya does not have a strategic rivalry with the government, rather an issue with violent
non-state groups.
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security, which impeded the efforts of the UNHCR and other humanitarian orga-
nizations to assist and protect refugees and asylum seekers.” The report highlights
the ways in which the government made it difficult for humanitarian organiza-
tions to operate within Kenya. At one point, the government “ordered the IOM
International Organization for Migration] to stop transporting refugees from the
border” (U.S. State Department 2010).
Moreover, the Dadaab camp implemented restrictive policies rendering
refugees unable to leave the encampment and subject to arrest, detention, or
expulsion if caught without special movement passes (Kerubo 2013). Because
Kenya and Somalia are not traditionally considered interstate rivals, there was no
opportunity for Kenya to gain key foreign policy benefits in terms of undermin-
ing Somalia’s government. Thus, the situation surrounding Somali refugees in
Kenya became one of exclusion narrative, human rights abuses, discrimination,
and securitizaton of borders that allowed for the an overall increase in repression
by the Kenyan government.
The perception that refugees are related to the insecurity within a country is
powerful and can permit the use of state repression. In a form of domestic di-
versionary conflict, governments can commit human rights abuses in the name
of protecting the state from an enemy within their border (Tir and Jasinski 2008).
Further, host governments do not have as many incentives to highlight hospitable
behavior toward refugees when they do not come from a rival. We should ex-
pect governments hosting refugees from a non-rival to decrease their respect for
human rights because they are more likely to face pressure to repress from their
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fearful, xenophobic populations while also lacking foreign policy incentives to
exercise restraint in their treatment of refugees.Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 A state is more likely to decrease respect for human rights upon accepting
refugees from a non-rival country.
2.5 Research Design
In the previous section, two testable hypotheses are derived suggesting a link
between refugees arriving from a rival or non-rival country and changes in re-
spect for human rights in the host state. In order to test this association, I build
a dataset with the host country-year as the unit of observation. All countries in
the Correlates of War state system list are included from 1990-2010 (Correlates of
War Project 2011). I limit the analyses to the post-Cold War for several reasons.
First, refugees during the Cold War tended to come from Communist countries,
while hosting countries were mostly democracies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
By the end of the Cold War, most refugees were those fleeing civil war and the
sheer scope of the refugee problem increased substantially (Barnett 2001a). Fur-
ther, refugees during the Cold War were more likely to be educated and skilled
whereas the post-Cold War refugees are often more poor and less educated, which
makes hosting these populations less desirable from the standpoint of the state
(Toft 2007). Since the end of the Cold War, potential host countries claim individu-
als are dishonestly trying to obtain refugee status and are not fleeing persecution
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(Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Rather, they are “economic migrants” are only flee-
ing in pursuit of economic opportunity (Neumayer 2005; Zetter 2007). In order
to account for these shifting dynamics, I only examine the post-Cold War period
since the population of refugees is qualitatively different from the population after
the Cold War.
The dependent variable for this analysis is the change in the host country’s
respect for human rights from the previous year. I use the Latent Human Rights
Protection Scores (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014), which includes information on
a state’s overall human rights practices derived from a variety of sources such as
annual human rights reported published by Amnesty International and the U.S.
State Department, quantitative indicators of repression such as the Political Ter-
ror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2014) and CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards, and
Clay 2014), as well as the increasing standard of accountability overtime in hu-
man rights (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014). The score is a continuous value
normalized around a mean of zero, with positive numbers indicating greater re-
spect for human rights and negative numbers meaning lower respect. While these
scores take into account a country’s overall respect for human rights, the country
reports used to generate the scores address refugee, asylum-seeker, and migrant
rights within the country. Therefore, these reports do indeed account for how a
state treats refugee populations within their borders. However, the latent score
does not disaggregate by different types of populations, which is why I discuss
a general change in the score.8 To account for the change in respect for human
8Further explanation of reports and where to access them online can be found in Appendix A.
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rights, I subtract the reported score of respect for human rights in yeart from the
score in yeart 1. Accordingly, change in respect for human rights is a continuous
variable, with higher values attributed to increased respect for human rights as
compared to the year before and lower values associated with decreased respect
as compared to the previous year. Since the dependent variable is continuous,
I run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. However, the time-series cross-
sectional format of the data requires methods that account for potential temporal
dependence. Therefore, I include panel corrected standard errors to address bias
that is introduced due to the structure of the data (Beck and Katz 1995).
My primary independent variable of interest is whether refugees are from a
rival country. Refugee data come from the UNHCR (2018b), which collects infor-
mation on the number of refugees in a host country and the country of origin.
The data include country of asylum and country of origin. I then determine
whether the host state and country of origin are considered strategic rivals as
defined by Thompson and Dreyer (2011). I use the Thompson and Dreyer (2011)
conceptualization because it defines rivalries as a perceived level of tension or
hostility between countries, which is an important facet of the presented rela-
tionship. They derive their list of strategic rivals based on qualitative accounts,
especially foreign policy histories of governments, belligerent public statements,
and acts of aggression between countries. This is in contrast with other measures
of rivalry, which denote two states as rivals only if they are if involved in a certain
number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) within a specified time amount
of time (Bennett 1997; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Refugees from Rival Countries
Observations Mean Number of Refugees Std. Dev.
Refugees from rival 556 144113.6 394077.7
Refugees from non-rival 2599 49396.86 148149.9
Refugees from rival only 30 526834 724779.6
Refugees from non-rival only 2073 41073.44 102151.1
Refugees from both 526 204485.4 455567.2
I then produce four variables to capture whether refugees came from a rival
state. The first two are dichotomous indicators of whether the state has refugees
from a rival or a non-rival, coded 1 if the host country took in refugees from
a rival or non-rival in a given year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The second
two variables are the logged number of refugees host countries take in from rival
and non-rival countries. Since these variables are not mutually exclusive because
states can host refugees from rivals and non-rivals simultaneously, I generate
categorical and continuous variables indicating whether a state took in refugees
exclusively from a rival, non-rival, or both, and how many refugees were accepted
in each of these contexts. The count of refugees is logged because of the right
skew of the data. Table 2.1 displays the number of observations in each category
along with the average and standard deviation of the non-transformed number of
refugees.
Control variables included in the analyses are based on findings from foun-
dational articles of cross-national studies of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994;
Hill and Jones 2014). All control variables are lagged by one year. I include
binary variables for whether or not the country of asylum is involved in an inter-
state or civil armed conflict, respectively, generating at least 25 battle deaths that
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year (Melander, Pettersson, and Themne´r 2016). Prior studies demonstrate a link
between higher levels of repression when a neighboring state is involved in an
intrastate conflict in order to stymie the threat of conflict contagion (Danneman
and Ritter 2014). I include a dichotomous indicator of whether a contiguous state
is involved in a civil conflict based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s def-
inition of a civil conflict (Melander, Pettersson, and Themne´r 2016). Contiguity
is measured as two states separated by a land or river border or separated by 12
miles of water or less (Correlates of War Project 2017; Stinnett et al. 2002). The
presence of Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) in other states can lead to the emer-
gence of rivalries with other states (Jenne 2014) as well as other domestic political
issues that can lead to armed conflict (Cederman et al. 2013). Most of these stud-
ies stress that these ethnic groups must be relevant in order to have an influence
in domestic politics of the host state as well as the choice of the country of asylum
(Ru¨egger and Bohnet 2018; Ru¨egger 2019). To account for this, I include a binary
variable indicating whether there are relevant TEK among the population of the
host state (Vogt et al. 2015).
Other standard control variables are the wealth and size of the host country
measured by logged GDP per capita and logged population (World Bank 2016).
Regime type is a strong determinant of levels of repression (Poe and Tate 1994;
Fein 1995; Davenport 2007), though typical indicators of regime type, such as a
country’s Polity score, are deemed an unfit measure of regime type with respect
to repression due to endogeneity concerns (Hill and Jones 2014). Constraints on
the chief executive are shown to be a better descriptive characteristic of democracy
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(Gleditsch and Ward 1997) than the aggregate 21-point Polity scale since some of
the other factors include repression systematically in its definition. Accordingly,
I use Polity’s executive constraints measure to capture the degree of democracy
in a country (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). Executive constraints is coded 1-7,
with 1 meaning the executive has unlimited authority and no limitations and a
7 translating to accountability groups having an effective authority equal to or
greater than the executive. Finally, since refugees tend to flee to countries with
better human rights records (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003), I include the host
country’s latent respect for human rights score from the year prior to observation.
Full summary statistics of these variables are found in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
2.6 Results
Table 2.2 presents findings from the panel corrected standard errors OLS models,
using the different operationalizations of whether host states take in refugees from
a rival or non-rival. When using a binary indicator (Model 1), accepting refugees
from a rival does not influence changes in respect for human rights. On the other
hand, taking in refugees from a non-rival is negatively associated with a decrease
in respect for human rights, though this is only statistically significant at the 0.1
level. Moving to Model 2, which uses the logged number of refugees, when a state
accepts more refugees from a rival, we see an increase in respect for human rights.
This is in support of Hypothesis 1, which anticipated this relationship because a
host state can capitalize on the opportunity to publicize their hospitably toward
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refugee populations while simultaneously undermining their rival by providing
sanctuary for displaced populations of their enemy.
The opposite relationship is observed with respect to refugees from non-rival
states. In both the binary (Model 1) and count (Model 2) operationalizations, a
country taking in refugees from a non-rival is more likely to experience a decrease
in respect for human rights the following year. This is in support of Hypothesis
2, which suggested the arrival of refugees will be met with skepticism and xeno-
phobia, which allows and even encourages host governments to increase human
rights abuses, particularly toward migrant populations. Futhermore, the absence
of an interstate rivalry means a host state does not have incentives to enact or
publicize hospitable behavior since there is no foreign policy objective to doing
so.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 2.2 include the results of mutually exclusive cate-
gories of taking in refugees from a rival, non-rival, or both, with the baseline
category as hosting no refugees. The relationship between rivalry and overall
respect for human rights holds even when taking into account states accepting
refugees from rivals. When taking in refugees solely from non-rivals, there is an
expected decrease in respect for human rights only when there are large numbers
of individuals entering the state. This could be due to a small inflow of refugees
not generating a backlash whereas a high number of refugees incurs domestic
debate about hosting. Interestingly, countries taking in refugees from both rivals
and non-rivals have no statistically significant effect, though this does not hold
for the binary indicator in Model 3. This could be because the effects of hosting
58
Table 2.2: Refugees from Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugees from Rival 0.0102 0.0018* - -
(0.0092) (0.0009)
Refugees from Non-rival -0.0128† -0.0025** - -
(0.0077) (0.0009)
Refugees from Rival Only - - 0.0698* 0.0052*
(0.0311) (0.0024)
Refugees from Non-rival Only - - -0.0087 -0.0019*
(0.0076) (0.0009)
Refugees from Both - - -0.0021 -0.0008
(0.0104) (0.0010)
Interstate Conflict -0.0459* -0.0518* -0.0447* -0.0446†
(0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0228) (0.0228)
Civil Conflict -0.0778*** -0.0786*** -0.0779*** -0.0780***
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0099** 0.0093** 0.0098** 0.0094**
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Population (logged) -0.0125*** -0.0105** -0.0126*** -0.0110**
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0038)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0062 -0.0054 -0.0065 -0.0056
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055)
TEK 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0009
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0097)
Executive Constraints 0.0122*** 0.0120*** 0.0123*** 0.0120***
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Respect for HRt 1 -0.0454*** -0.0438*** -0.0453*** -0.0442***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0084)
Constant 0.1339** 0.1110* 0.1332** 0.1170*
(0.0500) (0.0529) (0.0504) (0.0532)
N 3201 3201 3201 3201
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
from different countries are pulling the estimate in each direction, thus negating
any relationship between refugees and respect for human rights.
In order to depict the relationship observed in the coefficient results, Figure 2.1
displays the predicted change in respect for human rights based on the number
of refugees from a rival and non-rival country (results from Column 2). The
graph demonstrates the more refugees a country takes in from a rival, the more
likely the host government will increase respect for human rights overall. Further,
countries taking in refugees from a non-rival country experience a decrease in
general respect for human rights.
Almost all of the control variables behave the way the repression literature
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Figure 2.1: Predicted Change in Respect for Human Rights Given Strategic Rivalry
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predicts. Consistent with other studies, interstate and civil conflict are negatively
associated with respect for human rights (Young 2013; Hill and Jones 2014). Un-
expectedly, the wealth of a country decreases respect for human rights. The pop-
ulation of a country, whether a contiguous neighbor is experiencing civil conflict,9
and the presence of relevant TEK have no bearing on changes in respect for hu-
man rights in the following year.10 As the executive becomes more constrained,
respect for human rights is higher (Hill and Jones 2014). Finally, governments
with lower levels of respect for human rights in the year prior are more likely to
9Other contiguity specifications, such as expanding the water distance between countries, yield
similar regression results.
10These results are consistent with other TEK variables, such as a count of relevant TEK groups
and whether TEK is excluded in the host state.
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make a change for the better in the following year compared to states who already
score highly. One explanation for this finding is that countries with lower respect
for human rights have room to make improvements compared to other states that
regularly maintain high levels of respect for human rights.
2.7 Robustness Checks
There could be several alternative explanations for the observed relationship that
hosting refugees from a rival country leads to an increase in respect for human
rights and a decrease if refugees hail from a non-rival state. The first is contiguity.
The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries (Schmeidl 1997; Melander
and O¨berg 2006). For instance, more than half of the Afghan refugee population
resides in Pakistan, Kenya hosts the majority of Somali refugees, and Turkey,
Jordan, and Lebanon together host approximately 85% of the registered Syrian
refugee population. While some try to obtain asylum in countries farther away,
the bulk of refugees stay nearby because they lack resources to move further, they
want to maintain close contact with their home state, and they desire to return as
soon as possible (Schmeidl 1997; Crisp and Jacobsen 1998).11
With respect to interstate rivalries, most rivals also happen to be are neighbor-
ing countries. Because of their close proximity, neighboring dyads are prone to
iterative interactions that may develop into a hostile relationship. Since refugees
tend to flee next door, externalities of the civil war can follow them into the host
11The timing and number of returnees will be explored in the next two chapters of this disser-
tation.
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country through cross-border raids by non-state groups or hostile origin countries
(Salehyan 2008a).
Thus, it is unclear how contiguity influences the observed relationship be-
tween interstate rivalry, hosting refugees, and changes in respect for human
rights. Table 2.3 presents the results of OLS regressions with panel corrected
standard errors that take into account whether states are neighbors from the Cor-
relates of War Direct Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War Project 2017; Stinnett
et al. 2002). In Model 5, estimates show that whether refugees arrive from a neigh-
boring country or further afield do not influence human rights abuses from the
previous year. When accounting for how many refugees a state accepts, more
refugees from a non-contiguous country leads to a decrease in respect for human
rights whereas refugees from a neighboring state holds no association (Model 6).
Thus, being neighbors with a refugee-producing country does not hold any
strong association with changes in respect for human rights. On the other hand,
as countries host more refugees from a non-neighboring country, it becomes more
likely that the host a state will decrease respect for human rights. A potential
explanation for this correlation is refugees from further afield are considered more
foreign to the host country whereas refugees from a neighbor are more likely to
be a known population. For instance, the fervor of the European refugee crisis
in 2015 could be because the Syrian civil war, located far away, was displacing
vast numbers of civilians to countries where they do not have much contact or
cultural similarity with the state. Turkey, neighbor to Syria, initially supported
hosting Syrians with claims they were their “Muslim brothers” who needed their
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Table 2.3: Refugees from Contiguous States & Strategic Rivals on Changes in
Respect for HR
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugees from Contig. -0.0075 -0.0001 - -
(0.0088) (0.0009)
Refugees from Non-contig. 0.0068 -0.0018* - -
(0.0073) (0.0007)
Refugees from Rival, Contig. - - 0.0112 0.0019*
(0.0095) (0.0009)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig. - - -0.0247 -0.0023
(0.0153) (0.0021)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig. - - -0.0097 -0.0010
(0.0083) (0.0010)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig. - - 0.0072 -0.0015*
(0.0071) (0.0007)
Interstate Conflict -0.04086† -0.03756† -0.0472* -0.0499*
(0.0224) (0.0218) (0.0234) (0.0239)
Civil Conflict -0.0760*** -0.0770*** -0.0754*** -0.0783***
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0131)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0100** 0.0105** 0.0097** 0.0097**
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Population (logged) -0.0136*** -0.0109** -0.0131*** -0.0109**
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0030 -0.0055 -0.0033 -0.0049
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0060)
TEK -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0015
(0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0095)
Executive Constraints 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0125*** 0.0124***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Respect for HRt 1 -0.0462*** -0.0444*** -0.0452*** -0.0438***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086)
Constant 0.1415** 0.1046* 0.1326** 0.1084*
(0.0495) (0.0498) (0.0488) (0.0492)
N 3201 3201 3201 3201
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
help. Future research could tease out these relationships in more detail.
Turning to the next two models, I code whether refugees came from a ri-
val and/or a contiguous state. Model 7 operationalizes these distinctions cat-
egorically whereas Model 8 examines the logged number of refugees that fall
under these categories. The results reveal interesting patterns. First, the associ-
ation between refugees from a rival state and an increase in respect for human
rights seems to be driven by contiguous countries. With respect to non-rival
states, accepting any refugees from a contiguous country shows no discernible
pattern with changes in respect for human rights. However, when considering
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Change in Respect for HR Given Strategic Rivalry and Con-
tiguity
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the number of refugees in MOdel 8, we see that it is refugees from non-rival non-
contiguous states that are associated with a decline in respect for human rights,
similar to Model 6.
The predicted change in respect for human rights given the number of refugees
from rival and contiguous states is displayed in Figure 2.2. As the number of
refugees from a contiguous rival rise, the more likely we are to observe the host
state increasing respect for human rights in the subsequent year. The rest of the
categories show a decrease in respect for human rights in the host state when
more refugees arrive. These findings suggest the contiguous nature of a strategic
rivalry translates to fewer human rights violations. Absent this context, the arrival
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of refugees, especially in larger numbers and from non-contiguous countries, is
associated with a decrease in respect for human rights.
I also run a series of robustness checks that examine different specifications
of the dependent variable. The first is using the absolute human rights scores,
rather than changes in respect. Tables A.2 and A.3 of Appendix A display results
of models where the dependent variable is respect for human rights in year t
and includes a lagged dependent variable in the list of covariates. The coefficient
estimates are similar to the main results.
Next, I expand the window of time for changes in respect for human rights.
Only examining changes from one year to the next could be too narrow of a win-
dow to produce meaningful alterations in human rights practices. I re-estimate
the regressions using dependent variables accounting for changes in respect for
human rights in a 3- and 5-year windows. The regression results can be found
in Appendix A, with Tables A.4 and A.5 for the changes in 3 years and Tables
A.6 and A.7 for changes over 5 years. The results corroborate the findings of
the main results. Even when expanding the time frame, refugees from rival states
are associated with an increase in respect for human rights whereas refugees from
non-rival states lead host states to be more likely to abuse human rights. Refugees
from neighboring countries do not have an influence on respect for human rights
unless they arrive in large numbers from non-neighboring states. Finally, it is the
context of refugees from neighboring rival states that lead host countries to re-
spect human rights more, whereas refugees from non-contiguous rival states and
refugees from non-rival states lead to a decline in respect.
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The final robustness check concerns the rivalry indicator. In the main results,
I specifically use Thompson and Dreyer’s strategic rivalry because it captures
the perception of threat, not just the number of militarized interactions between
states. I also re-run the models using Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) specifica-
tion of interstate rivalry. Their conceptualization of rivalry consists of four di-
mensions: spatial consistency, duration, militarized competitiveness, and linked
conflict. Since the data ends in 2001, the sample is restricted to this year and may
not be directly comparable to the main findings. The results of these models are
found in Tables A.9 and A.10 of Appendix A.
The results of the models using the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) concep-
tualization of rivalry are not consistent with the main results presented in this
chapter. While in some models the distinction leads to similar patterns as the
main results, it is not consistent. Even when accounting for contiguity, there is
no meaningful statistical relationship between hosting refugees and respect for
human rights. This suggests the definition of rivalry matters for the association
between taking in refugees from a rival and changes in respect for human rights.
Most likely, since Thompson and Dreyer (2011) rely on the perception and be-
lief that the other state is an enemy, and this belief is shared mutually between
both countries, rivalries are more emotionally triggering and well-known in their
conceptualization. Importantly, these rivalries are more likely to be be known
publicly, such that citizens support state actions This distinction is important be-
cause the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) conceptualization relies on frequent
military action in a period of time whereas states do not have to fight militarily to
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be considered rivals in Thompson and Dreyer (2011). Further, since each country
needs to perceive the other as a threat in Thompson and Dreyer’s specification
of rivalry, there can be instances where one country thinks the other is an enemy
whereas the other does not even if they are often engaged in militarized disputes.
Relating to the association with changes in respect for human rights given the
arrival of refugees, the goodwill of accepting refugees from a rival will only be
substantiated if both countries perceive the other as an enemy. Otherwise, there
is no incentive to capitalize on embarrassing the origin state by imporving respect
for human rights.
2.8 Conclusion
Most quantitative studies investigating the relationship between refugees and se-
curity tend to find that refugees are associated with a higher propensity for civil
conflict onset (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), one-sided violence against civilians
(Fisk 2018), and repression in the host state (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Wright
and Moorthy 2018). While other studies show that accepting refugees is beneficial
for the host in terms of political and economic gains (Jacobsen 2002; Cortes 2004;
Sadiq 2005; Adamson 2006), they tend to address specific cases that are not always
generalizable to other situations. The findings of this study advance our knowl-
edge regarding how human rights practices in host states are impacted by the
arrival of refugees. Namely, accepting refugees from a strategic rival provides an
incentive to boast about humanitarian practices toward these populations, which
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can also garner good-will from the international community and are documented
in human rights reports.
I find that the arrival of refugees from a rival state leads to boasting of good
behavior by host governments because they are accommodating refugees. In this
context, the government has an incentive to highlight their humanitarian action
because there is a foreign policy objective to undermine their adversary and
project their hospitality to the international community. By accepting refugees
from their strategic rival, host states are able to tarnish the reputation of their
adversary by highlight that their enemy is unable to protect its own citizens. This
may also lead to the host state being more active in procuring funds from aid or-
ganizations and a productive working relationship with the UNHCR in order to
implement assistance programs. While this was not directly tested in this chapter,
future work can investigate whether and how some countries are more successful
at obtaining monetary and institutional support or whether the host state pro-
vides more of its own resources for hosting refugees . This would be especially
interesting over time when refugee situations become protracted and funds be-
come limited.
On the other hand, refugees from a non-rival state are met with a decrease
in respect for human rights. This is likely linked to the traditional theories of
immigration that expect a response of xenophobia and discrimination because
refugees pose a “threat” as an inherent out-group. While refugees are often con-
sidered more “deserving” than regular migrants for sanctuary, their arrival can
be associated with negative security externalities. This subjects host countries to
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implement policies designed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum within
their borders or to incentivize repatriation. Across the globe, this is witnessed
through closures of border crossings in Europe, the attempt to close down the
Dadaab camp in Kenya, de-funding assistance to refugees in Lebanon, and im-
plementing quotas on how many individuals are awarded refugee status in the
United Kingdom and United States. These actions contribute to a negative im-
pact on a country’s respect for human rights since governments are deliberately
enforcing measures to keep individuals out of their country.
This negative relationship between refugees and respect for human rights is
most pronounced when refugees arrive from a non-contiguous country. A simple
explanation is that refugees or immigrants from further away are more likely to be
“incompatible” with the national culture in the host state. Domestic populations
of the host state are more likely to view refugees as intruders when refugees are
seen as being more culturally and socially “distant” (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort
2016). For instance, refugees from the Middle East and Africa hoping to make
it to Europe are often treated with disdain and met with “non-assistance” poli-
cies by potential host states (Heller and Pezzani 2016). Policies toward refugees
are crafted under a framework of security, which can lead to more violations of
human rights by the government. This is reflected in the statistical relationship
found in the results.
How host governments promote their own behavior toward accepting or deny-
ing displaced populations is clearly being picked up by human rights monitors.
States certainly have strong motivations to vocalize good behavior toward the
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exiled population of their rival, which is observed as cooperative and positive
behavior. Since governments have the foreign policy goal of undermining their
rival, the government will purposefully act and broadcast this behavior. Con-
versely, states without such a foreign policy objective in mind must consider the
costs associated with hosting refugees and will act in their self-interest, which
tends to be characterized as xenophobic.
Another ramification is understanding the complexities of refugee burden
sharing. The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries, yet it seems
states farther away tend to enforce tough policies barring immigrants from en-
tering and are able to get away with it. In particular, countries farther away from
conflict regions (i.e. Western states) tend to have strict and long bureaucratic
vetting processes that may not grant asylum to the whole family. On the other
hand, countries within a region experiencing violence are less capable of control-
ling cross-border flows and are the states hosting most refugees. For instance,
Kenya announced they would close the Dadaab camp but after a backlash and
a Supreme Court ruling, Dadaab kept the doors open. On the other hand, poli-
cies like the United State’s “travel ban” are adopted to keep the already limited
number of refugees from entering.12
While there are exceptions, such as Canada and Germany who promote their
open border policy and increase their asylum seeker quota, there is domestic
12In the next chapter of the dissertation, I show how, since the end of the Cold War, 356 million
people are or have been refugees. The majority of these individuals remained in host states, with
27 million refugees repatriating to their country of origin and only 3 million refugees resettled to
a third country. Note third-country resettlement is the main avenue for refugees to be granted
asylum in developed Western nations, such as the United States.
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backlash to these stances. Right-wing anti-immigrant parties are collecting more
of the vote share in these countries in response to their federal government’s
stance. While out of the scope of this chapter, future work can examine the
variation in host government’s policies—and how this changes given inflows of
refugees—and the reasons behind this variation.
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Chapter 3
MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF REFUGEE
RETURN
3.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of people who fled conflict and perse-
cution and were forced to live elsewhere jumped from approximately 10 million
to over 62 million individuals in 2018 (UNHCR 2018b).1 Due to ongoing conflicts
in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin, the rate of
displacement since the 2010s is the largest since the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began recording these statistics in 1960. In 2014,
24 people were forced to flee their homes every minute—four times the rate in the
2000s (UNHCR Global Trends 2016).
Meanwhile, some refugees are returning to their country of origin under a
variety of circumstances. The UNHCR documents nearly 27 million refugees re-
turned to their country of origin, either on their own accord or through formal
repatriation programs (UNHCR 2018b). In doing so, individuals forfeit refugee
status and its accompanying international and legal protections. While the op-
tion of third-country resettlement exists, the bureaucratic process is slow, not all
1These figures take into account refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum-seekers.
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Figure 3.1: Ratio of Individuals who Return or Resettle in a Third Country to
Refugee Stocks
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family members may be granted this option, and it is highly selective. From
1989-2016, only a little over 3 million refugees were resettled. Figure 3.1 plots the
ratio of individuals who returned to their country of origin or resettled in a third
country to refugee populations in this time span. These numbers illustrate that
resettlement in a third-country is a highly unlikely option for refugees. On the
other hand, return is a more likely alternative for refugees who do not remain in
their host country.
Refugee status is only a snapshot of the process of displacement. Obtaining
refugee status is considered temporary protection until conditions in the country
of origin are favorable enough for refugees to be returned, according to the Hand-
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book on Repatriation and Reintegration (UNHCR 2004). To return refugees prior
to improvement in conditions at home would constitute refoulement—a violation
of international refugee law. Yet, countries hosting refugees are over-burdened
with this task (Hynie 2018). While the UNHCR is sent into host countries to
help alleviate the strain, the organization lacks the funds to properly manage
refugee situations sufficiently (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As refugee situa-
tions become protracted, resources aiding refugees dwindle, third-country reset-
tlement options prove to be unlikely, and domestic politics and citizen attitudes
in host countries grow increasingly xenophobic. In short, remaining in the host
state often grows harder for refugees every day.2 Additionally, surveys show
that refugees overwhelmingly prefer to return to their country of origin at some
point rather than stay in asylum forever (Koser 1997; Berlin Social Science Center
2015; Bohnet 2016; Alsharabati and Nammour 2017). Given all of these factors—
international protection but lack of resources and increasingly negative views of
refugees in host countries—we must ask the same questions refugees ask them-
selves: how and when does return become most likely?
This chapter contributes to our understanding of displacement by identifying
under what conditions refugees are returning to their countries of origin. Cur-
rently, there is little systematic research regarding when repatriation or return
2For instance, Lebanon, the country with the highest ratio of Syrian refugees to native citizens,
is no longer allowing Syrians who have entered since October 2015 to obtain refugee status. The
UNHCR in Lebanon lacks the resources to provide basic aid provisions, including food, to regis-
tered Syrian refugees in the country, let alone those in the country that do not have refugee status.
Moreover, citizen support for hosting refugees has declined. While initially empathetic to Syrians
at the beginning of the war, over time, Lebanese citizens have hardened their beliefs and think
refugees have overstayed their welcome (Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018).
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migration happens. Existing scholarship focuses on when and under what con-
texts forced displacement occurs (Clark 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Davenport, Moore,
and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013), the destinations of
where individuals flee (Day and White 2002; Neumayer 2004; Moore and Shell-
man 2007; Ru¨egger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and Chadefaux 2019), and the
impacts refugee populations have on host countries and their citizens (Ek and
Karadawi 1991; Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002; Cortes 2004; Adamson 2006; Sale-
hyan and Gleditsch 2006; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn, Braithwaite, and
Chu 2019; Braithwaite et al. 2019). Building upon the body of work on the de-
terminants of forced displacement, I account for political, economic, and security
conditions in the host and origin countries. Unlike these studies, however, I con-
tend host and origin countries cannot be examined as equals; origin countries
will almost always be deficient in terms of conventional macro-level indicators of
political, economic, and security. Instead, I argue positive changes in the circum-
stances in refugees’ country of origin and negative shifts in the host state will lead
to an increase in the likelihood and number of refugees who return.
Using data from the UNCHR on refugee returns since the end of the Cold
War, empirical assessments suggest building a theoretical and empirical model
of refugee return must take into account political, economic, and physical secu-
rity conditions in both the host and origin state. Furthermore, refugee return
movement seems to be most sensitive to physical security conditions in host and
origin states, with civil conflict in the host pushing refugees out and ongoing civil
conflict in the origin state deterring return. As refugee return continues to be a
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salient question with respect to the current forced displacement crisis, this study
provides an important foundation in explaining patterns of return and how to
best serve these populations in the future.
3.2 Phases of Refugee Displacement
3.2.1 Forced Displacement
There are four phases of involuntary migration: initial flight, resettlement in asy-
lum, repatriation home, and reintegration after return (Bascom 2002).3 The aca-
demic literature mostly focuses on initial flight and resettlement in asylum. Stud-
ies on forced displacement utilize theories of economic migration that take a ra-
tional actor approach in the decision to emigrate. They assume individuals have
agency, which involves the capacity to reflect on their current position, devise
strategies, and take action to achieve their desires (Bakewell 2010). While theories
of economic migration assume an individual has time to come to a decision, in
regards to forced displacement, people often need to make a quick decision to
flee in hopes the destination is safer than if they stayed (Schon 2019).
Factors influencing the decision to flee are well covered in the literature. Peo-
ple leave their homes and become displaced when they feel they are in physical
danger (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003). Schmeidl (1997) finds that civil wars
with foreign military intervention are more likely to produce large and prolonged
refugee migrations and that ethnic rebellions cause smaller flows rather than mass
3While these phases are helpful in conceptualizing stages of involuntary migration, it should
be noted that not every displaced person goes through all steps.
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exoduses. Moore and Shellman (2006) uncover that refugee flows are greater than
the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) when there is state-sponsored
genocide/politicide than during other forms of armed violence. Other factors
influencing whether people are internally or externally displaced depend on the
geographic distance of another country (Moore and Shellman 2007) and existence
and size of transnational ethnic kin in another state (Cederman, Girardin, and
Gleditsch 2009; Ru¨egger and Bohnet 2018), which both speak to the relative ease
of deciding to stay versus flee.
3.2.2 Repatriation and Return Migration
As compared to studies of initial displacement, there are fewer systematic as-
sessments considering when refugees return to their country of origin. Instead,
academics and policymakers who discuss repatriation typically evaluate how the
return of refugees is an imperfect process that requires more attention from host
states and the UNHCR (Chimni 2004; Loizides and Antoniades 2009; Bradley
2013). During the Cold War, resettlement in a third country was more common
and accepted because the environment of bipolarity made it a political slight to
return refugees back to communist countries, the volume of refugee flows was
smaller, and refugees tended to be more skilled and educated (Loescher 2001;
Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin et al. 2005; Toft 2007). Since the end of the
1980s, refugee flows are growing in size and predominantly come from less de-
veloped countries, which leads many in host states to believe that refugees are
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less likely to contribute to the host society, ultimately deterring many countries
from devoting effort and resources toward accommodating the displaced (Bradley
2013). The few who are granted permanent resettlement tend to be more skilled
and educated than their counterparts (McSpadden 2004).
As a result, repatriation is encouraged as the preferred solution for refugee
problems. In fact, the UNHCR declared the 1990s to be the “decade of repa-
triation” (Hammerstad 2000). This shift away from third-country resettlement
and host integration is heavily criticized, with claims that repatriation is eroding
rights of asylum, preventing refugees from accessing safety in wealthy democra-
cies, and states’ self-interests are motivating a seemingly unhumanitarian policy
(Barnett 2001a; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011). Yet, as
discussed in the previous paragraph, hosting states do not find it in their self-
interest to host refugees (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). This leads to the expec-
tation, that, in general, host states will prefer to return refugees.
International law dictates four preconditions for refugee return processes: (1)
there is a fundamental change of circumstances in the home country, (2) the deci-
sion to return is voluntary in nature, (3) a tripartite agreement is signed between
the origin state, host country, and the UNHCR, and (4) that the return process
happens in safety and dignity. However, repatriation in dignity and safety is
rarely what transpires in reality. As host states are demanding refugees leave as
soon as possible, the UNHCR is pressured to act (Barnett 2001b). Given wealth-
ier and more developed states are the major donors to the UNHCR (Zeager and
Bascom 1996), the organization is beholden to their demands and are unable to
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force these countries into accepting more refugees. While a “safe” return is less
likely, there are ethical challenges of refusing to help refugees return simply be-
cause they are returning to less than ideal conditions or to assist them regardless
because some help is better than none (Gerver 2016).4
While the budget and operations of the UNHCR have expanded since the
1990s to accommodate the shift in policy towards repatriation (Hammerstad
2000), the UNHCR is still under-resourced to provide adequately for refugees.
This leads to varying degrees of a “voluntary” return. A truly voluntary return is
when a refugee has full control of the decision to return or to stay permanently in
the host country. A less voluntary decision of return occurs when there are finan-
cial incentives, typically paid by the host country or an organization, that funds
their return or staying in the host country and risking forcible return at some
point in the future. Israel provided South Sudanese and Cote d’Ivorian refugees
with an ultimatum to return “voluntarily” with a stipend or face detention or
deportation without a stipend (Gerver 2014). Even though the South Sudanese
refugees were concerned about poverty, crime, and violence, they returned be-
cause of the threat of detention. The least voluntary type of return happens when
refugees are pushed to return by everything but the use of force, to the point that
they really have no choice in the matter (Black and Gent 2006), which some argue
is a form of refoulement (Chimni 1993; Hathaway and Neve 1997).5
4Activities of agencies can include facilitation, such as coordinating transportation and as-
sisting in documentation for return, or to directly promote return by encouraging refugees to
consider return as the viable solution to displacement, funding “go see” visits, and initiating local
reintegration programs (Bradley 2013). Yet, some agencies refuse to provide these services if they
believe conditions in the country of origin are not safe for their return (Gerver 2016).
5Refoulement is defined as the expulsion or return of a refugee to a place where her life or
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Collectively, the literature suggests that in practice, refugees are not returning
in accordance with international law and promoting repatriation as the solution
for refugee situations put refugees in danger. Additionally, the literature ascribes
normative assumptions that return must happen with safety and dignity. This
neglects whether refugees have agency and the necessity to return under condi-
tions prescribed by international law. In the next section, I develop expectations
on when refugee return is more likely using a push and pull framework of host
and origin states. Based on these factors, refugees, host states, and international
organizations are more likely to promote return when conditions in the origin
state are improving and deteriorating in the host state.
3.3 How Conditions in Origin and Host States are Associated
with Refugee Return
In considering what factors likely influence refugee return, I start where most
humanitarian observers, such as the UNHCR, would like to see with respect to
refugee repatriation. Current discussions emphasize the need for repatriation to
be conducted with accordance with the convention’s call for “safety” and “dig-
nity,” as well as a voluntary decision by refugees. In practice, this is a utopic and
optimistic view of the return process. While this would be ideal, most refugee re-
turns do not relect these dynamics in full (Barnett 2001b; Chimni 2004; Adelman
and Barkan 2011). However, this does not mean we should not examine when
freedom would be threatened and is prohibited by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
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refugee return patterns are more or less likely. The issue with focusing too much
on evaluating the process itself is that we may assume all refugees are coerced
to return when that might not be the case. We may be missing what observers
perceive as moments to push or pull refugees to return. Understanding what cues
host states, humanitarian organizations, and refugees observe to push return can
shift the focus towards providing policy recommendations for when to step in
and deter return.
A problem with the discussion on refugee return is the competing preferences
of actors dealing with refugee populations; this includes host states, international
humanitarian organizations, and, of course, the refugees themselves. Host states
differ in whether they accommodate refugees or not. Depending on these prefer-
ences, they treat refugees hospitably or find opportunities to decrease the number
of refugees within their borders. If they tend toward the latter, many promote
return because it is the preferred solution to protracted refugee situations (Ham-
merstad 2000; Long 2014).
Organizations serving displaced populations are charged with protecting
refugee rights and ensuring their safety. Since international legal norms of
conflict-induced migration are weak, accountability of and mechanisms to de-
ter malpractice by host states are lacking (Hathaway and Neve 1997; Hathaway
2007). This leads organizations, like the UNHCR, IOM, and other NGOs to resort
to advocacy and diplomatic tools to induce governments to provide protection for
refugees, to varying degrees of success (Robinson 1997; Martin 2012).
Normative practice assumes exile in a host state is inherently better than re-
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turning to their country of origin (Chimni 2004; Toft 2007; Adelman and Barkan
2011; Zimmermann 2012; Gerver 2016; Yahya 2018). However, this is not true
across all refugees. Survey data indicate 92% and 96% of Syrian refugees in Eu-
rope (Berlin Social Science Center 2015) and Lebanon (Alsharabati and Nammour
2017), respectively, would prefer to return at some point than naturalized in their
host country or resettled in a third-country. This is not specific to the Syrian
case. Other studies find similar patterns of Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-
Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva
2017), South Sudanese (Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black
2002; Black et al. 2004; Nalepa 2012). This includes a desire to return while con-
flict has not officially terminated in the country of origin (Stein and Cuny 1994;
Stein 1997; Koser 1997; Bohnet 2016; Lazareva 2016).
Taken together, there are competing and complementary viewpoints about the
situation of refugees and when return migration should be promoted and hap-
pen. Across these perspectives, a critical factor increasing the likelihood of return
is security. Security can be broken down into three broad categories identified
in the literature to matter deeply for forced migration: political, economic, and
physical (Bradley 2013; Ma and Chayavong 2017). At the micro-level, these factors
influence decisions about staying or leaving because of the direct impact on the
livelihoods of refugees. Host states and other observers involved with refugee
populations use these same factors to determine when they can facilitate return.
Security conditions cannot be discussed without understanding the circum-
stances in the host state as well as the country of origin. Borrowing from studies
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on voluntary and forced migration, I conceptualize patterns of return based on
a “push and pull” framework (Todaro 1969; Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Borjas
1989; Massey et al. 1998; Sassen 1988; Clark 1989; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo
1989; Weiner 1996; Schmeidl 1997; Massey 1999; Moore and Shellman 2004; Portes
and Rumbaut 2006; Bakewell 2010; Fussell 2012; Turkoglu and Chadefaux 2019).
This framework is useful in the context of refugee return for several reasons. First,
it does not suffer from a selection effect of only considering countries that already
produced refugees, as well as states that only produce returnees. Many refugees
still stay in host countries even if other refugees return. Therefore, only examining
cases where return happens will severely bias results. Second, push and pull fac-
tors highlight that refugees are influenced by conditions in origin and host states;
one cannot model refugee movements without the consideration of circumstances
in both places. This provides a more accurate depiction of the realities faced by
refugees in assessing the timing of return. Refugees residing in the same host
state, but from different origin countries, interpret their experiences and have
diverging aspirations because of the variance in their histories (Kvittingen et al.
2019). Similarly, refugees from the same conflict will have different experiences
compared to the state they settle in.
As with similar work on refugee flows, I conceptualize the number of refugees
who return to their country of origin as the aggregated observable implications
of the constrained choices of individuals deciding to move (Kunz 1973; Richmond
1988; Riddle and Buckley 1998; Van Hear 1998; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;
Neumayer 2004; Moore and Shellman 2007; Turkoglu and Chadefaux 2019). Us-
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ing Moore and Shellman (2007)’s cross-national analysis of refugee patterns as
a theoretical starting point, this study investigates useful refugees, host states,
and international organizations tend to respond to aggregate, macro-level infor-
mation, even when there will be individual-level variation across refugees’ risk
assessments and responsiveness to circumstances.
3.3.1 Host State Push Factors
There is a vast literature on the politics of refugee populations within host states.
Policymakers increasingly link migration to issues of national security (Adamson
2006; Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016). Accommodating refugees can take a social and
economic toll on states, especially since the majority of these countries are devel-
oping and lack resources to provide for their own domestic populations (Akar and
Erdog˘du 2018; Hynie 2018; Jackson and Atkinson 2018). While there are plenty
of studies demonstrating the positive impacts of refugee communities on host
societies (Jacobsen 2002; Cortes 2004; Adamson 2006; Taylor et al. 2016; Salehyan
2018) as well as types of governments who support the hosting of certain types
of migrants and refugees (Sadiq 2005; Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016; Chu 2019a),
host states are generally resistant of policies that would streamline permanent
integration into their countries. Many states hosting a large number of refugees,
such as Lebanon and Kenya, enact laws that bar refugees from being naturalized
or de facto practice means very few are ever granted citizenship (Ref World 1994;
Ha¨gerdal 2018; International Rescue Committee 2018).
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Moreover, the international community promoting repatriation as the pre-
ferred long-term solution to refugee crises affords host states the ability to be
resolute about perceiving hosting as a temporary solution until conditions are
safe enough in the country of origin. Even if host states are initially supportive
of hosting refugees, changes in government and public opinion of refugee com-
munities grow less supportive overtime (Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn
and Braithwaite 2018). Given that many host states are the major donors to the
UNHCR (Zeager and Bascom 1996), the organization is often beholden to their
demands. While a “safe” return is less likely, there are ethical dimensions of re-
fusing to help refugees make the journey back simply because conditions in the
origin state are less than ideal or to help them regardless because some assistance
is better than none (Gerver 2016).
Governments adopt a variety of policies to decrease the number of people
who try to reach their borders proactively by constructing physical barriers (Av-
dan and Gelpi 2016; Carter and Poast 2017), crafting restrictive asylum policies
(Bosswick 2000; Ivarsflaten 2005; Avdan 2014), or are uncooperative with organi-
zations serving displaced individuals (Betts 2011; Heller and Pezzani 2016). Yet,
studies show that asylum policies do not systematically impact refugees’ destina-
tion choice (Day and White 2002; Schaeffer 2010). Rather, restrictive policies tend
to channel migrants away from legally applying for asylum and toward irregu-
lar methods, such as usually smugglers or entering states illegally (Czaika and
Hobolth 2010).
Governments also take measures to limit livelihoods and deliberately foster
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hostile conditions for refugee populations already settled within their borders.
Kuhlman (1990) defines refugee integration into the host country as compatibility
with host state cultural values, attaining an adequate standard of living, and a lack
of worsening of the standards of living and economic opportunities for members
of the host community. While some states may promote immigrant integration
into host society (Jacobsen 2002; Sadiq 2005; Adamson 2006), others are likely to
deter refugees from becoming permanent members of society. Additionally, host
states are not unitary, with some portions of government or local communities
being more supportive of refugees than others, and these distributions changing
over time (Whitaker 2002; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2015; Getmansky, Sınmazdemir, and Zeitzoff 2018; Ghosn, Braithwaite,
and Chu 2019; Braithwaite et al. 2019).
When governments treat the hosting of refugees as a temporary policy, it in-
creases the likelihood of refugees being portrayed as unwelcome outsiders. Those
in exile in can experience feelings of exclusion and develop impressions that they
do not belong in their host country (Stefansson 2004). This is because being in
a foreign country can be characterized by a fall in social status, loneliness, and
experiencing racism (Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004).
Feelings of exclusion are often linked to other negative experiences while
abroad that then motivate return. A lack of economic opportunities, exposure
to violence, and repressive action in the host country all feed into these emotions.
While refugee status is supposed to be accompanied by basic human rights, such
as freedom of movement and access to goods and services, such as education
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and healthcare, with asylum status, host governments do not always honor inter-
national law (Verdirame 1999; Knudsen 2009; Zeus 2011). Conditions in refugee
camps can be even worse than those in the origin state (Milton, Spencer, and
Findley 2013). Koser (1997) finds Mozambican refugees were living in destitute
conditions in Malawi, which made returning to Mozambique a viable option even
though war In Mozambique was still ongoing. Host countries often impose re-
strictions on the movements and economic activities of refugees living in camps
by not allowing them to leave the perimeter of the camps (Zetter and Ruaudel
2016). Those who opt to settle in cities are sometimes subjected to police round-
ups and harassment (Hyndman and Giles 2011).
When there is a lack of economic opportunities, it is difficult for refugees to
foster livelihoods in the host state. Without job opportunities, refugees can get
lost in a sense of idleness and dependence on aid (Lehrer 2010; Fransen, Ruiz,
and Vargas-Silva 2017). In a survey of returned Burundian refugees who had been
hosted in Tanzania, one-third of returnees were unemployed while abroad, com-
pared to 11% before fleeing Burundi (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017). At
the same time, when a host state is relatively poor, the government is more likely
to engage in repression since they lack the capacity to accommodate refugees
(Wright and Moorthy 2018). Therefore, precarious economic situations in host
states can push refugees to return.
Violence in the host state is another potential “push” factor in the process of
refugee return. Existing studies show how incoming migrants, when not inte-
grated, can lead to disputes with populations living there. Fearon and Laitin
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(2011) argue migrants threaten local populations in host states, which often esca-
lates to low-level violent clashes between groups. Further, they claim that com-
pared to the local populations, migrants have a relatively cheap alternative to
war: return to their country of origin. The arrival of refugees can also lead to re-
source competition between citizen and refugee populations (Martin 2005). Thus,
if threats of violence become great enough and/or resource competition comes
to a tipping point, refugees may opt to return to their countries of origin. While
Rwandan refugees in Zaire hesitated to return in the late 1990s, it was overcome
by the greater fear of immediate danger posed by armed groups attacking their
camps (Janzen 2004). This is because threats to their physical security is now be-
cause caused by actors in the host state. Even though refugees may still be in the
cross-hairs of violence upon return, they might feel safer in a country they know
compared to a hostile host state environment.
In response to security issues of refugees, host governments can try to contain
the issue such that both refugees and domestic populations are supported, or
they can respond in ways that will only exacerbate the issue further. Empirically,
host states tend to opt for the latter, with governments more likely to use other
repressive or violent actions upon the arrival of refugees (Danneman and Ritter
2014; Fisk 2018), especially if refugees can be linked to the spread of violence
into the host state (Whitaker 2003; Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006;
Savun and Gineste 2019). Even if government and public fears about the link
between refugees and domestic issues are unfounded, these contexts provide an
opportunity to blame refugee populations for these problems. When refugees are
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scapegoated for domestic security issues, there are more attacks against refugees
(Bencˇek and Strasheim 2016; Savun and Gineste 2019) and domestic populations
are supportive of represive crackdowns by the government (Tir and Jasinski 2008;
Hutchinson 2013; Braithwaite et al. 2019). For instance, Afghan refugees were
driven out of Pakistan and Sri Lanka due to constant harassment by police (Abid
2015; Human Rights Watch 2015a; Ali 2016).
Beyond security risks, host governments may not have the political capacity
to absorb refugees without straining the resources they need to accommodate
their own citizens (Braithwaite 2010). In states hosting many refugees, such as
Lebanon, it is difficult for the government to support both their own citizens
while also providing for the needs of refugees (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015).
Domestic populations can become suspicious and resentful of refugees if they
perceive refugees are getting more assistance (Ek and Karadawi 1991; Adhikari,
Hansen, and Powers 2012).
As stated earlier, since repatriation is considered the preferred durable so-
lution to protracted displacement, the hosting of refugees is often perceived by
the host government to be a temporary policy (Hammerstad 2000; Barnett 2001a;
Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Due to this perception, there is less incentive to
funnel resources toward successfully integrating them into host societies. This is
compounded by the fact that most states hosting refugees are neighbors to origin
states, often less developed, over-burdened, and under-resourced to accommo-
date the numbers of refugees in their territory (Dempster and Hargrave 2017;
Hynie 2018). This is likely to lead to refugees returning more on average in host
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states with weaker political, economic, and physical security. Even if conditions
are unsafe in their country of origin, we should not expect refugees to stay in host
states countries that are politically, economically, or physically insecure.
This leads to the following “push” hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Host states characterized by weak security conditions are positively asso-
ciated with refugee return.
3.3.2 Origin State Pull Factors
Similarly, political, economic, and physical security in the country of origin mat-
ters greatly with respect to refugee return. Studies suggest that refugees com-
pare conditions in the host and origin countries and decide which is the better
place to reside (Koser 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shell-
man 2004 2006 2007; Ru¨egger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and Chadefaux 2019).
However, conceptualizing host and origin states as equivalents may be problem-
atic. As these studies show, there is a selection effect where refugees tend to find
asylum in host states that are proximate, wealthier, and more democratic states
when compared with their country of origin. Moreover, in order to obtain refugee
status, individuals must demonstrate credible fear for their physical safety, sug-
gesting conditions in the origin state must be inherently worse than in the host
state. As studies of civil war onset show, poorer and less democratic countries
tend to have higher propensities for conflict onset (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Vreeland 2008; Blattman and Miguel 2010).
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There could be issues toward strictly comparing conditions in the host and origin
states to elucidate patterns of return. Instead, an examination of conditions in the
country of origin, without comparing factors directly to the host state, might be
more appropriate. Discussions on the “right” time to return refugees typically
call for substantial changes in security conditions in the country of origin. But
what constitutes a “safe” environment?
A common distinguishing point used in the literature to mark a change to-
wards “safety” is the end of the conflict that displaced refugees in the first place
(Black and Koser 1999; Eastmond and O¨jendal 1999; Bariangaber 2001; Black 2002;
Kibreab 2002; Stefansson 2004; Bascom 2005; Black and Gent 2006; Black, East-
mond, and Gent 2006; Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012; Nalepa 2012; Bradley
2013; Adelman and Peterman 2014; Long 2014; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva
2017). This is usually when large scale repatriation programs are initiated by
the UNHCR to help “pull” refugees to return to their country of origin. For in-
stance, Burundian refugees felt more compelled to return after the signing of the
peace agreement that ended hostilities between warring parties (Fransen, Ruiz,
and Vargas-Silva 2017). Origin states can promote return at the end of the war by
formally recognizing the rights of displaced people to return (Phuong 2005; Black,
Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Joshi, Melander, and Quinn 2015) and exempting re-
turnees from prosecution of all political offenses (Essuman-Johnson 2011). While
some types of conflict termination, such as ending because of low activity, are less
likely to stir some refugees to return, host states may pressure international or-
ganizations to persuade refugees that they must return and even offer monetary
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assistance for the journey back (Bradley 2013). This was the case after the signing
of the Dayton Accords, with many host states pushing Bosnian refugees to return
because a peace plan was signed, even if refugees would have preferred to stay
abroad (Walsh 1995; Blitz 1999; Eastmond 2006; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006).
However, we should not expect refugees to delay returning for significant
international assistance or wait until the conflict to end (Stein and Cuny 1994;
Stein 1997). Indeed, reports from and articles on Burundi (Amnesty International
2005), Syria (Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017; Bassam 2018), and Afghanistan (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2002; Amnesty International 2018) report how refugees return
while conflict is ongoing, and particularly highlight how conditions are not nec-
essarily safe for them upon return. Rather, refugees are returning at a variety
of points in time due to political, economic, and physical security “pull factors”
from the country of origin. This is because international actors, like humanitarian
organizations and host states, are monitoring conditions in the country of origin
for changes in security to gauge whether they can promote return without com-
mitting refoulement. Additionally, refugees themselves are constantly updating
their beliefs using with information about conditions in their country of origin.
This informations comes from social networks including those who still reside
in the country of origin, newly arrived refugees, and news stories (Koser 1997;
Stefanovic and Loizides 2011; Chu et al. 2019).
Drawing upon the same indicators that pull refugees toward certain host coun-
tries (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Turkoglu and
Chadefaux 2019), I expect origin states that are more democratic and wealthy
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are more likely to “pull” refugees to return. Countries that are more democratic
should allow for more participatory political processes that would translate to
refugees potentially being a part of the political process upon return. Wealthier
origin states would provide more opportunities to work. War destroys infrastruc-
ture, which limits economic opportunities for people (Adhikari 2013), but if origin
states demonstrate they have a stronger economy, it could lead refugees and other
observers to promote return (Appel and Loyle 2012).
I also expect the dynamics of the conflict and patterns of violence in the coun-
try of origin to motivate return. Physical security is arguably the most impor-
tant consideration with respect to return, as observed with Syrian (Berlin So-
cial Science Center 2015; Chu et al. 2019), Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-
Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva
2017), South Sudanese (Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black
2002; Black et al. 2004; Nalepa 2012). For the most part, ongoing conflict will most
likely deter refugees from returning.
The duration of the conflict is another consideration that impacts the rate of
return.The longer the conflict lasts, the longer displaced persons are left in pro-
tracted situations that disrupt their economic and social livelihoods (Joireman,
Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012). Even if conflict continues in their origin state, stay-
ing in exile for a long time translates to limited access to educational and career
options (Long and Oxfeld 2004). In the case of Northern Uganda, people who
were displaced longer and settled farther away are more likely to be unable to
reclaim property they once owned, lose more land, and experience more land-
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related disputes upon returning (Adelman and Peterman 2014). Emotions play
a role in individual-level decision making and can lead to more risk-accepting
behavior (Pearlman 2013), which can lead refugees to return even if conflict is
still ongoing. Displacement takes a severe toll on the well-being and can feed into
decision-making about returning (Lehrer 2010). As a result, we should expect
more refugees to return as conflicts drag on.
Simultaneously, host governments and domestic populations grow increas-
ingly impatient the longer they are obligated to support these populations (Long
2014; Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). Several refugee camps in Kenya established
in the early 1990s primarily for Somali refugees were meant to be temporary and
closed within a couple of years. However, most of the camps are still open today
and operate well over its intended capacity (Hujale 2016). When Kenya proposed
to close the Dadaab camp in 2016, which would result in the return of 260,000 So-
mali refugees, there was a backlash by the international humanitarian community
that led Kenya’s High Court to block the decision (BBC News 2017). The Pakistani
government also regularly pushes Afghan refugees out by claiming enough time
has past and conditions are sufficient for return (Human Rights Watch 2017). This
all suggests that the longer conflict continues to rage in the country of origin, we
should expect to see more refugees returning due to personal and external factors
like the host state and humanitarian organizations encouraging repatriation.
Collectively, security factors in the origin state can pull refugees back to their
country of origin. This can be an individual decision by refugees as well as one
driven by host states and humanitarian organizations serving displaced popu-
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lations as they monitor the situation in the origin state. On the aggregate, we
should observe more refugees returning with higher levels of political, economic,
and physical security in the state of origin.
This leads to the following “pull” hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Origin states characterized by positive security conditions are positively
associated with refugee return.
In the previous discussion of push and pull factors from host and origin states,
I treat only security considerations as absolute measures. A corollary to this
discussion concerns refugee return patterns being more sensitive to changes in
security dynamics. When shifts are observed, refugees can become pushed out of
host states or pulled toward origin countries, depending on the direction of the
change.
Political shifts, particularly changing regime type, are likely to influence con-
ditions of security within a country as well as provide an incentive for individuals
to flee (Vreeland 2008; Moore and Shellman 2004). In host states, negative changes
in security, particularly upon the arrival of refugees, are critical in predicting the
likelihood of scapegoating of refugee populations (Adamson 2006; Wright and
Moorthy 2018; Savun and Gineste 2019). As a result of to these shifts, refugee
return becomes more likely because conditions are getting worse for refugee pop-
ulations and host governments may not be able or willing to guarantee safety for
the displaced. Changes within the country of origin, like conflict dynamics, eco-
nomic recovery, and transitions toward democracy, can lead to more refugees re-
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turning. Even if refugees do not want to return to their country of origin yet, host
states will use the opportunity to encourage return by claiming that conditions are
getting better in the origin state and pressure humanitarian organizations assist.
Therefore, I expect changes in political, economic, and physical security con-
ditions are associated with the number of refugees returning to their country of
origin. This is because changes will translate into moments where refugees are
pushed out of the host state or pulled toward their country of origin. This leads
to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a Host countries experiencing negative shifts in security are negatively
associated with refugee return.
Hypothesis 3b Origin countries experiencing positive shifts in security are positively
associated with refugee return.
3.4 Research Design
In order to empirically assess what macro-level factors influence the likelihood
and size of return, I construct a directed-dyad level dataset that reflects every
possible route that people may travel to seek refuge in another country from 1989
to 2016. My unit of analysis is the origin country-host country-year. However,
including all possible directed-dyads may bias estimates, given some countries
may never produce nor host refugees. Therefore, I only include directed-dyad
host-origin country pairings where at least one refugee from an origin country is
documented to have received asylum status in that particular host country since
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1960. Countries in the analysis must be part of the Correlates of War Systems list
(Correlates of War Project 2011).
The dependent variable is the number of refugees returning from a host coun-
try to their country of origin in a given year. Data on returnees come from the
UNHCR (2018b), which defines returned refugees as “former refugees who have
returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion” and
returnees as “former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spon-
taneously or in an organised fashion.” The list of origin countries and the number
of refugees and returnees produced can be found in Table B.1 of Appendix B. The
list of host states, along with the number of refugees they host and the number of
refugees who return, are listed in Table B.2 of Appendix B.
3.4.1 Political Variables
The quality of democracy is widely considered to influence whether countries will
be hospitable toward forced migrants, as well as being a “goal” for post-conflict
societies in order for individuals to foster better livelihoods and lasting security
to prevail. I include two variables to capture the level of democracy in origin and
host states. The first is the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project (Marshall,
Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). Many studies on forced migration and civil conflict use
this measure to operationalize the quality of democracy in a state (Hegre et al.
2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Ru¨egger and Bohnet
2018). This variable is coded from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic).
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For an alternative specification of democracy, I use the participatory democracy
index from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2018). This variable
is an interval scale with a range of 0 (low) to 1 (high). Countries scoring high on
the participatory democracy index emphasizes that there is “active participation
by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral.” I use this variable
to capture the extent to which refugees could access political processes in the
country of origin upon return and in the host state. In the country of origin,
refugees will likely want to play an integral part in this process and either want
to or are encouraged to return because these practices exist in their country of
origin. In the host state, a more open political process would allow refugees to
express their grievances if needed.
A different variable related to political conditions and likely access to political
processes is respect for human rights. I use the Latent Human Rights Protection
Scores (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014), which generates a score of a state’s over-
all respect for physical human integrity practices based on annual human rights
reports published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, other
quantitative indicators of repression such as the Political Terror Scale (Gibney,
Cornett, and Wood 2014) and CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), and
the increasing standard of accountability overtime by international observers of
human rights practices (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014; Chaudry 2019). The
score is a continuous number normalized around a mean of zero, ranging from
-2.7 to 4.7. Positive numbers indicate a greater overall respect for human rights
and negative numbers corresponding to less respect.
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For each of these political variables, I test their effects on numbers of returnees
with the value of the independent variable for each country in a given year, as well
as the change in the value from the previous year.
3.4.2 Economic Variables
To capture a general sense of economic security in host and origin states, I rely
upon the logged Gross Domestic Product per capita of a country (World Bank
2016), much like other studies on civil conflict and forced migration (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Moore and Shellman 2004; Ru¨egger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and
Chadefaux 2019). Another variable that captures economic opportunity is the en-
gagement rate produced by the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer
2015).6 This variable calculates the share of permanent residents in a country that
is “engaged” economically, such as legal employment, in some capacity. As a rate,
the engagement rate ranges from 0 to 1. Similar to the political variables, I include
the raw score for each of these variables as well as the change in the variable from
the year before.
3.4.3 Physical Security Variables
Physical security is potentially the characteristic that most significantly influences
refugee migration patterns. The main condition expected to drive expectations
regarding physical security is civil conflict. Civil conflicts are the leading cause
6Economic variables such as employment rates and economic discrimination toward migrant
communities would be ideal for this analysis, though many of this information is missing for a
global sample.
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of forced displacement and refugee flows since the 1980s. Therefore, I generate
a battery of variables capturing civil conflict dynamics in the host and origin
states. Since these variables are civil conflict specific, these models only include
observations where civil conflict is ongoing in the country of origin, the ten years
prior to the onset of conflict, and the years following conflict termination. Data
on civil conflict are taken from the variety of available datasets from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander,
Pettersson, and Themne´r 2016). Civil conflict is defined as an incompatibility
between the government and an armed nonstate group where at least 25 battle
deaths are recorded. The first is a simple binary indication of whether there is
ongoing civil conflict in the origin and host state, respectively. In order to capture
the evaluation of conditions in both states, I generate a series of 3 binary variables
coded 0 if there is no civil conflict in either state and 1 if there is civil conflict
in: (1) the host state only, (2) in the origin country only, and (3) in both states
simultaneously.
I also include series of variables based off of the civil conflict dynamics in the
country of origin. I only focus on the country of origin because international
observers care more about this conflict in terms of returning refugees (UNHCR
2004; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006). The first such variable is conflict duration,
which is the number of years the conflict has been ongoing up to yeart. Next, I
generate a similar duration variable for post-conflict years, which is operational-
ized as the number of years since conflict has terminated. Finally, some conflict
termination types might pull more refugees to return than others. Conflicts end-
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Macro-level Indicators Between Host and Origin States
Host Mean Origin Mean Host St. Dev. Origin St. Dev
Polity 7.184 1.366 4.880 5.99
Particip. Democracy 0.515 .250 0.202 0.171
Respect for HR 1.214 -0.230 1.368 1.081
GDPPC (logged) 9.257 7.219 1.640 1.406
Engagement Rate 0.434 0.375 0.078 0.866
Civil conflict 0.113 0.298 0.316 0.457
Terrorist Events 16.330 36.231 75.266 180.919
ing in peace agreements guaranteeing rights or outright victories demonstrate a
more assured outlook for conditions in the country of origin compared to other
termination types, like ceasefires and low activity. Therefore, I generate a categor-
ical variable to see if certain types of termination are more likely to pull refugees
to return after conflict officially ends. I generate variables based on whether
the conflict terminated by peace agreement, ceasefire, government victory, rebel
victory, or low activity, taken from version 2 of the UCDP Conflict Termination
dataset (Kreutz 2010).
Table 3.1 shows how, on average, host countries score more positively on
macro-level indicators of political and economic security. This suggests directly
comparing host and origin states, such as subtracting the difference between the
two indicators, may be an inappropriate way to capture refugee return patterns.
This is because models would likely show that refugees are always returning to
worse conditions since origin states are inherently have worse political, economic,
and physical security.
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3.4.4 Control Variables
I control for several variables that influence the likelihood of refugee return.
Countries closer together spatially more likely to experience return because of
the ease and low economic cost of travel compared to countries located farther
apart. Additionally, most refugees settle in states neighboring their origin coun-
try, which would subsequently influence the total number of people who return.
Therefore, I include the logged minimum distance in kilometers between the dyad
(Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010). I include the logged number of refugees
from the country of origin residing in the host state to account for the size of the
refugee population (UNHCR 2018b). I also include the logged population of host
and origin countries (World Bank 2016).
The amount of time of refugees from a certain country of origin spend residing
in a host state likely influences how host states behave toward refugees. States can
grow weary over time after supporting refugee groups, which can serve as a push
factor if governments no longer want to host refugees (Hujale 2016; Dempster
and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). To account for this, I include a
variable caputring the number of years that at least one refugee from a particular
country of origin has resided in the host state.
3.4.5 Modeling Strategy
All explanatory variables are lagged by one year such that all covariates are coded
as 1 year prior to observing the incidence and number of refugees returning. I
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account for time dependence by computing the length of non-return year spells,
along with the squared and cubic versions of this variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998; Carter and Signorino 2010). Summary statistics for all variables included
in the models are displayed in Table 3.2. Summary statistics when at least one
refugee returns can be found in Table B.3 of Appendix B. Due to a large num-
ber of zeroes and count format of the dependent variable, zero-inflated negative
binomial regressions (ZiNB) are used (Gelman and Hill 2007).
First, I run political, economic, and physical security variables separately to
assess each of the effects independent of the other. I then run a final set of models
that includes all three of these security factors to see if the results hold when
accounting for all of these variables together.
3.5 Discussion of Results
I begin by discussing the results of models focused on macro-level political, eco-
nomic, and physical security factors in host and origin countries before turning
to the analyses taking into account all three conditions. ZiNB regression models
provide two estimates: (1) the “inflate stage,” which estimates a logistic regres-
sion of the likelihood of a “non-event” and (2) the “count stage,” which estimates
a negative binomial regression modeling the expected count given the depen-
dent variable has surpassed 0. In terms of the dependent variable, the first stage
(columns labeled Pr(0)) columns provide estimates on the factor change in the
odds that refugee return never happens and the second stage (columns labeled
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 144087 89.074 4259.531 0 776521
Polity, Origin 144087 .909 6.251 -10 10
Polity, Host 144087 6.022 5.689 -10 10
Polity Change, Origin 143744 .026 2.238 -18 15
Polity Change, Host 143998 .015 1.589 -18 15
Particip. Democ., Origin 144087 .244 .174 .011 .834
Particip. Democ., Host 144087 .457 .22 .011 .834
Particip. Democ. Change, Origin 143894 .001 .04 -.543 .414
Particip. Democ., Host 143889 .001 .035 -.543 .337
Respect for HR, Origin 144087 -.224 1.065 -2.703 4.705
Respect for HR, Host 144087 .884 1.426 -2.703 4.705
Change in HR, Origin 144084 .018 .164 -.876 .87
Change in HR, Host 144087 .023 .133 -.876 .87
GDPPC (logged), Origin 144087 7.094 1.4 4.19 11.659
GDPPC (logged), Host 144087 8.726 1.707 4.19 11.659
GDPPC Growth (logged), Origin 143326 4.63 .286 -.127 8.929
GDPPC Growth (logged), Host 142980 4.627 .279 -.127 7.083
Engagement Rate, Origin 138419 .368 .086 .119 .75
Engagement Rate, Host 142140 .414 .086 .119 .75
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin 134139 .001 .009 -.098 .124
Change in Eng. Rate, Host 137857 .001 .01 -.098 .124
Civil Conflict, Origin 119246 .467 .499 0 1
Civil Conflict, Host 119246 .15 .357 0 1
Civil Conflict, Origin Only 119246 .393 .488 0 1
Civil Conflict, Host Only 119246 .076 .264 0 1
Civil Conflict, Both 119246 .074 .262 0 1
Conflict Duration 119246 4.174 8.012 0 51
Post-conflict Duration 119246 3.607 5.854 0 26
Peace Agreement 72431 .289 .453 0 1
Government Victory 72431 .181 .385 0 1
Rebel Victory 72431 .099 .299 0 1
Low Activity 72431 .301 .459 0 1
Hosting Duration 144087 3.033 4.986 0 24
Population (logged), Origin 144087 16.49 1.462 12.622 21.029
Population (logged), Host 144087 16.576 1.405 12.622 21.029
Minimum Distance 144087 7.609 2.195 0 9.821
Refugees (logged) 144087 1.431 2.277 0 14.041
Years since last return 144087 10.619 7.117 0 24
Years since last return2 144087 163.407 167.068 0 576
Years since last return3 144087 2878.514 3745.052 0 13824
Count) columns represent the expected count when the number of returnees is
not always 0. Across all models, the dispersion parameter, logged a, is positive
and significant, meaning a model accounting for the zero-inflated nature of the
dependent variable is appropriate.
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Before delving into a deeper discussion of the results, it is worth nothing that
some the changes in participatory democracy and engagement rate variables re-
port large coefficients and standard errors. I believe a lack of variation in both
the dependent and independent variable of change is producing in these issues.
I report these models and discuss the findings, though I would caution draw-
ing any strong conclusions. Therefore, I cannot conclusively claim support for
Hypotheses 3a and 3b, which suggested shifts in conditions would be associated
with systematic patterns of return.
Table 3.3 presents the results of the models examining the relationship between
political conditions and refugee return. Origin countries that are more democratic
are more likely to experience refugees returning. This pattern emerges using both
the Polity2 score as well as V-DEM’s index of participatory democracy. Using the
polity score, if at least 1 refugee returns, an extremely autocratic regime (-10) is
expected to pull 1491 returnees, compared to 3643 for anocracies (0) and 8823 for
full democracies (10).
Democratic host states are less likely to see any return; yet, if at least 1 refugee
returns, more refugees tend to follow and in higher numbers. This suggests origin
countries that democratic regimes are “pulling” refugees to return, even in small
numbers. When democratic host states push refugees out, they do so in high
numbers. Fully autocratic host states (polity score of -10) are predicted to push
out 2664 refugees it at least one refugee returned, compared to 3491 for anocracies
(polity score of 0) and 4346 for democracies. Therefore, there is no support for
Hypothesis 1 about political security conditions in the host state. In fact, refugees
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are leaving democratic states, rather than staying there. On the other hand, there
is some initial support for Hypothesis 2, with more democratic origin countries
pulling more refugees to return.
Shifts in regime type, particularly toward democracy, might produce larger
numbers of returnees. Models 2 and 4 display results of changes in Polity and
participatory democracy from the year before, respectively. Increasing democratic
performance in the origin state is associated with an increase in the likelihood of
return and higher counts of returnees. Changes toward democracy in the host
state have no meaningful influence on the count of refugees that return.
Models 5 and 6 in Table 3.3 show the results using respect for human rights as
an alternative to level of democracy to capture features of the political landscape
in host and origin states. Contrary to expectations, origin states with better hu-
man rights records are likely to see fewer refugees returning whereas host states
that exhibit greater respect human rights are likely to see larger outflows of re-
turnees. Origin states moving from a score of -1 to 1 on this measure leads to
2,403 fewer refugees returning to their country of origin. For host states, moving
from a score of -1 to 1 leads to a predicted 5,749 increase in the number of refugees
making the journey back. However, when I examine the change in respect from
the previous year, it seems to comport with my expectations. Origin countries
that improved their respect for human rights in the previous year are more likely
to experience return and see higher numbers of refugees coming back.
On the other hand, host states who decrease their respect for human rights
are associated with more refugees returning to their countries of origin. An ex-
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planation for origin states pulling refugees to return could be that these states are
emerging from conflict and are therefore do not score highly on these indicators,
rather than refugees being attracted to return to these conditions. Additionally,
host states tend to be more respectful of human rights, which is why refugees try
to gain asylum in these countries. Therefore, it could be that more refugees are
returning to origin states simply because a greater number of individuals fled to
these respectful countries in the first place.
Moving to the relationship between refugee return and economic indicators,
Table 3.4 shows the results of gross domestic product per capita and the engage-
ment rate. The logged gross domestic product per capita in the country of origin
has no meaningful influence on likelihood nor the number of refugees return-
ing. Wealthier host states are more likely to have no refugees return to countries
of origin, but, if refugees do return, it is in higher numbers. The average of
gross domestic product per capita for host states (approximately $6680 million)
is expected to return approximately 10,500 refugees to their country of origin.
Host states that are approximately two standard deviations above the mean in
logged gross domestic product (approximately $16200 million) are predicted to
return about 52,000 refugees. Unexpectedly, changes in gross domestic product
per capita has the opposite expected effect on the number of returnees. For both
host and origin states, growth in gross domestic product per capita is associated
with a small number of refugees returning.
Similarly, the engagement rate shows the opposite expected effect. Origin
states with more individuals engaged in the economy are less likely to pull
108
Table 3.4: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return
(Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) (Model 10)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin -0.032 -0.175
(0.034) (0.109)
GDPPC, Host 0.526*** 0.528***
(0.034) (0.079)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.718*** -1.733**
(0.132) (0.635)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.332*** -1.368***
(0.100) (0.244)
Engagement Rate, Origin 1.358* -3.590*
(0.545) (1.703)
Engagement Rate, Host 6.337*** 5.490***
(0.588) (1.634)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -18.310*** -49.972***
(2.864) (7.871)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -8.268** 23.566***
(2.564) (6.582)
Minimum Distance -0.045** -0.809*** -0.610*** 0.069*** -0.706*** 0.039** 0.070*** -0.641***
(0.016) (0.062) (0.011) (0.042) (0.014) (0.054) (0.012) (0.050)
Refugees -0.379*** 0.268*** -0.298*** 0.280*** -0.314*** 0.273*** -0.285*** 0.258***
(0.019) (0.043) (0.014) (0.043) (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) (0.045)
Hosting Duration -0.096*** -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.118*** -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.056**
(0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) (0.022)
Population, Origin 0.087* -0.040 -0.008 -0.244† 0.070† 0.008 0.029 -0.215
(0.037) (0.136) (0.035) (0.141) (0.038) (0.150) (0.037) (0.160)
Population, Host 0.196*** 0.425*** 0.176*** 0.440*** 0.122*** 0.380*** 0.161*** 0.451***
(0.031) (0.088) (0.029) (0.107) (0.033) (0.096) (0.031) (0.112)
Constant -6.300*** -0.784 8.053*** 19.139*** -4.073*** 1.063 -1.908** 3.935†
(0.768) (2.157) (0.911) (3.554) (0.795) (2.431) (0.677) (2.037)
ln(a) 2.278*** 2.173*** 2.211*** 2.197***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062)
N 174595 5246 172243 5203 156381 4648 151582 4614
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
refugees to return. Host states with higher engagement rates are more likely
to push refugees out. With respect to changes, an increase in the engagement rate
in the country of origin decreases the number of refugees returning whereas an
increase in the host state leads to more refugees returning. Therefore, I do not
find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding economic security factors. One po-
tential explanation for this finding is that the engagement rate only captures the
legal employment of permanent residents of a country. If origin and host states
are already at a saturation point regarding the employment of permanent resi-
dents, that suggests there will be fewer opportunities for refugees to participate
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in the economy.
Next, I turn to a discussion of physical security indicators, operationalized
as civil conflict in host and origin states. Recall that since I am examining civil
conflict dynamics, I restrict the sample to observations where civil conflict in the
conflict of origin is ongoing, the 10 years leading up to conflict onset, and the
years after conflict termination.
Table 3.5 explores the relationship between refugee return and conflict occur-
rence in the host state an country of origin on the number of returnees. Civil
conflict in refugees’ country of origin is likely to experience at least one refugee
to return. However, as expected, the count of refugees returning is small. Con-
trary to expectations, when the host state is experiencing civil conflict, refugees
are more likely to stay in their host state. When accounting for the occurrence of
civil conflict in either or both the host and origin states (Model 12), refugees are
less likely to return under all conditions and will instead stay in the host state.
Figure 3.2 shows the expected number of returnees given these different sets of
conditions related to civil conflict occurrence reported in Model 12. The greatest
number of returnees is expected when neither the host nor home state is expe-
riencing conflict, demonstrating the pull effect of the country of origin in the
absence of ongoing conflict in either state. The other three conditions all report
similar numbers of refugees returning. Interesting, the occurrence of civil conflict
in only country of origin predicts 3,169 returnees, which is higher than if only
the host is experiencing civil conflict (2,242 returnees) or both (2,521). This offers
initial support for Hypothesis 2 about origin state conditions but not Hypothesis
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Table 3.5: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return
(Model 11) (Model 12)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.155† -0.744*
(0.086) (0.289)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.278** -0.616*
(0.108) (0.298)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.105 -0.942**
(0.088) (0.308)
Civil Conflict, Host Only -0.145 -1.292**
(0.124) (0.402)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.545*** -1.209**
(0.157) (0.412)
Minimum Distance 0.071*** -0.641*** 0.072*** -0.633***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.013) (0.041)
Refugees -0.288*** 0.265*** -0.288*** 0.265***
(0.015) (0.043) (0.014) (0.042)
Hosting Duration -0.066*** -0.026 -0.066*** -0.026
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.020)
Population, Origin 0.153** -0.190 0.151*** -0.192
(0.047) (0.193) (0.045) (0.180)
Population, Host 0.121*** 0.417*** 0.117*** 0.400***
(0.031) (0.122) (0.031) (0.180)
Constant -3.235*** 4.015 -3.164*** 4.379†
(0.801) (2.819) (0.768) (2.637)
ln(a) 2.191*** 2.186***
(0.058) (0.057)
N 119246 5165 119246 5165
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
1 about the host state, at least concerning physical security conditions.
Table 3.6 presents results of dynamics of the civil conflict in the country of ori-
gin. The duration of conflict has a negative influence on the number of returnees.
As civil conflict progresses, fewer refugees are returning. This can be interpreted
as most refugees returning within a few years of the conflict starting or refugees
staying in host countries for a longer period time the more protracted a conflict
is. Since this data cannot capture how long an individual has been in asylum, it
is difficult to disentangle the exact mechanism.
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Figure 3.2: Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Re-
turnees
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Conflict termination is widely considered to be a strong pull factor for refugee
return. Model 14 tests the relationship between the length of the post-conflict
period on refugee returns. The results estimates a negative relationship with
post-conflict duration. This suggests most refugees are pulled to return within
the first couple years of conflict termination.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the predicted number of returnees over the length of con-
flict in the country of origin in the left panel and the duration of the post-conflict
period in the right panel. Both graphs show that more refugees are expected to
return early on, with return numbers dropping with every subsequent year. In-
terestingly, the graphs illustrate that refugees are predicted to return in higher
numbers during conflict instead of during the years after conflict officiallly ends.
Certain types of conflict termination may produce more or less refugees. Ac-
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Table 3.6: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns
(Model 13) (Model 14) (Model 15)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.019*** -0.056***
(0.005) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.002 -0.175***
(0.011) (0.031)
Peace Agreement -1.518*** 0.256
(0.126) (0.366)
Ceasefire 0.266* 0.868*
(0.124) (0.339)
Govt. Victory -0.767*** -0.226
(0.109) (0.264)
Rebel Victory -0.751*** 0.206
(0.155) (0.390)
Low Activity -0.467*** -1.291***
(0.135) (0.357)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.312** -0.749** -0.253* -0.645* -0.260* -0.997***
(0.109) (0.281) (0.105) (0.274) (0.122) (0.267)
Minimum Distance 0.067*** -0.660*** 0.077*** -0.634*** 0.058*** -0.746***
(0.013) (0.045) (0.013) (0.043) (0.015) (0.048)
Refugees -0.285*** 0.274*** -0.284*** 0.215*** -0.305*** 0.264***
(0.015) (0.043) (0.014) (0.041) (0.015) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.067*** -0.026 -0.075*** -0.030† -0.043*** -0.119***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023)
Population, Origin 0.157*** -0.213 0.121** -0.501*** 0.041 -0.183
(0.046) (0.183) (0.039) (0.145) (0.049) (0.169)
Population, Host 0.135*** 0.473*** 0.117*** 0.433*** 0.165*** 0.482***
(0.032) (0.123) (0.029) (0.102) (0.035) (0.093)
Constant -3.499*** 3.456 -2.627*** 9.135*** -1.177 3.763
(0.809) (2.711) (0.730) (2.207) (0.960) (3.118)
ln(a) 2.189*** 2.145*** 1.917***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.065)
N 119246 5165 119246 5165 72431 2619
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
cordingly, Model 15 assesses variation in how civil conflicts end in the country
of origin, restricted to post-conflict years. Of the five types, only two report re-
lationships with statistical significance. Figure 3.4 shows the expected number of
returnees given each termination type. Ceasefires are associated with an increase
in the number of refugees, with 8,236 refugees expected to return. While the lit-
erature on ceasefires compared to other termination types suggest ceasefires can
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Figure 3.3: Conflict and Post-conflict Duration on Number of Returnees
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be a tenuous form of peace (Fortna 2004), what could be happening is that host
states are using the opportunity to claim combatants have reached some form of
agreement and start to encourage return. Conflicts ending in low activity are less
likely to pull refugees to return, with only 1,143 refugees expected to take the
journey back. This makes sense given the conflict in the country of origin has not
been resolved; rather fighting just peters out.
Finally, I turn to a discussion of models including variables accounting for
physical, political, and economic security conditions. For these models, I vary
the physical security variables and keep the political (polity and respect for hu-
man rights) and economic variables (logged gross domestic product per capita)
constant. These models are presented in Table 3.7. It is important to include all
these conditions together in one model as many prior studies demonstrate factors
cannot be independently addressed in these models (Poe and Tate 1994; Hegre
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Figure 3.4: Comparing Conflict Termination Types on the Number of Returnees
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et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Vreeland 2008; Hill
and Jones 2014).
Model 16 shows the results between refugee return and conflict occurrence
in either or both the host and origin states. When controlling for the political
and economic security factors, relationships change from Model 13. Figure 3.5
reproduces a graph similar to Figure 3.2 but with the estimates of Model 16. The
least number of refugees are predicted to return when only the country of origin
is experiencing civil conflict, with 3,309 returnees. Compared to contexts where
both the origin and host state are not experiencing violence, the expected number
of returnees is similar to when only the host country is experiencing violence,
with approximately 11,700 refugees returning. When both states are experiencing
civil conflict, the expected number of returnees is 7,289, which is higher than
contexts where only the origin state is experiencing conflict but fewer than if only
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Table 3.7: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn
(Model 16) (Model 17) (Model 18)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict Origin, Only -0.106 -1.268***
(0.122) (0.342)
Civil Conflict Host, Only 0.725*** 0.065
(0.182) (0.372)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.321 -0.448
(0.211) (0.456)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.025*** -0.093***
(0.007) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.066*** 0.001
(0.015) (0.051)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.580*** 0.504† 0.651*** 0.438
(0.149) (0.274) (0.175) (0.301)
Polity, Origin -0.076*** 0.032 -0.070*** 0.049 -0.073*** 0.047
(0.012) (0.033) (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033)
Polity, Host -0.014 -0.038† -0.015 -0.039† -0.012 -0.023
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin -0.017 -0.910*** -0.084 -0.984*** -0.129* -0.716***
(0.064) (0.143) (0.062) (0.148) (0.065) (0.146)
Respect for HR, Host 0.409*** 0.417** 0.426*** 0.492*** 0.409*** 0.434**
(0.067) (0.135) (0.066) (0.132) (0.065) (0.134)
GDPPC, Origin -0.061 -0.290* -0.048 -0.241† -0.085† -0.421**
(0.050) (0.125) (0.052) (0.135) (0.051) (0.144)
GDPPC, Host 0.509*** 0.477*** 0.498*** 0.441*** 0.518*** 0.535***
(0.048) (0.102) (0.048) (0.099) (0.049) (0.104)
Minimum Distance -0.080*** -0.812*** -0.085*** -0.826*** -0.076*** -0.851***
(0.021) (0.054) (0.021) (0.052) (0.021) (0.053)
Refugees -0.399*** 0.212*** -0.401*** 0.181*** -0.394*** 0.190***
(0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.067*** 0.011 -0.065*** 0.023 -0.078*** -0.005
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
Population, Origin 0.114* -0.424** 0.102† -0.473** 0.114* -0.477**
(0.050) (0.093) (0.052) (0.092) (0.053) (0.100)
Population, Host 0.258*** 0.411*** 0.277*** 0.488*** 0.263*** 0.462***
(0.044) (0.093) (0.043) (0.092) (0.044) (0.100)
Constant -7.397*** 6.252* -7.477*** 5.548* -7.566*** 6.703*
(1.021) (2.652) (1.050) (2.721) (1.040) (2.732)
ln(a) 2.230*** 2.201*** 2.240***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
N 89411 3440 89411 3440 89411 3440
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
the host state or either of the two states are going through conflict.This suggests
when host states are going through civil conflict, refugees are being pushed out of
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Figure 3.5: Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Re-
turnees, Accounting for Political and Economic Factors
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host states, even when the refugees’ country of origin is also experiencing conflict.
Moreover, the absence of conflict in the country of origin pulls refugees to return.
Turning to civil conflict dynamics in the country of origin, Model 17 estimates
the same negative relationship between the duration of conflict and refugee re-
turn. However, the length of time since civil conflict ends has no bearing on the
predicted number of returnees, with an average number of returnees hovering
around 6,000 returnees each year.
In Models 17 and 18, civil conflict in the host country is positively associated
with return, though this relationship is only statistically significant at the 0.1 level
in Model 17. Therefore, I cannot make conclusive claims that physical security in
the host state is a push factor.
With respect to origin states, states with a higher level of democratic are likely
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to see at least one refugee return, though it has no influence on the count of re-
turnees. Origin states with a lower overall respect for human rights and poorer
countries are more likely to pull refugees to return. As noted before, this can be
interpreted as refugees returning to precarious conditions and vulnerable govern-
ments.
For host states, more democratic countries are negatively associated with the
count of returnees, except in Model 18. However, host states that exhibit an
overall respect for human rights and those that are wealthier are more likely to
push refugees to return. This does not support Hypothesis 1, which expected
fewer refugees to return from wealthier and more democratic states.
The discrepancies in the findings between testing political, economic, and
security factors separately and all together suggest that it is necessary to take
into account all factors in models of refugee return. Given refugees, host states,
and humanitarian organizations take into account all of these conditions, a fuller
model specification is most likely more important, especially since the academic
literature shows how many of these factors are related (Hill and Jones 2014).
Finally, the general control variables perform as expected. Countries closer
together and with larger refugee populations from a particular origin state are
more likely to see higher numbers of refugees returning. The longer a state has
hosted refugees from a certain country of origin, the fewer refugees are expected
to return. However, this relationship goes away in the models accounting for
political, economic, and physical security considerations. The population of the
origin state does not influence return patterns but host states with larger popula-
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tions are more likely to see more returnees.
3.5.1 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks
I run a series of models using alternate measures or other concepts that might
influence refugee return. First, terrorist events in host and origin countries may
impact refugee movement. In host states, refugees are occasionally linked to these
events (Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016; Polo and Wucherpfennig 2018) and consequently
this can change host state perceptions toward hosting refugees (Savun and Gineste
2019). In origin states, terrorism is a relatively common phenomenon and strategy
employed by rebel groups during civil war (Stanton 2013; Thomas 2014; Fortna
2015). Moreover, terrorist attacks are often meant to target civilians (Kydd and
Walter 2006), which can deter refugees and humanitarian organizations from en-
couraging return to origin countries where terrorism is pervasive. Therefore, I
generate a variable capturing the logged number of terrorist events in host and
origin countries from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2015).
Table B.4 of Appendix B shows the results of models exploring the association
between terrorist events and refugee returns. Unexpectedly, as more terrorist
events occur in the country of origin, the greater number of refugees are likely
to return. Terrorist events in the host state decrease the number of returnees,
significant at the 0.1 level. I also interact the number of terrorist events in the
origin and host state to capture the effect of both states experiencing terrorist
events, though there does not seem to be any conditional effect on return. I
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also interact civil conflict with terrorist events, yet again, there is no conditional
influence of ongoing civil conflict with the number of terrorist events on return.
Therefore, terrorist attacks do not seem to operate as push and pull factors as
expected in the theory section.
In order to try and explain this counter-intuitive finding, I break down types
of terrorism into domestic and foreign attacks, with results reported in Table B.7
of Appendix B. The results suggest the findings for terrorism more generally are
mostly driven by domestic terrorist events. The number of foreign terrorist attacks
in both the host and origin states are not related to refugee returns. The more
domestic terror attacks experienced in the country of origin, the more likely we
are to observe larger numbers of refugees returning. Domestic terror attacks in the
host state is negatively associated with refugee return, though this relationship is
not statistically significant. This still does not explain why terrorism events in
the country of origin are associated with greater numbers of refugees returning.
A potential explanation could be that terrorist events are more likely to induce
internally displaced flows or host states are more likely to push refugees to return
if they are from a terror prone state.
Moving to another variable I test, refugees may be sensitive to the number of
civilians killed by the conflict they are fleeing. I run a model with the logged
number of civilian casualties in a year as a substitute for the indicator of ongoing
civil conflict in the origin state, with coefficient estimates reported in Model 4B
of Table B.5 of Appendix B. Results show that the more civilians killed by the
conflict, the greater numbers of refugees returning. This could potentially be an
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artifact of the scale of the civil conflict: larger scale wars are likely to produce
more refugees and therefore experience a greater number of returnees.
I then assess the influence of inter-communal conflict (ICC) in host and origin
states on return patterns. ICC data is taken from the Uppasala Conflict Data Pro-
gram’s Non-State Conflict dataset and is defined as an incompatibility between
at least two non-state armed groups that accrued at least 25 battle deaths (Sund-
berg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Pettersson and Eck 2018). I test for ICC because
studies on refugee return suggest most disputes with returnee communities are
with the domestic populations that stayed or with internally displaced persons
who move into property that used to belong to refugees (Bradley 2013; Schwartz
Forthcoming). Similar to models 11 and 12 of the main analysis, I code a binary
distinction of ICC and a categorical variable capturing ICC in the host only, origin
only, and both. Models 5B and 6B in Table B.5 of Appendix B show that ICC in
the origin state is a deterrent of refugees returning, with fewer refugees returning
if their origin state is reported to be experiencing ICC. ICC in the host state does
not influence patterns of return. This is similar to patterns of civil conflict, where
ongoing violence in the country of origin tends to deter refugees from returning
yet violence in the host seems to push refugees out in similar numbers compared
to no violence in either state.
In Table B.6 of Appendix B, I use a country’s CIRI score (Cingranelli, Richards,
and Clay 2014) as an alternative to Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014)’s latent mea-
sure of respect for human rights. An origin state’s CIRI score, or its change, in-
fluences the number of returnees. Unlike the latent measure of respect for human
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rights, an origin state’s CIRI score, nor the change in the score from the previous
year, is not related to the number of refugees who return. However, results are
similar with respect to host states. Host states with a higher rated respect for
human rights, according to CIRI, are more likely to return refugees. This again
suggests that host states may, in general, may be more respectful of human rights,
rather than acting as a push factor of return.
Given the highly skewed nature of the count of returnees, I check the robust-
ness of results by removing some of the outliers. The top two origin countries
with the highest number of returnees are Afghanistan and Eritrea. To ensure re-
sults are not driven by these two countries, I rerun the models removing all years
where these two states are origin countries. The results can be found in Tables B.8-
B.12 of Appendix B. Next, I omit observations that are above the 95th percentile of
the distribution of returnees. This drops all directed-dyads in which over 19,400
refugees reportedly returned. These estimates are reported in Tables B.13-B.17
of Appendix B. Even when removing these outliers, results corroborate the main
analyses and demonstrate similar substantive and statistical relationships.
I also run the same regression models of the main results on three different
samples. The first is including all directed-dyads, with all countries having the
potential to be a refugee-producing state and a country that hosts refugees. The
other two samples only include origin states that experienced some form of orga-
nized conflict that produced 25 battle deaths or more, but may or may not have
produced refugees. In the first sample, I include all conflict years as well as 5
years before and after the conflict. The next sample expands to a 10 year pre-
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and post-conflict window. The full results are in Tables B.18-B.22 for all directed
dyads, B.23-B.27 for the 5 year risk sample, and B.38-B.32 for the 10 year risk
sample. Results are robust and in line with the findings from the main analyses.
3.6 Conclusion
Currently, forced displacement is one of the most pressing global issues. While
the international community identifies three durable solutions to refugee crises,
the return of the displaced to their countries of origin is the most preferred policy
option. Most scholarship on refugee return focuses on evaluating the quality
of policies and implementation of the process itself, reintegration upon return,
or the impact of refugees who return on post-conflict processes. Yet, there is
less knowledge regarding cross-national trends of refugee return patterns more
generally. This gap is problematic given most refugees want to return to their
country of origin at some point, and knowing when refugees are returning can
help inform policies that support refugee preferences and agency.
This chapter fills this gap by investigating the relationship between macro-level
political, economic, and physical security conditions in host and origin countries
on the number of refugees that return to their country of origin. I expand the
scope geographically and temporally compared to existing studies that tend to
examine single cases in a specific time period by attempt to explain refugee return
patterns globally. I adapt a“ push and pull” framework used in other studies of
voluntary and forced migration and derive hypotheses about political, economic,
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and physical security conditions in host and origin countries that are expected to
be associated with the numbers of refugees who return.
The findings of the empirical analyses suggest several facets must be taken
into account when explaining refugee return patterns on the aggregate. Certain
circumstances in the host and origin countries must be considered when develop-
ing expectations about when refugees are returning to their country of origin. The
decisions made by refugees, as well as policies of host states, countries of origin,
and international organizations, are not created based on circumstances in only
the host or origin state. Second, political, economic, and physical security condi-
tions in the host and origin countries must be considered concurrently, rather than
independent of one another. This becomes extremely apparent when regression
models incorporating all of these factors exhibit different statistical relationships
than models treating these factors separately.
Third, physical security seems to supersede the explanatory power of political
or economic factors when it comes to understanding the conditions under which
refugees return. This could be due to the fact that macro-level factors used in
the models, such as regime type and GDPPC, are not as strong of a push or pull
factor than an individual’s physical safety. Ongoing civil conflict in the country
of origin has a strong dampening effect on the number of refugees who return.
Yet, the results suggest refugees do return during conflict and do so in larger
numbers than the post-conflict period. This is particularly puzzling given exist-
ing academic literature on refugee return restricts the focus to the post-conflict
period (Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017).
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Additionally, there is variation in the number of returnees based on how the con-
flict ended. Future research should explore why refugees might return during
conflict as well as how conflict termination and the ensuing post-conflict period
provides different incentives for refugees to return on the aggregate.
A limitation of the current study is the lack of information at the micro-level
with respect to refugee decision-making, as well as characteristics of those who
decide to stay in the country of asylum compared to those who end up returning.
As refugee return is supposed to happen with “safety” and “dignity,” it is unclear
how voluntary the decision to return was for repatriated refugees, or if they felt
external actors such as host states and international organizations were heavily
persuading refugees to return. While this study is able to show on average what
tends to be shifting refugee return numbers, there is a lot of important infor-
mation about return populations that remains unknown. There is also minimal
understanding of how individual refugees process information about political,
economic, and physical security as these conditions pertain to the timing of re-
turn. Future work can use survey data of refugees who are still in asylum and
those who returned to investigate the differences between these two populations.
125
Chapter 4
THE EFFECT OF LEADER TURNOVER ON
REFUGEE RETURN
4.1 Introduction
What motivates refugees to return to their country of origin? Are there contexts
or cues from their country of origin that help inform this decision? Existing
scholarship tackles questions of when and under what conditions initial forced
displacement occurs, locations to which individuals flee, and the impact refugee
populations have on host countries and their citizens. This chapter builds upon
this work by investigating another part of the journey refugee populations can
take: the return of displaced populations to their country of origin.
Refugees are defined by international law as “[a] person who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being out-
side of the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 1967). The
same statute also defines and characterizes repatriation as a voluntary decision
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by the refugee; entrusts the UNHCR, governments, and other organizations to
play a role in the return of displaced refugees; and establishes that repatriation
is facilitated and promoted as the preferred solution to refugee situations. In
practice, repatriations are rarely purely voluntary and are more broadly referred
to as refugees returning to their country of origin, with many returning “sponta-
neously” on their own accord or coerced into the decision based on a combination
of pressures by host governments, a lack of livelihood abroad, and support from
humanitarian organizations.
Refugee return is consequential for several reasons. For the refugees them-
selves, repatriated individuals give up international protections and assistance
that come with asylum status. For host countries, the return of refugees to their
country of origin means an alleviation of these pressures on their own resources
and attenuating domestic tensions that came with hosting refugees. Indeed, repa-
triation is the preferred policy solution for refugee populations by the interna-
tional community (Hammerstad 2000; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Toft 2007) and
the refugees themselves (Stein and Cuny 1994; Berlin Social Science Center 2015),
as compared to integrating into the host state or resettlement to a third-country,
since the end of the Cold War.
For the country of origin, findings on return migration of refugees are mixed.
Refugee return flows can indicate that conflict is close to an end and the start
of the rebuilding process (Black and Gent 2006). At the same time, origin so-
cieties may not have the capacity nor resources to support their return (Barnett
2001a; Chimni 2004). Returnees also vary in their preferences for the peacebuild-
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ing process from populations who stayed within the country of origin (Adhikari,
Hansen, and Powers 2012; Schwartz Forthcoming). But first, it is necessary to
understand why and under what conditions refugees ultimately repatriated back
to their country of origin, particularly since these contexts can help inform the
impact of refugee repatriation on their country of origin.
Refugees make a judgment call on whether they should return to their coun-
try of origin or stay in the host nation based on pressures they feel by host states
and humanitarian organizations as well as their ability to foster a livelihood in
asylum. Assessing conditions in both the host and origin countries, refugees will
think about which situation is the best option for their physical security. While
there is usually some form of compromise built into a somewhat involuntary de-
cision, refugees can decide to return rather than stay abroad. For the most part,
refugees are most concerned with their security. Moreover, host states will look
for windows of opportunity to promote return without being accused of refoule-
ment. Humanitarian organizations servicing displaced populations will advocate
on their behalf but realize they must work with refugees and host governments
who have different agendas. While they look out for the best interest of refugees,
host state pressure may lead these organizations to support refugee return when
there is some positive progress in the country of origin. From the current lit-
erature, it is unclear what information or event is sufficient enough for return
migration to be promoted except that decisions are made by comparing circum-
stances in the host and origin countries (Koser 1997).
I contend that a political event that can serve as a useful heuristic for observers
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to gauge conditions in the country of origin are leader turnovers. In particular,
I argue leader transitions demonstrating policy change from the previous leader,
stability, and legitimacy will provide updated information to refugee populations,
host countries, and humanitarian organizations that the country of origin has
progressed toward a more secure political environment. Using a global sample
of refugee returns and leader turnovers from 1989-2016, I test my argument and
generally find support for the hypotheses presented. Results show leader changes
conveying forecasted policy change, regularity with established rules, and lead-
ers who come to power without foreign assistance attract more refugees to return.
When combining policy change with stability and legitimacy, I find both stability
and policy change must be present in order for larger numbers of refugees to
return whereas legitimacy matters more than forecasted changes in policy trajec-
tory. Moreover, while civil conflict decreases the number of refugees who return
overall, these patterns of leader turnover still emerge. The findings suggest that
what leader turnovers provide information to refugees, host states, and humani-
tarian about conditions in the country of origin that either heightens or limits the
number of refugees who ultimately return.
4.2 When Refugee Return Occurs
Since the end of the Cold War, repatriation has become the preferred policy so-
lution for refugee crises (Toft 2007; Bradley 2013). The two other policy options,
integration into the host country and third country resettlement, are unsustain-
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able given the sheer size of refugee populations and lack of resources of host states
to accommodate refugees (Bradley 2013). With respect to refugee return, much
of the academic and policy discussion focus on when violence in the country of
origin ends (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chimni 2004; Stefanovic and Loizides
2011). This is because, according to international refugee law, host states cannot
commit refoulement, or return populations until conditions are safe enough in their
country of origin. Furthermore, voluntary repatriation programs spearheaded by
the UNHCR emphasize physical, legal, and material safety for returnees, but ac-
knowledge in practice these three conditions are rarely met (UNHCR 2004).
Conflict termination is considered a clear signal by host governments and hu-
manitarian organizations that the country of origin is in the initial stages of the
peacebuilding period (Black and Gent 2006). This is typically when the logistics
of large scale voluntary repatriation of refugee populations abroad begin to take
shape. Origin countries promote return at the end of the war by exempting re-
turnees from persecution for political offenses, as was done in Liberia (Essuman-
Johnson 2011) and Sri Lanka (Ritorto 2017). Peace processes and agreements can
formally recognize the right of displaced people to return (Joshi, Melander, and
Quinn 2015; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Phuong 2005). For example, Bu-
rundian refugees felt more compelled to repatriate after the signing of the Arusha
Peace Accord (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017).
These discussions tend to only capture a partial picture of refugee return by
focusing only on the post-war period. In reality, a large number of refugees return
to their country of origin “spontaneously,” or without international assistance and
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while violence continues to be a threat in the origin state (Stein and Cuny 1994;
Stein 1997). Indeed, while civil conflict is ongoing, refugee returns are likely to
occur, though the number of returnees is often small (Chu 2019b). What explains
this relationship? Studies on migration theorize individuals have agency, or the
capacity to reflect on their current situation, devise strategies, and take action
to achieve their desired outcome (Bakewell 2010). Under the context of forced
displacement, people flee to a safer location than if they stayed put (Schmeidl
1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2006).
Therefore, the preferences of refugees regarding their next steps should be
taken into consideration. Some refugees from Syria (Lazareva 2016) and South
Sudan (Bohnet 2016) deliberately settle in neighboring countries to be near their
homeland and always anticipated returning at some point, rather than journeying
farther away to countries in Europe or to the United States. Surveys of Syrian
refugees show over 90% prefer to return than stay in a host state forever (Berlin
Social Science Center 2015; Alsharabati and Nammour 2017). Sometimes refugee
preferences can clash with expectations of international organizations, who refuse
to help refugees return before the country of origin is deemed safe (Gerver 2014),
and host states that tend to want refugees to return as soon as possible.
The timing and circumstances necessary for refugee return being acceptable
for all actors involved in the process is unclear.1 While humanitarian organi-
zations may consider the situation at in the country of origin to be worse for
1“Actors” and “observers” involved in this process include host states, humanitarian organi-
zations serving displaced populations, and refugees. For brevity, the use of the word “actors” for
the rest of the manuscript reflects these actors.
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refugees, conditions in exile may be inadequate or hostile for refugees to stay. At
the same time, host states do not want to be accused of refoulement and may wait
for the right opportunity to promote return without backlash.
Despite substantial research on refugee return once conflict subsides (Black
and Koser 1999; Eastmond and O¨jendal 1999; Bariangaber 2001; Black 2002; Ki-
breab 2002; Stefansson 2004; Bascom 2005; Black and Gent 2006; Black, Eastmond,
and Gent 2006; Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012; Nalepa 2012; Bradley 2013;
Adelman and Peterman 2014; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), there is still
a gap regarding other contexts or cues that encourage return more broadly. The
next section develops a theoretical argument on how refugees deliberate their op-
tions based on their current situation. Refugees constantly update their beliefs on
their safety, livelihood, and well-being and must decide if they should stay in their
host country or return to their origin state. One factor that helps update informa-
tion used by refugees, host states, and international observers to gauge prospects
for return is leader turnover. Leadership changes in the origin state, especially
what the transition signals, provides information about the political climate in
the nation of origin, which translates into variation in patterns of return.
4.3 Leader Turnover as a Heuristic of Political Conditions in the
Country of Origin
I start with the assumption that refugees and humanitarian organizations care
most about the safety of the individual (Ma and Chayavong 2017). Recent survey
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and focus group data of Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon show their primary
concern is physical safety, with all decisions motivated around this central con-
cern for the individuals themselves and their family members (Chu et al. 2019).
Additionally, approximately 40% of refugees surveyed were willing to return to
Syria within the next couple of months, instead of staying in Lebanon or trying
to reach another destination, due to violence generally subsiding in the country.
This is not unique to Lebanon as a host or Syrian refugees. Other studies find
similar patterns of Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and
Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), South Sudanese
(Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black 2002; Black et al. 2004;
Nalepa 2012).
Similarly, humanitarian organizations are wary of supporting refugees who
want to return while violence persists in the country of origin (Gerver 2016).
Their mission is to protect refugees as well as their human rights of asylum in the
host country. They are tasked with advocating on behalf of displaced individuals,
particularly since many do not have rights nor agency to advocate safely in the
host nation. These observers also monitor how host states treat refugees and will
shame them for poor practices and if they are committing refoulement. Annual
human rights reports produced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and the U.S. State Department documents on country practices have specific sec-
tions dedicated to the treatment of refugee and migrant populations in the reports
(Chu 2019a). The reports praise positive behavior and chastise governments who
neglect their duty to protect refugees.
133
At the same time, these organizations are cognizant of the realities of the situ-
ations of refugees such that they will do their best to fight for the best conditions
for refugees while understanding harsh realities that lead to compromise. In the
Handbook of Voluntary Repatriation, the UNHCR claims refugees should only
return when there is physical, legal, and material safety, but recognizes that in
practice, only some of these conditions need to be met for repatriation to hap-
pen (UNHCR 2004). Moreover, organizations will adapt to the needs of refugees.
South Sudanese refugees in Israel were given the ultimatum of returning or face
detention by Israeli authorities. Humanitarian organizations reluctantly assisted
their return because of continued violence at in the country of origin (Gerver
2014). The UNHCR started to move operations to Syria when they observed
many refugees were returning (Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017). Organizations
even disagree with assessments at in the origin state—for example, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International heavily criticized the United Nations for work-
ing with the Pakistani government to return Afghan refugees when Afghanistan
was unsafe and unprepared for their return (Human Rights Watch 2017; Amnesty
International 2018).
Therefore, refugees and international observers assess safety for refugees with
respect to the decision to return based on the extent of current or forecasted
circumstances in the country of origin. I argue an event that signals information
that can be used to update beliefs about the environment in the country of origin
is leader turnover. The focus on leaders is derived from the distinct position the
individual possesses as the figurehead of a state (Ahlquist and Levi 2011). Downs
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and Rocke (1994) make the claim that citizens of every state have an interest in
ensuring that their chief executive makes decisions that reflect their desires. In the
country of origin, the leader and how power was turned over, reflects the extent
of political turmoil and signals stability of conditions in the origin state.
Leader change is a useful heuristic for refugees, host governments, and hu-
manitarian organizations aiding displaced populations in search of information
about conditions in the country of origin. Leader turnover is a major political
event. The nature of the leadership transition helps to infer the security envi-
ronment in the origin state. In particular, leader changes demonstrating policy
change from the predecessor, stability, and legitimacy provides information about
whether circumstances are or will be progressing towards safety and better con-
ditions such that refugee populations can make the journey back. First I will
discuss how each factor can be associated with refugee return patterns indepen-
dently and then explain expectations for transitions exhibiting a combination of
these factors.
First, a leader’s commitment to maintaining their predecessor’s policies leads
to refugees and humanitarian organizations to shape expectations about whether,
upon return, refugees will be safe. Moreover, host countries can use the oppor-
tunity to encourage refugees to return given the leader is expected to shift policy
trajectories from their predecessor. Refugees abroad have an idea who culpable
leaders, or the leader they believe are responsible for the war that displaced them
and its dynamics (Croco 2011; Prorok 2016). New leaders differ from predeces-
sors by having dissimilar preferences in policy areas, evaluate relevant informa-
135
tion differently, and less likely to be entrapped in policies started during their
tenure (Pilster, Bo¨hmelt, and Tago 2015). This is particularly the case if a leader
comes to power with different societal groups than their predecessor, this signals
a potential change in policies of the government since new populations supported
the new leader (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Candidates for executive power
may campaign based off of how their government would deal with the conflict,
as was the case in Colombia’s 2014 presidential elections (Weintraub, Vargas, and
Flores 2015). Governing elites in the country of origin may even promote return
migration if the refugee/emigrant population will help consolidate the new gov-
ernment’s power (Mylonas and Zˇilovic´ 2017).
A change in the domestic governing coalition is often necessary to reignite or
change expectations that would be necessary to end the war or come to an agree-
ment (Stanley and Sawyer 2009). Given different domestic groups likely have di-
vergent preferences regarding domestic and international issues, changes to poli-
cies are most likely when a leader who caters to different interests and preferences
than their predecessor come to power (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Draw-
ing support from different groups, the new leader likely signals coming policy
agenda changes with respect to refugees. Predecessors may have become bogged
down based on their own individual preferences towards a policy, information,
and entrapment obstacles. On the other hand, change in the domestic governing
coalition is often a necessary condition to kick-start the updating process (Stanley
and Sawyer 2009; Ryckman and Braithwaite Forthcoming). Therefore, outsider
changes, when the leader depends on the support from different domestic soci-
136
etal groups than their predecessor, could lead refugees to update their beliefs that
living abroad is not necessarily a safer alternative. Rather, refugees are compelled
to return to their country of origin. One example is Afghanistan. From 1993-1996,
Afghanistan was in a period of “warlordism” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).
This period was marked by lawlessness, poverty, and violence as warlords fought
each other for territorial control, and many individuals fleeing the countries and
becoming refugees. The Taliban began to gain popularity, grow in strength, and
instituted Taliban rule in 1996 with Omar as their leader. Since the Taliban drew
support from different domestic groups than the previous leader, refugees started
to return and were supported by the UNHCR. From Pakistan alone, over 150,000
individuals returned.
On the other hand, leaders that come to power with support from the same do-
mestic societal groups as their predecessor are more likely to signal a commitment
to status quo policies. A new leader from the same group will be associated with
the regime that persecuted refugees (Prorok 2016). On the extreme end, when
a state experiences a failed coup attempt, opponents are ousted and provide the
pretext for their removal, which consolidates the leader’s hold on power and only
bolsters the leader’s policy objectives (Powell, Chacha, and Smith 2018). In this
context, leader transitions are less likely to alter beliefs about physical safety of
repatriated populations, and thus return should be less likely.
For instance, many individuals, the majority being Tamils, fled Sri Lanka after
the defeat of the LTTE. While the Sri Lankan government has made open dec-
larations that refugees should feel safe to return without any political recourse
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(Ritorto 2017), refugees are not returning because the Sri Lankan government
represents the same regime that suppressed and targeted them. Then president
Mahinda Rajapaksa is considered an “insider change” from his predecessor Chan-
drika Kumaratunga (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016), who stands accused
of gross human rights abuses during the civil war (Human Rights Watch 2015a).
Thus, Tamils are wary they will be safe if they repatriate to Sri Lanka because the
leader is linked politically to his predecessor that discriminately targeted them
(Kandasamy 2017). Additionally, the Sri Lankan government has yet to fully re-
store ownership of land and property to those who have returned, even though
the civil war ended almost ten years ago (Human Rights Watch 2018b). This
demonstrates the government’s lack of commitment toward returnees in fulfilling
promises. Therefore I anticipate the following:
Hypothesis 1 Leader turnovers demonstrating policy change from the predecessor are
positively associated with refugees returning.
Second, signals of political turmoil in refugees’ country of origin demonstrate
uncertainty of the direction the country is going towards. Especially if observers
care greatly about the future of the country of origin and whether new policies
will be enacted, how leader turnover occurs will show observers of the conflict
whether the country of origin is heading in a positive and secure direction. In
the context of negotiations, new leaders help overcome lags in the rational up-
dating process, leading to a higher likelihood of negotiation between combatants
(Ryckman and Braithwaite Forthcoming). This shows commitment to peace and
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stability, albeit tentatively, which motivates host states to promote return because
it shows armed groups are thinking about ending the conflict.
Turnovers that happen in keeping with the rules of the origin country’s system
is one way leader changes indicate stability in the country of origin. When there
is a commitment to regulations and laws of the country, observers are more likely
to encourage return migration. Vojislav Kosˇunica’s win in the 2000 presiden-
tial election and ensuing Otpor movement to oust incumbent Slobodan Milosˇevic´
drew many refugees who fled to return to Yugoslavia, with over 760,000 indi-
viduals returning, compared to an average of 1,140 returnees per year in the five
years leading up to the historic win. In Burundi, Pierre Nku´runiziza’s ascension
to power in 2005 led refugees to start returning, especially since the government
demonstrated a commitment to ethnic power-sharing and efforts to bring rebel
groups to the negotiating table, with an increase of over 20,000 refugees returning
from the previous year.
On the other hand, leader turnovers that occur outside of the rules of the coun-
try illustrate a lack of stability in the origin state. When leaders come to power
in this way, refugees are less likely to return since turnovers of power are not oc-
curring based off stipulated laws, suggesting continued political turmoil at home.
In these contexts, new executives have a large incentive to engage in reputation-
building, or coercive action, to prove their resolve (Licht and Allen 2018). When
the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, was assas-
sinated in 2001, the number of refugees returning drops after several steady years
of returnees trickling back to the DRC. This was most likely because his son and
139
successor, Joseph Kabila, in attempts to build his reputation, tried 135 people in
a military tribunal investigating the assassination, with many observers believing
the convicted defendants were innocent. When leaders use their coercive appa-
ratus to suppress dissent (Albertus and Menaldo 2012), refugees will wait longer
before returning. Moreover, humanitarian organizations will highlight continued
insecurity and repressive action in the country of origin and host governments
will not be able to encourage refugee return without being accused of refoulement.
This leads to the following expectation:
Hypothesis 2 Leader turnovers demonstrating stability are positively associated with
refugees returning.
Third, the legitimacy of a leader’s ascension to power is crucial in gleaning in-
formation about stability and policy change. Leaders who rise to power through
illegitimate means with the help of foreign actors do so against established con-
ventions of transitions of power (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). If there
is debate as to whether a leader came to power through legitimate means, domes-
tic groups will question the ability of the government to exert power and enforce
laws within their borders (Weber 1965; Rotberg 2004; Bo¨rzel and Risse 2010). This
will increase the likelihood the new executive will foresee challenges to their rule.
This is why violent groups carry out acts of spoiler violence leading up to elec-
tions since they understand the ability to achieve their objectives occurs during
periods when policy change is up in the air (Kydd and Walter 2006; Braithwaite,
Foster, and Sobek 2010; Findley and Young 2015). In states where governments
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lack any ability to exert power because they are unable to control territory, it pro-
vides opportunities for other actors, particularly nonstate actors, to come in and
fill the vacuum (Lake 2014). Leaders who come to power without much legitimacy
because they required external assistance will need to demonstrate their resolve,
typically through repressive action, to quell dissent from opposition groups (Licht
and Allen 2018). Thus, executives who are unable to demonstrate or actually exer-
cise control within its borders are unlikely to stir refugees to consider returning.
Moreover, humanitarian agencies are less likely to allow refugees to return un-
der these circumstances. For example, many observers do not support the return
of Afghan or Somali refuges because their respective governments are unable to
implement the rule of law and only have territorial control in small parts of the
country (Amnesty International 2003 2013; Human Rights Watch 2017; Amnesty
International 2018).
A way leader change indicates a lack of legitimacy is when foreign actors are
directly involved with the deposition of the previous leader. Receiving external
support is framed in the literature as a principal-agent relationship with ques-
tionable allegiances about whether they are acting on the interest of domestic
populations or on behalf of their guarantors (Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan,
Siroky, and Wood 2014). Therefore, new leaders who replace their predecessor
with the help of foreign actors will be the figurehead of a government without
much legitimacy since they were only able to gain control with this form of sup-
port (Call 2008; Cunningham 2010; Salehyan 2010). This was the case after the
invasion of American forces in Afghanistan and Ahmed Karzai coming to power
141
with the help of the United States. When governance is shared or supported by
other domestic and international actors, including humanitarian NGOs, civilians
do not place faith in their governments to maintain rule of law (Autesserre 2010;
Salehyan 2010; Lake 2014 2017). Refugees may believe new leaders are only a
puppet for those who supported their ascension to power, regardless of whether
it was through violent or nonviolent means as mentioned above if they received
foreign support. In response, refugees will be wary that the new executive will
be able to legitimately rule or be able to enforce the rule of law that would lead to
the protection of refugees’ physical safety. On the other hand, leaders who come
to power without foreign assistance will have more domestic legitimacy, leading
to refugees being more likely to return.
Hypothesis 3 Leader turnovers demonstrating legitimacy are positively associated with
refugees returning.
Leader transitions that will most likely lead to policy changes can overlap with
the other two factors of stability, based on regular transitions of power, and legit-
imacy, based on whether leaders required foreign assistance. Specifically, I expect
a conditional relationship with respect to leader changes providing information
about the potential for future policy changes, stability, and legitimacy. Table 4.1
and Table 4.2 displays the expected size of the returnee flow based on the presence
or absence of these conditions. With respect to leadership changes representing
stability and policy changes in the country of origin, we should expect the most
refugees to return compared to the other conditions. This is because a new leader
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Table 4.1: Regularity of Turnovers and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee Predictions
Regular Irregular
Policy change Most Some
No policy change Some Least
who breaks away from the status quo of their predecessor who comes to power
within the rules endowed by the constitution will demonstrate the most stable
environment for refugees. If this happens, host countries can claim a peaceful
transition of power happened with a new leader who does not represent the vi-
sion of the predecessor, and more reassuringly promotes return. Humanitarian
organizations will say that while the situation in the origin state is not perfect,
this is a step in the right direction. This was the case with the democratically
elected Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who espoused different policies than her predeces-
sor, Gyude Bryant, and led to the return of many refugees to Liberia. Her pop-
ularity among domestic populations and the international community (Gerdes
2015), as well as winning the election, helped demonstrate Liberia was moving in
a positive direction.
Alternatively, leader turnovers that demonstrate unstable conditions and a lack
of change from the prior leader are expected to have the least number of returnees.
Organizations will be extremely wary that returned refugees will be protected or
safe. Host states, even if they want to decrease the number of refugees in their
borders, could not promote return given this type of turnover signifies an unsafe
environment for refugees to consider return and would be committing refoulement.
Therefore, I anticipate the following:
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Hypothesis 4 Leader turnovers demonstrating both stability and policy change from the
predecessor is positively associated with refugees returning.
With respect to legitimacy and policy change, we should expect a similar dy-
namic. When leader turnovers provide information to outside observers that the
change was legitimate and the new leader will likely pursue different policies
than their predecessor, this shows a positive change in conditions in the country
of origin. Turnovers are considered less legitimate when the leader required for-
eign assistance to gain power. Host states can capitalize on the opportunity by
claiming conditions have sufficiently changed enough for refugees to start return-
ing. Refugees may believe this is enough positive progress to take the journey
back, especially if they were living in suboptimal conditions in the host state.
Organizations assisting refugee populations will be less likely to refuse help for
refugees who want to return because they too are observing changes in the coun-
try of origin.
On the other hand, leader turnovers suggesting illegitimate rises to power
with no policy change will severely limit the number of refugees who return.
For example, when Iyad Allawi took office as the Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004
with continued help from the United States, refugees were extremely reluctant to
return because of continued violence as well as a leader supported by a foreign
government. This leads to the following expectation:
Hypothesis 5 Leader turnovers demonstrating both legitimacy and policy change from
the predecessor is positively associated with refugees returning.
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Table 4.2: Turnovers with Foreign Assistance and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee
Predictions
With Foreign Assistance Without Foreign Assistance
Policy change Most Some
No policy change Some Least
4.4 Research Design
In order to test the relationship between the dynamics of leader changes and the
number of returning refugees, I construct a dataset of country directed-dyad-
years from 1989-2016.I use directed-dyad-years as the unit of observation instead
of the origin-state year because conditions of the host states must be taken into
account when explaining refuge return patterns (Chu 2019b). I do not do a dyadic
approach because host states can produce refugees that are hosted in another state
and I want to ensure that the directionality of return, host to origin country, is
maintained. I report models that only include pairings of directed-dyads if, since
1960, there was a flow of refugees from an origin country to that particular host
country. Countries included in the analysis must be part of the Correlates of War
Systems list (Correlates of War Project 2011).
The dependent variable is the number of refugees returning from a host coun-
try back to their country of origin in a given year. This information is provided
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2018b). In the
data, returnees are defined as “former refugees who have returned to their coun-
try of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion.” This takes into account
individuals who obtained refugee status and returned, and not those that are
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asylum seekers or those who did not attain refugee status. This implies that ad-
ditional individuals may have returned to their country of origin as well, but are
not documented by the UNHCR because they did not complete or go through the
process of obtaining official refugee status.
My primary independent variable is types of leader change in countries of ori-
gin. I produce a series of binary variables operationalizing leader turnovers and
whether the transition demonstrated stability, legitimacy, or policy change from
two datasets on world leaders: Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009)
and Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) (Mattes, Leeds, and Mat-
sumura 2016). The baseline “0” category in all models is no change in leadership
in that year.
For stability, I use the exit variable from Archigos. I generate Regular exit,
coded 1 if a leader was removed in accordance with explicit rules or established
conventions of the country, such as term limits or defeat in elections. Irregular exit
is coded 1 if a leader is removed outside the established conventions of the state
by domestic forces, such as coups or popular revolts.
I consider legitimate leader transitions to occur when the leader required no
foreign assistance and illegitimate transitions when the leader was helped with
foreign actors. Removed with foreign support is coded 1 if a leader was directly
imposed by a foreign entity or a domestic group removed the leader with foreign
support. Foreign-imposed information comes from the Archigos exit variable.
I use the exitcode variable, which codes whether domestic groups, such as the
military, protests, rebels, or other government actors received foreign support to
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help depose the leader. Removed without foreign support is coded 1when there were
no foreign parties involved in the turnover of power.
Leader turnovers signaling future policy change occur when the new leader
most likely has different preferences and support bases than their predecessor.
From the CHISOLS data, I code insider changes as instances where the new leader
comes to power with the same domestic societal groups and outsider changeswhen
the leader comes to power with different support base as their predecessor.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 suggests a combination of policy change with stability
and legitimacy will influence the expected number of refugees. Table 4.3 dis-
plays the number of observations and other summary statistics of these leader
changes in the sample. It should be noted that there are only 78 instances of a
leader change with foreign supporters helping an individual domestically linked
to their predecessor. Moreover, in these 78 observations, there is no reported ev-
idence of refugees returning to their country of origin. While this could serve as
preliminary evidence that leaders who come to power with foreign support with
no expected policy changes are the least likely to attract any returnees, the small-
N size makes it difficult to make any conclusions. Because of these limitations,
I cannot run the model with this full specification. Instead, I group all insider
changes together and only differentiate foreign support with outsider changes.
I control for an array of other factors that could influence the number of re-
turnees in a given year. First I control for whether a leader transition happens due
to death unrelated to political circumstances. This is in line with other studies of
distinguishing leader turnover types (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). I
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Table 4.3: Returnees Based on Type of Leader Change
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Regular Outsider 7,621 174.152 6289.549 0 435790
Regular Insider 5,690 104.329 2263.244 0 98050
Irregular Outsider 2,572 139.836 4561.802 0 215566
Irregular Insider 1,017 50.853 969.630 0 29100
Outsider w/ No Foreign Support 9,850 141.562 5543.458 0 435790
Insider w/ No Foreign Support 7,613 87.795 2001.725 0 98050
Outsider w/ Foreign Support 484 611.322 10394.660 0 215566
Insider w/ Foreign Support 78 0 0 0 0
No turnover (baseline) 98,376 157.117 7815.991 0 1569248
also include a dummy variable for leadership transition in the host state.
I include several variables characterizing the directed-dyad relationship be-
tween the host and origin countries. The first is the logged minimum distance
between the directed-dyad in kilometers (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010)
and the logged existing size of the refugee population in the host state (UNHCR
2018b).
I account for civil conflict in the country of origin, particularly since most
refugees are fleeing this form of violence. I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram’s Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and
Themne´r 2016) to generate indicators of civil conflict in the origin state. I gener-
ate a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country of origin is experiencing civil
conflict where there is an incompatibility between the government and a nonstate
group where at least 25 battle deaths are recorded, and 0 otherwise.
I also control for macro-level indicators of both the host and origin countries
that are generally considered “push-pull” factors. These include levels of electoral
democracy (Coppedge et al. 2018), logged GDP per capita (World Bank 2016), and
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Archigos Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 170388 118.254 6205.408 0 1569248
Leader Change 170388 .144 .351 0 1
Regular Exit 170388 .116 .321 0 1
Irregular Exit 170388 .026 .16 0 1
Removed w/ Foreign Support 140990 .005 .072 0 1
Removed w/o Foreign Support 169663 .173 .378 0 1
Leader Death 170388 .011 .102 0 1
Minimum Distance, (logged km) 170388 7.607 2.185 0 9.821
Refugees (logged) 170388 1.517 2.334 0 14.603
Leader Change, Host 170388 .187 .39 0 1
Civil Conflict 170388 .284 .451 0 1
Electoral Democracy, Origin 170388 .413 .232 .015 .94
Electoral Democracy, Host 170388 .667 .261 .015 .94
GDPPC, Origin 170388 7.19 1.401 4.19 11.688
GDPPC, Host 170388 8.798 1.691 4.19 11.688
Population, Host 170388 16.553 1.448 11.87 21.044
Population, Origin 170388 16.484 1.488 11.144 21.044
Years since last return 170388 11.835 7.965 0 27
Years since last return2 170388 203.5 208.969 0 729
Years since last return3 170388 4008.602 5241.083 0 19683
logged population (World Bank 2016). All independent variables are lagged by
one year such that refugee returns occur in the following year. To account for
time dependence, I compute the length of non-return year spells, along with the
squared and cubic transformations of the variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998;
Carter and Signorino 2010).
Overall, the Archigos sample includes an N of 170,388 with 5,212 directed-
dyad years where return occurs and an N of 116,568 with 3,605 directed-dyad
years when using CHISOLS. This is because the CHISOLS data only covers
turnovers up to 2008 whereas Archigos is coded to 2015. Summary statistics of
all variables included in the models are found in Table 4.4 for the Archigos sam-
ple and Table 4.5 for the CHISOLS sample. Summary statistics for the variables
restricted to whether at least one refugee returned in a given year can be found
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 116568 153.462 7409.772 0 1569248
Leader Change 116568 .156 .363 0 1
Insider Change 116568 .067 .25 0 1
Outsider Change 116568 .089 .285 0 1
Regular Insider 116568 .055 .227 0 1
Irregular Insider 116568 .01 .101 0 1
Regular Outsider 116568 .072 .258 0 1
Irregular Outsider 116568 .025 .158 0 1
Insider change w/ and w/o FS 116568 .074 .261 0 1
Outsider Change w/ FS 116568 .005 .07 0 1
Outsider Change w/o FS 116568 .091 .288 0 1
Leader Death 116568 .011 .103 0 1
Minimum Distance, (logged km) 116568 7.592 2.207 0 9.821
Refugees (logged) 116568 1.318 2.282 0 14.603
Leader Change, Host 116568 .198 .399 0 1
Civil Conflict 116568 .287 .452 0 1
Electoral Democracy, Origin 116568 .394 .235 .015 .923
Electoral Democracy, Host 116568 .653 .269 .015 .923
GDPPC, Origin 116568 6.914 1.357 4.19 11.481
GDPPC, Host 116568 8.533 1.697 4.19 11.481
Population, Origin 116568 16.448 1.441 12.622 21.004
Population, Host 116568 16.573 1.367 12.622 21.004
Years since last return 116568 8.5 5.679 0 19
Years since last return2 116568 104.509 106.102 0 361
Years since last return3 116568 1467.508 1895.295 0 6859
in Tables C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C.
Since there are a large number of zeroes because return flows are relatively rare
and given the dependent variable is the count of returnees, I use zero-inflated neg-
ative binomial models (ZiNB). I employ ZiNB, rather than a zero-inflated poisson,
because the count portion of the sample is over-dispersed (Long 1997). I cluster
standard errors on the directed-dyad.
4.5 Discussion of Results
Results of the ZiNB models are presented in a series of tables. ZiNB models pro-
vide two sets of coefficient estimates. The first is for the probability that return
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does not occur (Pr(0) columns), with positive coefficients interpreted as the like-
lihood of a “non-event” being more likely and negative coefficients meaning a
“non-event” is less likely. In terms of the dependent variable, a positively signed
coefficient is interpreted as the independent variable increases the likelihood that
no refugees return in a given year. The second stage (Count columns) accounts
for the count element of the dependent variable once it has surpassed the “0”
threshold. A positively signed coefficient is interpreted as the covariate being as-
sociated with a higher number of returnees given at least 1 individual returned
that year. Moreover, ZiNB is the appropriate count model for these analyses since
the dispersion parameter, logged a, is positive and significant for all models.
Table 4.6 presents results for the various specifications of what leader
turnovers signal.2 Model 1 tests whether inside or outside leader changes are as-
sociated with refugee returns. For insider changes, the likelihood that no refugees
return is small. Yet, there is no statistically meaningful relationship in the size of
the returnee flow, though the coefficient is negative. For outsider changes, there
is no influence on whether we will see any return happen. However, if at least
one refugee returns, we are more likely to see a high number of returnees. In-
sider changes are predicted to pull in 4,262 returnees whereas outsider changes
are expected to have 13,053 refugees repatriating home. This shows support for
Hypothesis 3. Outsider changes, which heuristically demonstrates an upcoming
policy shift from the predecessor, entice larger numbers of refugees to return. In-
2Results of models with a binary specification of any leader turnover in the country of origin
can be found in Table C.3 of Appendix C.
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Table 4.6: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -1.078*** -0.230
(0.154) (0.293)
Outsider Change 0.064 0.954**
(0.110) (0.299)
Regular Exit -0.597*** 0.525*
(0.107) (0.212)
Irregular Exit 0.925*** -0.330
(0.227) (0.402)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. 0.221 -1.511**
(0.527) (0.548)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.380*** 0.585**
(0.099) (0.217)
Leader Death 0.783*** -0.233 0.537* -0.537 0.662** -0.659
(0.233) (0.626) (0.249) (0.683) (0.232) (0.698)
Minimum Distance -0.027† -0.767*** -0.047** -0.788*** -0.047** -0.784***
(0.016) (0.053) (0.016) (0.057) (0.016) (0.055)
Refugees -0.522*** 0.209*** -0.490*** 0.247*** -0.492*** 0.252***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036)
Leader Change, Host 0.100 0.064 0.040 -0.188 0.039 -0.164
(0.089) (0.248) (0.081) (0.226) (0.082) (0.228)
Civil Conflict -0.610*** -1.309*** -0.573*** -0.639** -0.537*** -0.734**
(0.105) (0.250) (0.093) (0.243) (0.093) (0.234)
Electoral Democracy, Home -1.750*** -0.452 -0.982*** 0.366 -1.079*** 0.317
(0.237) (0.634) (0.275) (0.786) (0.272) (0.771)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.251 -0.300 0.707** -0.081 0.706** -0.052
(0.238) (0.457) (0.221) (0.496) (0.219) (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin 0.117** -0.188 -0.027 -0.244* -0.038 -0.251*
(0.045) (0.135) (0.042) (0.123) (0.042) (0.121)
GDPPC, Host 0.488*** 0.354*** 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.461***
(0.043) (0.094) (0.041) (0.096) (0.041) (0.094)
Population, Origin 0.103* -0.184 0.138** -0.017 0.139** -0.009
(0.042) (0.128) (0.044) (0.151) (0.044) (0.152)
Population, Host 0.156*** 0.367*** 0.189*** 0.398*** 0.188*** 0.387***
(0.037) (0.098) (0.035) (0.099) (0.036) (0.102)
Constant -5.881*** 4.377† -6.758*** -0.386 -6.620*** -0.215
(0.885) (2.236) (0.818) (2.082) (0.823) (2.084)
N 116568 3605 170388 5212 170388 5212
ln(a) 2.352*** 2.341*** 2.348***
(0.063) (0.056) (0.056)
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
sider changes, on the other hand, show no meaningful difference in the number
of returnees, suggesting a continuance of the status quo in the government is less
likely to alter refugee’s calculations about whether return is a viable option.
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Model 2 shows the results of regular leader exits, suggesting stability, and
irregular turnovers, suggesting instability. When a leader leaves office according
to the regulations of the state, the probability that no refugee returns is low and
we are more likely to see higher numbers of refugees returning in the subsequent
year. Compared to years without leader turnovers, a regular exit is 45% more
likely to witness at least one refugee return to their home country. On the other
hand, irregular exits are not likely to prompt even one refugee to return nor does
it influence the size of the return flow, though the coefficient is negatively signed
as expected. The likelihood no refugees return when there is an irregular change
is 152% higher than no leadership changes. This is in support of Hypotheses 1,
which expected regular changes to be associated with more returnees because
regular exits demonstrate stability at home and turnovers of power abiding by
the rules of the system whereas irregular changes signaling political turmoil and
therefore fewer refugees deciding to return. In the count stage, 8,574 individuals
are expected to return after a regular exit, 3,607 after an irregular exit, and 5,004
during times of no changes, all else being equal. This suggests regular leadership
exits are a meaningful pull factor from home that encourages refugees to return,
whereas irregular changes are not.
Model 3 examines the influence of foreign support as a means of replacing a
country’s leader. Leaders removed with foreign support are no more or less likely
to lead to return construed as a binary, though in the count stage, fewer refugees
return. On the other hand, when a leader is removed without foreign support, we
are likely to see at least 1 refugee return and the size of the return flow is higher
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than in years when no leader turnover occurred. The percent change in the ex-
pected count for returnees given a leader is removed with foreign support is a
decrease of 77.9% and an increase by 79.4% when the leader is removed without
foreign support. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 2, which anticipated
turnovers demonstrating the leader came to power through legitimate means en-
courages return whereas illegitimate rises to power decrease the likelihood of
return. Whether foreign actors were involved with the turnover is a sign that the
leader is incapable of coming to power without external sponsorship. This makes
refugees and humanitarian governments wary about the ability of the govern-
ment to maintain the rule of law and ensure safety. On the other hand, we do see
that leaders who come to power without foreign support are much more likely
to prompt refugee returns, due to the legitimacy of the government being able to
wield power without foreign assistance. Therefore, there is evidence that there
is a relationship between leader exits and whether the new executive had foreign
assistance.
Figure 4.1 displays the average marginal effect of the various leader turnover
types on the number of returnees while keeping all other variables at their means
and takes into account both the zero-inflated and count stages of the model.3
Outsider changes, regular exits, and leaders removed without foreign support are
predicted to observe more refugees repatriating than years without turnover. Al-
ternatively, insider changes, irregular leader changes, and leaders removed with
3Pairwise comparisons of these predictions can be found in Figures C.1 and C.2 of Appendix
C.
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Figure 4.1: Average Marginal Effect of Leader Turnover Types
-500
0
500
1000
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 P
re
di
ct
ed
 N
um
be
r o
f R
et
ur
ne
es
Insider Outsider
-500
0
500
1000
Regular Irregular
-500
0
500
1000
With Foreign Support Without Foreign Support
foreign support are expected to see fewer refugees returning.
Next, Table 4.7 presents the results of leadership changes sharing multiple
characteristics. Model 4 shows the estimates for turnovers signifying combina-
tions of stability and policy change. As expected, leaders who leave office in
accordance with established rules who drew support from different domestic so-
cietal groups are associated with an increase in the number of refugees who re-
turn. There is no influence on the first stage on the likelihood of any return. When
transitions occur regularly and the successor draws support from the same do-
mestic societal groups, the likelihood at least one refugee returns is high but there
is no impact on the number of returnees. Irregular turnovers of power, regardless
of whether the successor drew support from the same or different groups, are
more likely to have no refugee make the journey back. However, there is no influ-
ence on the number of refugees who decide to return to their country of origin.
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This provides support for Hypothesis 4, which expected most refugees to return
under the conditions of a regular outsider change since it signals a commitment
to stability as well as forecasted changes in policy. Under these circumstances,
16,626 individuals are predicted to return, compared to fewer than 5,000 for the
other three categories. This suggests turnovers conveying stability and changes in
policy are required for refugees to return.
Model 5 shows results of leader changes conveying legitimacy and policy
change. Recall that there was no variation with respect to insider changes with
foreign support in the data (see Table 4.3), which is why foreign support is only
disaggregated for outsider changes. In line with Hypothesis 5, leader changes
more likely to enact policy change that did not need foreign support to enter of-
fice are associated with an increase in the number of refugees who return. 14,778
refugees are expected to return under these circumstances. On the other hand,
leaders who required foreign support are associated with a decrease in those who
make the journey back to their country of origin, with only 845 refugees predicted
to return under this condition. Similar to Model 3, insider changes are likely to
have at least 1 refugee return but has no influence on the count of returnees. From
these results, leaders who enter office legitimately seem to matter most. Even if
a leader is anticipated to break from their predecessor’s policies, if the leader
needed external support to enter office, observers, such as refugees and human-
itarian organizations, are more reluctant to promote return. Even if host states
might want refugees to leave, humanitarian organizations will be more inclined
to pressure host states to continue their obligation to host because circumstances
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Table 4.7: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Turnovers
(Model 4) (Model 5)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider Change -0.148 1.228***
(0.117) (0.323)
Regular Exit, Insider Change -1.322*** -0.291
(0.163) (0.309)
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change 0.864** 0.093
(0.277) (0.447)
Irregular Exit, Insider Change 0.656† 0.510
(0.392) (0.850)
Without Foreign Support, Outsider 0.031 1.049***
(0.110) (0.303)
With Foreign Support, Outsider 0.212 -1.798**
(0.817) (0.641)
Insider Change -1.080*** -0.229
(0.154) (0.292)
Leader Death 0.617* 0.171 0.785*** -0.226
(0.240) (0.599) (0.233) (0.626)
Minimum Distance -0.026 -0.760*** -0.028† -0.769***
(0.017) (0.054) (0.016) (0.054)
Refugees -0.521*** 0.207*** -0.522*** 0.210***
(0.022) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036)
Leader Change, Host 0.117 0.097 0.097 0.055
(0.089) (0.243) (0.089) (0.247)
Civil Conflict -0.690*** -1.288*** -0.622*** -1.305***
(0.105) (0.250) (0.105) (0.250)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.664*** -0.460 -1.726*** -0.435
(0.238) (0.630) (0.237) (0.630)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.240 -0.349 0.240 -0.352
(0.238) (0.459) (0.239) (0.456)
GDPPC, Origin 0.120** -0.203 0.117* -0.193
(0.045) (0.135) (0.045) (0.135)
GDPPC, Host 0.497*** 0.357*** 0.490*** 0.361***
(0.043) (0.095) (0.044) (0.093)
Population, Origin 0.114** -0.173 0.109** -0.175
(0.043) (0.132) (0.042) (0.127)
Population, Host 0.152*** 0.350*** 0.157*** 0.370***
(0.037) (0.098) (0.037) (0.098)
Constant -6.061*** 4.563* -6.008*** 4.203†
(0.894) (2.259) (0.888) (2.225)
N 116568 3605 116568 3605
ln(a) 2.348*** 2.350***
(0.064) (0.063)
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
are not conducive for return.
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Figure 4.2: Average Marginal Effects of Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers
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Figure 4.2 shows the average marginal effects of the combination of leader
turnover types compared to no leader change in a given year and incorporates
both the binary and count portions of the model.4 From the left panel, regu-
lar outsider changes and outsider changes without foreign support, which signal
stability and expected policy changes, and outsider changes without foreign sup-
port, are predicted to have the largest increase in difference in the number of
individuals who return. The other conditions do not expect statistically different
numbers of returnees compared to years of no turnover.
Moving to the right panel, turnovers conveying legitimate ascension to power
and a higher likelihood of a different policy trajectory are expected to see more
individuals returning. On the other hand, even if a leader derives support from
4Pairwise comparisons of these predictions can be found in Figures C.3 and C.4 of Appendix
C.
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different domestic societal groups than their predecessor, if they received foreign
assistance, there is a sharp decrease in the number of refugees who return to their
country of origin.
The control variables behave as previous literature expected. When a leader
dies in office unrelated to political circumstances, the likelihood no refugee re-
turns is high yet there is no influence on the count. The larger the refugee stock
in a host state and the closer a host state is to the country of origin, the more likely
we are to see returns in larger numbers. Civil conflicts are more likely to lead to
at least one refugee returning, but not in large numbers. Leader changes in the
host state do not have meaningful impacts on whether returns occur nor the size
of the outflow. The more democratic the origin state is, the more likely we are
to see return, but there is no influence on the count of returnees. If refugees are
hosted in a country with electoral democracy, we are less likely to see any refugee
return, though there is no bearing on the count of returnees. The wealthier the
origin nation, the less likely we are to see refugees returning to their country of
origin. The wealthier the host state, the more likely we are to see returns hap-
pening. While counter-intuitive, Chu (2019b) explains this is because on average,
countries of origin score lower on macro-level conditions such as GDPPC because
they are recovering from events like civil conflict. Finally, host states with larger
populations are more likely to see more refugees returning whereas the popula-
tion of the country of origin does not produce meaningful statistical relationships.
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4.5.1 Robustness Checks
I run several robustness checks to see if the results are similar under different
samples. First, given the high skew of the number of returnees, I rerun the mod-
els by removing some outliers. Afghanistan and Eritrea are the top two countries
with the higehst number of refugees. Tables 6 and 7 of the Appendix report mod-
els where I remove all observations where Afghanistan and Eritrea are countries
of origin. Next, I remove observations that are above the 95th percentile of the
distribution of returnees. The coefficient estimates are in Tables C.8 and C.9 of
Appendix C. Results are robust to the main results.
The current sample includes all directed-dyads if there was a flow of refugees
from an origin country to the host state since 1960. Tables C.10 and C.11 of Ap-
pendix C display models where all possible directed-dyads are included, with
all countries in the international system having the potential to be a refugee-
producing state and a state that hosts refugees. Regular exits are no longer as-
sociated with refugee return. This could be due to the over inflation of zeros
since this sample includes directed-dyads where countries may never produce
nor host refugees. However, when testing for combinations of leader turnovers,
regular exits with an outside change do indeed lead to more refugees returning,
and therefore match the results of the main models. All other regressions display
similar relationships to the main models.
Next, since most refugees in the Post-Cold War period are fleeing civil conflict,
I restrict the current dataset to only include countries of origin that experienced
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling
Stability with Civil Conflict
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some form of organized conflict that produced 25 battle deaths or more. In the
first sample, I include all conflict years as well as the 5 years leading to onset and
5 years after termination. These results are in Tables C.8 and C.9 of Appendix C..
The second sample is the same except I extend the years of pre- and post-conflict
to 10 years, with coefficient estimates in Tables C.10 and C.11 of Appendix C.
These different sample specifications corroborate the main findings.
Up to this point, I have remained agnostic about the role of civil conflict pro-
cesses in this picture. However, as civil conflicts are events that produce the most
refugees, this cannot be ignored. Leader turnovers could be part of the conflict
termination process, which then leads to a higher number of refugees returning
in the following year. I address this by interacting the civil conflict variable with
the various leader turnover variables. The full results tables can be found in Ta-
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling
Legitimacy and Policy Change with Civil Conflict
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bles C.4 and C.5 of Appendix C. To interpret the results more easily, I generate
the predicted number of returnees under each of these circumstances. The results
are presented as scatter plots in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5.5 Circles
correspond to predictions when there is no conflict whereas squares correspond
to ongoing conflict in the country of origin.
In general, there is a dampening effect of civil conflict across all models, where
fewer refugees are returning when civil conflict is ongoing. With respect to
turnovers conveying stability at in the country of origin, an interesting pattern
emerges. Regular turnovers in the absence of conflict are expected to generate the
most returnees. On the other hand, when conflict is ongoing, both regular and
irregular transitions of power, as well as no leader changes, yield approximately
5For ease of legibility, confidence intervals have been omitted from the graph. For the statistical
significance of specific variables, please see the corresponding results tables in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.5: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Combination of
Turnovers with Civil Conflict
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the same number of returnees. However, irregular exits during conflict are pre-
dicted to have an extremely small number of individuals returning. This suggests
ongoing conflict impacts information about stability differently. Moreover, if an
ongoing conflict is considered “unstable” and the absence of fighting is “stable,”
these patterns bolster the arguments developed in the theory section. There is
a spike in the number of returnees when conflict is absent and the turnover of
power happens within the rules and regulation of the country. In other words,
stable turnovers during conflict are not enough to boost the number of refugees
who return. Alternatively, when there is an irregular transfer of power during
the unstable period of civil conflict, conditions in the country of origin are clearly
unacceptable for refugees to return.
Moving to turnovers with or without foreign assistance (left panel of Fig-
ure 4.4), the patterns are similar to Model 2 where, in general, leaders who come
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to power with foreign support attract fewer refugees and leaders without help are
expected to more refugees to return compared to no turnover. There are, however,
slight differences in this distinction if a conflict is ongoing. If a leader comes to
power with foreign support during conflict, fewer refugees are expected to return.
On the other hand, leaders who come to power during conflict without foreign
support are predicted to have the most refugees return, even compared to the
absence of fighting. Therefore, leaders who come to power with the assistance of
foreign actors convey that they are most likely unable to enforce the rule of law,
especially during conflict.
The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows predictions based on insider and outsider
changes. The only difference from Model 3 is clearly, outsider changes have an
effect on return conditional on ongoing conflict. Outsider changes during con-
flict have approximately the same expected number of returnees as the other
categories. On the other hand, outsider changes in the absence of conflict lead
to an expected 28,008 individuals to return. Therefore, leader changes that are
associated with future policy changes that happen during conflict may not be
meaningful enough to encourage refugees to return.
Figure 4.5 displays the predicted number of returnees when combining pol-
icy change with stability (left panel) and legitimacy (right panel). As expected,
regular outsider turnovers expect the most refugees to return when there is no
civil conflict. Irregular turnovers that happen while conflict is ongoing is pre-
dicted to produce more returnees than if this type of turnover happened in the
absence of conflict because this condition exhibits the most stable environment
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for refugees. This could suggest irregular turnovers during conflict are linked to
conflict dynamics in the country of origin.
Moving to the right panel, civil conflict has a dampening effect on the num-
ber of refugees who return in all of these circumstances. The starkest difference
in the predicted number of returnees is outsider changes that did not require
foreign support while conflict subsides. Yet, even if the country of origin is not
experiencing civil conflict, outsider leader changes that require foreign support
are expected to produce fewer refugees than all other conditions. This highlights
the legitimacy of the new leader still matters in conveying information about the
status of the country of origin and whether it is conducive to return.
4.6 Conclusion
The findings of the large-N, cross-national empirical test suggest refugee return
patterns are sensitive to changes in the political environment in their country
of origin. When leader turnovers in the country of origin demonstrate stabil-
ity, legitimacy, and a higher likelihood of policy change from the predecessor,
refugees abroad are responding by returning to their origin state. When investi-
gating leader changes that embody a combination of these factors, policy change
tends to matter more than stability and legitimacy is more likely to lead to more
refugees returning than signals of policy change. These patterns emerge even
when taking into account ongoing civil conflict in the country of origin.
These findings are relevant given most attention is centered on the factors
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inducing flight, with less focus on alternative solutions to refugees. As indus-
trialized countries continue to limit options for resettlement (Hatton 2009) and
local integration into host countries is unsustainable because of the large number
of refugees (Hynie 2018), other durable solutions must be taken into considera-
tion. Given the majority of refugees want to return, understanding under what
conditions refugees are more likely to return to will help shift resources toward
returnees to assist with reintegration into their country of origin.
One limitation to the large-N analysis is the inability to know which actor
is driving refugees to return: host states, humanitarian organizations, or the
refugees themselves. While refugees are the ones making the journey back, it
is unclear how voluntary the decision was. UNHCR data on returnees account
for spontaneous returns, or when refugees return to their origin country with-
out any form of assistance, and through a formal repatriation agreement or pro-
gram moderated by the UN. It is unclear if host countries are pressuring the
UN to formulate a repatriation agreement, as in the case of Pakistan returning
Afghan refugees (Human Rights Watch 2017). Future research could survey re-
turned refugees to gauge the voluntariness of return as well as current refugees
to understand their preferences about return, what circumstances they would like
to observe before return, how pressured they feel to leave by host states, and
how helpful humanitarian organizations are with this process. Researchers can
also interview humanitarian organizations working with displaced populations
to understand their perspectives, as well as their role as they navigate host state
demands and refugee needs.
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This highlights the next step of refugee return, particularly what influences
their return has on their country of origin. While a “successful” reintegration of
returnees is considered to be a necessary condition for reconciliation and recon-
struction (Black and Gent 2006), there are various obstacles to this conclusion.
Origin countries may want to repatriate citizens who fled, but fear they lack the
capacity to do so. The Nicaraguan government feared that they did not have
the resources to sustain the return of refugees (Phillips 2004). Returnees can also
lead to tensions with individuals who opted not to leave the country (Kibreab
2002). Repatriates are less likely to ask for assistance upon their return compared
to those that stayed (Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012). Even if returnees be-
lieve the government owes them reparations, they may lack confidence in the
post-conflict government to provide assistance (Cantor 2011).
Moreover, the results of the current study show refugees are returning while
conflict is ongoing. Future work can address whether return influences conflict
dynamics in the country of origin. Refugees may harbor different preferences
about the political direction of their country compared to domestic populations
that stayed within the origin state (Schwartz Forthcoming). This can be conse-
quential to the political climate since returnees can lead to new balances of power
and political arrangements (Koser 2000). From other research, individuals af-
fected by war violence are found to be more politically active and participate in
community programs than those that identify as non-victims (Blattman 2009; Bel-
lows and Miguel 2009). Therefore, understanding how returned refugees are a
part of this process can help with the reintegration and rebuilding process of the
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origin state.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
Finding solutions for the millions of forcibly displaced persons is not a simple
task. Yet, there are many ways academics and policymakers can contribute to a
general understanding by studying the observable actions of governments and
refugees. I break away from current assumptions that refugees are completely
bereft of agency and are able to know what is best for their situation, even if this
goes against normative beliefs of safety. With this in mind, this dissertation is
an attempt to understand the consequences of some of these dynamics, particu-
larly circumstances in the host nation and origin state for refugees and their jour-
neys onward. Aside from the individual arguments and findings of each chapter,
which are detailed below, I identify two broader contributions of this project to
the fields of international relations and political science.
The first broader contribution is (re)introducing the relations between states
in our understanding of refugee politics. Putnam (1988)’s seminal work on two-
level games pushed international relations scholars to evaluate both international
and domestic to help explain international behavior. The conceptual framework
of using international and domestic levels to help explain observable patterns is
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not constrained to certain types of phenomena. When understanding forced dis-
placement, it is critical to engage both domestic and international considerations,
especially when multiple states are involved. While monadic studies are useful in
understanding certain research questions, this setup only provides a partial pic-
ture. A more holistic approach incorporates, at a minimum, both circumstances
in the host and origin countries.
The second broader contribution is an improved understanding of how condi-
tions in host and origin states influence refugee experiences and how decisions are
made about their future. Scholarship up to this point has produced a great deal
of work addressing why people flee their homelands (Clark 1989; Schmeidl 1997;
Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013; Schon
2019) and how the arrival of refugee populations affect a variety of outcomes in
the host state (Ek and Karadawi 1991; Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002; Cortes 2004;
Adamson 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016; Taylor et al.
2016; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Polo and Wucherpfennig 2018; Ghosn, Braith-
waite, and Chu 2019; Braithwaite et al. 2019), such as economic growth, political
changes, and violence, in the host state. I build upon this literature by identifying
conditions in the host and origin states that likely to push and pull refugees to
make the journey back to their country of origin.
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5.2 Review of the Empirical Chapters
Beyond the broader contributions of this dissertation, the three empirical chap-
ters make more directed contributions through novel arguments and corroborated
with empirical tests. The following sections highlights these arguments and con-
tributions from these chapters.
5.2.1 Chapter 2 - Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Re-
spect for Human Rights
In this chapter, I develop an argument suggesting refugees from a a strategic rival
will motivate host states to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled
population of their adversary. By doing so, host states are openly shaming their
rival in an attempt to undermine their adversary’s legitimacy and discredit that
government in the eyes of the international community. The self-promotion and
cooperation with humanitarian organizations to host refugees will be associated
with an increase in respect for human rights. On the other hand, the absence of a
strategic rivalry between the host and origin state provides less of an incentive for
host states to be willing to protect refugees, especially in the face of a xenophobic
domestic public.This should lead to a decrease in respect human rights.
I test these arguments using data on the number of refugees a host states ac-
cepts from rival and non-rival country and changes in respect for human rights
in the host state. I find support for my arguments; hosting refugees from neigh-
boring rival states is associated with the strongest improvement in human rights
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whereas refugees from a contiguous and non-rival state are related to the steepest
decrease in respect for human rights.
The findings of this study show that the arrival of refugees is not always met
with repressive action by the state (Danneman and Ritter 2014). In fact, there
seems to be a conditioning effect once interstate relations are taken into account.
At the same time, conditions for refugees in the host state are not necessarily rosy,
especially since most refugees are not from strategic rivals. This leads to questions
about how refugee populations interpret situations in the host state and whether
there are other options besides staying in exile.
5.2.2 Chapter 3 - Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return
Building upon Chapter 2, this essay explores one option refugees could take: re-
turn to their country of origin. Existing scholarship on refugee return tends to
critically evaluate the lack of voluntary decision-making or limit the scope to the
post-conflict period. Yet, there is little systematic knowledge about conditions ad
circumstances in host and origin countries that are, on average, more likely to
lead to refugees returning.
To address this gap in the literature, I adopt a “push and pull” framework used
in studies of voluntary and forced displacement as a conceptual foundation for
when refugee return is expected. I contend refugees are pushed to return when
political, economic, and physical security in the host state is weak and pulled to
return when they are positive in the country of origin. However, I disagree with
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prior studies that directly compare host and origin countries, as these states are
not equivalent. I anticipate shifts in the origin and host nations can stimulate
returns as a means to get around this selection issue.
I test my hypotheses on a cross-national dataset of origin and host states in the
Post-Cold War period. The analyses suggest several factors to keep in mind when
studying refugee return. First, explaining return must take into account political,
economic, and physical security conditions in host and home states. Without
taking these factors into account, there is an incomplete picture of the context
refugees are operating in. Moreover, physical security tends to supersede the
explanatory power of political and economic circumstances, serving as a strong
push and pull factor for patterns of refugee return.
A puzzling finding from this analysis is that more refugees are expected to
return during conflict, rather than the post-conflict period. This is intriguing given
many studies on refugee return focus solely on the years after conflict official
terminates in the origin state. This leads to questions about why refugees would
return to their country of origin while conflict is ongoing and whether there are
other factors in the origin state that might pull refugees to return.
5.2.3 Chapter 4 - The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Re-
turn
After the counter-intuitive finding that refugees tend to return in larger numbers
during conflict than in the post-conflict period, Chapter 4 identifies a political
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factor in the origin state that might motivate return: leader turnover. Transitions
in leadership can provide observers, such as refugees, host governments, and hu-
manitarian organizations, with updated information about safety considerations
in the country of origin. I argue leader changes are a useful heuristic providing
signals of: (1) leader’s commitment to maintaining their predecessor’s policies,
(2) political turmoil in refugees’ origin state, and (3) legitimacy of the leader’s as-
cension to power. Based upon this information, there is a re-evaluation of whether
circumstances in the country of origin have changed enough to encourage refugee
return.
Updated information is crucial in understanding why refugees are returning
after specific types of leader change. As Chapters 2 and 3 point out, host states
are over-burdened with the task of supporting refugee populations and will try
to find windows of opportunity to alleviate that burden. Refugees in survey
data consistently claim they want to return at some point, but it is unclear what
conditions are “safe enough” to alter their decisions about staying in a host state.
International humanitarian organizations serving refugee populations advocate
on behalf of refugees and are constantly monitoring the situation in the country
of origin. Leader turnovers, and what they signal to observers, can change how
these three actors assess the situation in the country of origin and whether they
will promote return.
I generally find support for my arguments, with results demonstrating more
refugees are returning to their country of origin after leader changes signifying
forecasted policy change, happen according to established rules of the state, and
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the new leader did not require foreign assistance to rise to power. These findings
suggest that ongoing conflict dynamics in the country of origin are not the only
factors used to motivate return. Rather, a political change conveys enough in-
formation about conditions in the country of origin that promotes or suppresses
return.
5.3 Future Directions
There are several limitations of this dissertation project, some of which will be
addressed in future research. One issue is selection of examining refugee pop-
ulations only. This dissertation focuses only on the forcibly displaced that cross
international borders for safe haven. However, the majority of individuals remain
in the country of origin as internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2018b). There-
fore, this dissertation is only able to explain dynamics of the externally displaced.
Another issue, and arguably the main limitation of the analyses, lies in data
quality. The returnee data used in Chapters 3 and 4 only provides information
that a refugee returned to their country of origin in that year. Other potentially
valuable information that is not included in this variable is how long the indi-
vidual was displaced, if they applied for asylum or third-country resettlement,
how voluntary the return journey was, and where the individual returned within
their origin state. Many of these factors likely influence refugee return patterns,
especially since refugee populations differ greatly in their preferences about the
timing of return.
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Finally, return to the country of origin is not the only option for refugees. Stay-
ing in the host state is the most likely outcome and third-country resettlement is
least likely. But what makes refugees want to stay in host states despite poor
conditions and increasing resentment from domestic populations? Many of these
questions can be answered with survey data. With the new baseline knowledge of
general patterns of refugee return provided in this dissertation, I plan to further
explore these processes using data on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. With other
collaborators, I plan to explore the preferences and efficacy of the three durable
solutions to displacement, as well as refugees’ beliefs and endorsements about
prospects for peace in Syria. Using survey data collected of Lebanese residents
who lived through the Lebanese Civil War, I intend to explore why some individ-
uals fled while others did not and explanations for why some individuals took
longer to return than others.
A logical next step for the dissertation is understanding the role, if any, re-
turned refugees have on peace talks, conflict dynamics, and political processes
once the conflict ends. With the One Earth Future Foundation, I plan on inves-
tigating some of these dynamics, particularly refugee political participation, in
Colombia and the Balkans.
Another counter-intuitive finding I would like to explore more is explaining
refugee return during conflict. As Chapter 3 shows, refugees do return during
conflict and do so in larger numbers than the post-conflict period. In a working
paper, I explain refugee return during conflict as an artifact of whether combat-
ants target civilians through deliberate killings or sexual violence. When com-
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batants engage in this behavior, refugees are less likely to return because they
do not want to be victims and humanitarian organizations will strongly dissuade
host states and refugees from returning to these conditions. The findings sug-
gest when armed combatants perpetrate one-sided and sexual violence during
conflict, fewer refugees return to their country of origin, especially if abuses are
widespread geographically across the state.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of widening scope conditions for
comprehending government behavior toward refugee populations and refugee
journeys back to their countries of origin. By limiting our theories to a monadic
level of analysis, we have been missing a critical part in explaining observable
behavior that, as this dissertation shows, is affected by more than one state. Take-
aways from each chapter show the relationship between origin and host states
can lead to greater respect for human rights, conditions in both the host and ori-
gin state encourage or deter return, and political events in the country of origin
are closely monitored by observers abroad. While most of the decision-making
is done at the individual-level, especially in patterns of refugee return, we can
observe at aggregated units of analysis the implications of these individual de-
cisions. Therefore, it is important to listen to refugee voices and allow them to
make decisions for what they believe is best for them, rather than what academics
or policymakers believe is the best solution. My future work will be able to know
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how refugees do this by testing the macro-level findings at the individual level,
but for now, the findings of this dissertation provide a strong foundation for all
researchers who care about understanding the journeys and livelihoods of refugee
populations.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material to Hosting Refugees from a
Rival State and Respect for Human Rights
A.1 Country reports
• Amnesty international - each country has a section on refugees’ and migrant
rights: www.amnesty.org/en/countries/
• U.S. State Department - each country has a section on refugee protection:
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm
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A.2 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in Respect for HR Yt  Yt 1 3201 .027 .157 -.876 .87
Change in Respect for HR Yt  Yt 3 3173 .081 .372 -1.898 1.644
Change in Respect for HR Yt  Yt 5 3138 .135 .522 -2.353 2.24
Raw Respect for HR Score Yt 3201 .382 1.256 -2.703 4.699
Raw Respect for HR Score Yt 1 3201 .355 1.257 -2.703 4.686
Raw Respect for HR Score Yt 3 3173 .3 1.259 -2.703 4.642
Raw Respect for HR Score Yt 5 3138 .244 1.262 -2.703 4.578
Refugees from rival (binary) 3201 .174 .379 0 1
Refugees from non-rival (binary) 3201 .812 .391 0 1
Refugees from rival (logged) 3201 1.382 3.448 0 14.995
Refugees from non-rival (logged) 3201 6.542 4.083 0 14.934
Refugees from contiguous state (binary) 3201 .593 .491 0 1
Refugees from non-contiguous state (binary) 3201 .765 .424 0 1
Refugees from contiguous state (logged) 3201 4.545 4.651 0 15.244
Refugees from non-contiguous state (logged) 3201 5.034 3.731 0 13.661
Refugees from rival, contiguous (binary) 3201 .159 .366 0 1
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (binary) 3201 .023 .151 0 1
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (binary) 3201 .541 .498 0 1
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (binary) 3201 .765 .424 0 1
Refugees from rival, contiguous (logged) 3201 1.285 3.364 0 14.995
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (logged) 3201 .126 .98 0 11.162
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (logged 3201 3.837 4.359 0 14.934
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (logged) 3201 5.029 3.729 0 13.661
Refugees from rival only (binary) 3201 .009 .096 0 1
Refugees from non-rival only (binary) 3201 .648 .478 0 1
Refugees from both (logged) 3201 .164 .371 0 1
Refugees from rival only (logged) 3201 .114 1.179 0 14.506
Refugees from non-rival only (logged) 3201 5.212 4.497 0 13.872
Refugees from both (logged) 3201 1.605 3.782 0 15.244
Interstate conflict 3201 .012 .111 0 1
Civil conflict 3201 .165 .371 0 1
GDPPC (logged) 3201 7.729 1.632 4.19 11.647
Population (logged) 3201 16.02 1.556 12.65 21.014
Neighboring civil conflict 3201 .518 .5 0 1
TEK 3201 .88 .325 0 1
Executive constraints 3201 4.715 2.141 1 7
180
A.3 Robustness Checks
Table A.2: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)
Refugees from rival 0.0102 0.0018* - -
(0.0092) (0.0009)
Refugees from Non-rival -0.0128† -0.0025** - -
(0.0077) (0.0009)
Refugees from rival only - - 0.0698* 0.0052*
(0.0311) (0.0024)
Refugees from non-rival only - - -0.0087 -0.0019*
(0.0076) (0.0009)
Refugees from Refugees from both - - -0.0021 -0.0008
(0.0104) (0.0010)
Interstate conflict -0.0459* -0.0518* -0.0447* -0.0446†
(0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0228) (0.0228)
Civil conflict -0.0778*** -0.0786*** -0.0779*** -0.0780***
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0099** 0.0093** 0.0098** 0.0094**
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Population (logged) -0.0125*** -0.0105** -0.0126*** -0.0110**
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0038)
Neighboring civil conflict -0.0062 -0.0054 -0.0065 -0.0056
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055)
TEK 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0009
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0097)
Executive constraints 0.0122*** 0.0120*** 0.0123*** 0.0120***
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Resepect for HRt 1 0.9546*** 0.9562*** 0.9547*** 0.9558***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0084)
Constant 0.1339** 0.1110* 0.1332** 0.1170*
(0.0500) (0.0529) (0.0504) (0.0532)
N 3201 3201 3201 3201
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.3: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score, Continued
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(5A) (6A) (7A) (8A)
Refugees from contig. -0.0075 -0.0001 - -
(0.0088) (0.0009)
Refugees from non-contig. 0.0068 -0.0018* - -
(0.0073) (0.0007)
Refugees from rival, contig. - - 0.0112 0.0019*
(0.0095) (0.0009)
Refugees from rival, non-contig. - - -0.0247 -0.0023
(0.0153) (0.0021)
Refugees from non-rival, contig. - - -0.0097 -0.0010
(0.0083) (0.0010)
Refugees from non-rival, non-contig. - - 0.0072 -0.0015*
(0.0071) (0.0007)
Interstate conflict -0.0408† -0.0375† -0.0472* -0.0499*
(0.0224) (0.0218) (0.0234) (0.0239)
Civil conflict -0.0760*** -0.0770*** -0.0754*** -0.0783***
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0131)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0100** 0.0105** 0.0097** 0.0097**
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Population (logged) -0.0136*** -0.0109** -0.0131*** -0.0109**
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Neighboring civil conflict -0.0030 -0.0055 -0.0033 -0.0049
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0060)
TEK -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0015
(0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0095)
Executive constraints 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0125*** 0.0124***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Resepect for HRt 1 0.9538*** 0.9556*** 0.9548*** 0.9562***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086)
Constant 0.1415** 0.1046* 0.1326** 0.1084*
(0.0495) (0.0498) (0.0488) (0.0492)
N 3201 3201 3201 3201
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.4: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR over 3
Years
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(9A) (10A) (11A) (12A)
Refugees from Rival 0.0156 0.0040* - -
(0.0209) (0.0020)
Refugees from Non-rival -0.0171 -0.0050* - -
(0.0181) (0.0020)
Refugees from Rival Only - - 0.1296* 0.0091†
(0.0637) (0.0050)
Refugees from Non-rival Only - - -0.0091 -0.0035†
(0.0176) (0.0021)
Refugees from Both - - -0.0004 -0.0015
(0.0238) (0.0022)
Interstate Conflict -0.1380** -0.1555** -0.1358** -0.1382**
(0.0498) (0.0510) (0.0496) (0.0497)
Civil Conflict -0.2721*** -0.2747*** -0.2723*** -0.2727***
(0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0324)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0513*** 0.0496*** 0.0512*** 0.0501***
(0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0091)
Population (logged) -0.0510*** -0.0463*** -0.0513*** -0.0478***
(0.0082) (0.0094) (0.0082) (0.0094)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0186 -0.0178 -0.0191 -0.0177
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0123)
TEK -0.0186 -0.0151 -0.0199 -0.0169
(0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0218) (0.0219)
Executive Constraints 0.0424*** 0.0422*** 0.0426*** 0.0420***
(0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Respect for HRt 3 -0.1875*** -0.1831*** -0.1873*** -0.1846***
(0.0248) (0.0257) (0.0248) (0.0256)
Constant 0.4412*** 0.3926*** 0.4398*** 0.4068***
(0.1095) (0.1156) (0.1103) (0.1167)
N 3173 3173 3173 3173
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.5: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 3
Years, Continued
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(13A) (14A) (15A) (16A)
Refugees from Contig. -0.0258 -0.0008 - -
(0.0172) (0.0019)
Refugees from Non-contig. 0.0429** -0.0014 - -
(0.0162) (0.0017)
Refugees from Rival, Contig. - - 0.0103 0.0042*
(0.0220) (0.0021)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig. - - -0.0546† -0.0039
(0.0311) (0.0043)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig. - - -0.0211 -0.0027
(0.0181) (0.0024)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig. - - 0.0402* -0.0007
(0.0162) (0.0018)
Interstate Conflict -0.1308** -0.1270** -0.1383** -0.1555**
(0.0492) (0.0479) (0.0507) (0.0521)
Civil Conflict -0.2677*** -0.2702*** -0.2657*** -0.2730***
(0.0313) (0.0309) (0.0319) (0.0315)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0506*** 0.0516*** 0.0507*** 0.0496***
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0093)
Population (logged) -0.0547*** -0.0499*** -0.0537*** -0.0500***
(0.0082) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0091)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0090 -0.0155 -0.0107 -0.0146
(0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0134)
TEK -0.0228 -0.0182 -0.0239 -0.0180
(0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0216)
Executive Constraints 0.0421*** 0.0418*** 0.0428*** 0.0429***
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Respect for HRt 3 -0.1893*** -0.1871*** -0.1877*** -0.1852***
(0.0251) (0.0259) (0.0253) (0.0260)
Constant 0.4775*** 0.4194*** 0.4550*** 0.4294***
(0.1077) (0.1091) (0.1067) (0.1079)
N 3173 3173 3173 3173
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.6: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5
Years
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(17A) (18A) (19A) (20A)
Refugees from Rival 0.0130 0.0051* - -
(0.0251) (0.0024)
Refugees from Non-rival -0.0107 -0.0053* - -
(0.0235) (0.0026)
Refugees from Rival Only - - 0.1624† 0.0119†
(0.0936) (0.0071)
Refugees from Non-rival Only - - -0.0007 -0.0030
(0.0236) (0.0028)
Refugees from Both - - 0.0038 -0.0010
(0.0295) (0.0027)
Interstate Conflict -0.1562* -0.1822** -0.1536* -0.1590*
(0.0635) (0.0657) (0.0632) (0.0636)
Civil Conflict -0.4436*** -0.4481*** -0.4437*** -0.4451***
(0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0402)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0942*** 0.0919*** 0.0941*** 0.0929***
(0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0124) (0.0131)
Population (logged) -0.0855*** -0.0801*** -0.0858*** -0.0824***
(0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0125)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0310† -0.0314† -0.0317† -0.0310†
(0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0171)
TEK -0.0482† -0.0432 -0.0498† -0.0460†
(0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Executive Constraints 0.0657*** 0.0657*** 0.0660*** 0.0655***
(0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Respect for HRt 5 -0.3195*** -0.3139*** -0.3192*** -0.3165***
(0.0355) (0.0369) (0.0356) (0.0367)
Constant 0.6841*** 0.6327*** 0.6827*** 0.6528***
(0.1315) (0.1385) (0.1325) (0.1408)
N 3138 3138 3138 3138
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.7: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5
Years, Continued
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(21A) (22A) (23A) (24A)
Refugees from Contig. -0.0400† -0.0013 - -
(0.0211) (0.0026)
Refugees from Non-contig. 0.0716*** 0.0013 - -
(0.0186) (0.0023)
Refugees from Rival, Contig. - - 0.0016 0.0054*
(0.0263) (0.0024)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig. - - -0.0795* -0.0062
(0.0392) (0.0053)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig. - - -0.0251 -0.0036
(0.0237) (0.0032)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig. - - 0.0651*** 0.0023
(0.0192) (0.0023)
Interstate Conflict -0.1512* -0.1501* -0.1551* -0.1876**
(0.0632) (0.0619) (0.0646) (0.0673)
Civil Conflict -0.4377*** -0.4407*** -0.4343*** -0.4440***
(0.0389) (0.0383) (0.0397) (0.0392)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0922*** 0.0936*** 0.0933*** 0.0910***
(0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0136)
Population (logged) -0.0904*** -0.0870*** -0.0889*** -0.0870***
(0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0121)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0168 -0.0259 -0.0201 -0.0248
(0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0187)
TEK -0.0534† -0.0500† -0.0557* -0.0497†
(0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0276) (0.0270)
Executive Constraints 0.0653*** 0.0651*** 0.0658*** 0.0665***
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0069)
Respect for HRt 5 -0.3206*** -0.3210*** -0.3193*** -0.3180***
(0.0360) (0.0370) (0.0364) (0.0374)
Constant 0.7390*** 0.7078*** 0.7042*** 0.7177***
(0.1275) (0.1314) (0.1297) (0.1312)
N 3138 3138 3138 3138
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.8: Summary statistics for KGD Rivalry
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in Respect for HR Yt  Yt 1 1536 .03 .165 -.876 .774
Refugees from rival (binary) 1536 .098 .298 0 1
Refugees from non-rival (binary 1536 .318 .466 0 1
Refugees from rival (logged) 1536 .93 2.967 0 15.244
Refugees from non-rival (logged) 1536 2.028 3.646 0 14.44
Refugees from contiguous state (binary) 1536 .543 .498 0 1
Refugees from non-contiguous state (binary) 1536 .672 .47 0 1
Refugees from contiguous state (logged) 1536 4.426 4.826 0 15.244
Refugees from non-contiguous state (logged) 1536 4.496 3.853 0 13.352
Refugees from rival, contiguous (binary) 1536 .069 .254 0 1
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (binary) 1536 .033 .179 0 1
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (binary) 1536 .157 .364 0 1
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (binary) 1536 .209 .407 0 1
Refugees from rival, contiguous (logged) 1536 .654 2.559 0 15.244
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (logged) 1536 .299 1.663 0 12.432
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (logged) 1536 1.136 2.987 0 14.44
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (logged) 1536 1.093 2.653 0 12.766
Refugees from rival only (binary) 1536 .033 .178 0 1
Refugees from non-rival only (binary) 1536 .252 .434 0 1
Refugees from both (logged) 1536 .066 .248 0 1
Refugees from rival only (logged) 1536 .328 1.867 0 15.244
Refugees from non-rival only (logged) 1536 1.437 3.052 0 14.44
Refugees from both (logged) 1536 .701 2.719 0 14.176
Interstate conflict 1536 .012 .108 0 1
Civil conflict 1536 .177 .382 0 1
GDPPC (logged) 1536 7.479 1.597 4.19 10.875
Population (logged) 1536 15.971 1.532 12.742 20.956
Neighboring civil conflict 1536 .536 .499 0 1
TEK 1536 .873 .333 0 1
Executive Constraints 1536 4.486 2.201 1 7
Raw Respect for HR Score Yt 1 1536 .198 1.228 -2.61 4.275
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Table A.9: Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(25A) (26A) (27A) (28A)
Ref. from Rival 0.0012 0.0021 - -
(0.0128) (0.0017)
Ref. from Non-rival -0.0129 -0.0029 - -
(0.0107) (0.0019)
Ref. from Rival Only - - 0.0503† 0.0059*
(0.0296) (0.0027)
Ref. from Non-rival Only - - -0.0048 -0.0006
(0.0100) (0.0018)
Ref. from Both - - -0.0324* -0.0028*
(0.0151) (0.0012)
Interstate Conflict -0.0446 -0.0401 -0.0543 -0.0555
(0.0500) (0.0510) (0.0509) (0.0516)
Civil Conflict -0.0980*** -0.0994*** -0.1014*** -0.1029***
(0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0178)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0122* 0.0119* 0.0124* 0.0122*
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0053)
Population (logged) -0.0136** -0.0133** -0.0131** -0.0133**
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0050)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0030
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0075)
TEK -0.0102 -0.0103 -0.0094 -0.0094
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Executive Constraints 0.0172*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0168***
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Respect for HRt 1 -0.0566*** -0.0557*** -0.0564*** -0.0563***
(0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Constant 0.1214† 0.1212† 0.1130† 0.1168†
(0.0647) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0679)
N 1536 1536 1536 1536
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table A.10: Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR, Continued
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(29A) (30A) (31A) (32A)
Ref. from Contig. -0.0207 -0.0019 - -
(0.0130) (0.0013)
Ref. from N.-Contig. 0.0073 0.0002 - -
(0.0116) (0.0011)
Ref. from Rival, Contig. - - 0.0151 0.0031
(0.0172) (0.0021)
Ref. from Rival, N.-Contig. - - -0.0231 -0.0017
(0.0192) (0.0023)
Ref. from N. Rival, Contig. - - -0.0147 -0.0034†
(0.0131) (0.0018)
Ref. from N. Rival, N.-Contig. - - -0.0047 0.0003
(0.0108) (0.0023)
Interstate Conflict -0.0483 -0.0481 -0.0383 -0.0354
(0.0516) (0.0521) (0.0496) (0.0496)
Civil Conflict -0.0964*** -0.0960*** -0.0984*** -0.1002***
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0175) (0.0173)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0109† 0.0103† 0.0121* 0.0112*
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Population (logged) -0.0149*** -0.0142** -0.0134** -0.0145**
(0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0051)
Neighboring Civil Conflict 0.0031 0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0005
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0068) (0.0071)
TEK -0.0069 -0.0080 -0.0083 -0.0083
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0148)
Executive Constraints 0.0167*** 0.0164*** 0.0172*** 0.0170***
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Respect for HRt 11 -0.0576*** -0.0570*** -0.0565*** -0.0569***
(0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Constant 0.1523** 0.1498** 0.1171† 0.1402*
(0.0552) (0.0563) (0.0650) (0.0692)
N 1536 1536 1536 1536
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Appendix B
Supplementary Material to Macro-level Determinants
of Refugee Return
B.1 Refugees and Returnees by Country
Table B.1: Number of refugees and returnees by home country
Country Refugees Returnees
Afghanistan 6801199 460846
Albania 237444 250
Algeria 165549 97
Angola 8013416 673064
Argentina 14838 122
Armenia 1810205 27
Australia 441 0
Austria 772 0
Azerbaijan 4044530 68096
Bahrain 3409 20
Bangladesh 481919 29962
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Belarus 97474 0
Belgium 1068 0
Benin 6542 10
Bhutan 2127122 3
Bolivia 17418 475
Bosnia 455880 93
Botswana 1475 3
Brazil 18237 9
Bulgaria 76420 1
Burkina Faso 18403 13
Burundi 9907131 1207182
Cambodia 698627 52475
Cameroon 178920 542
Canada 1887 0
Cape Verde 330 0
Central African Republic 2594998 66396
Chad 3089218 539011
Chile 182656 5692
China 3467535 3857
Colombia 3648906 1122
Comoros 4617 1
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Congo Brazzaville 406723 171708
Congo Kinshasa 10200000 695248
Costa Rica 5233 2
Croatia 3279267 95116
Cuba 542823 595
Cyprus 222 390
Czech Republic 50614 6
Czechoslovakia 13755 0
Denmark 322 0
Djibouti 75723 460
Dominican Republic 3931 0
East Timor 29027 32327
Ecuador 16167 3
Egypt 157911 16
El Salvador 2108202 32420
Equatorial Guinea 382768 10016
Eritrea 5010249 151508
Estonia 11984 6
Ethiopia 9649530 803832
Fiji 22081 0
Finland 106 0
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France 1976 0
Gabon 2022 6
Gambia 49677 7
Georgia 320893 6257
Germany 9265 0
Ghana 430267 1301
Greece 3296 0
Guatemala 869218 41098
Guinea 162774 69
Guinea-Bissau 296293 56405
Guyana 8375 0
Haiti 407139 8725
Honduras 45153 66
Hungary 63156 9
India 289221 9
Indonesia 410300 7280
Iran 2098075 6704
Iraq 6307658 135834
Ireland 125 0
Israel 20564 6
Italy 2270 0
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Ivory Coast 729165 284380
Jamaica 15288 1
Japan 2124 0
Jordan 32080 67
Kazakhstan 156176 14421
Kenya 160925 7812
Korea South 8655 0
Kosovo 0 0
Kuwait 16571 0
Kyrgyzstan 84139 1152
Laos 1484391 33276
Latvia 24410 0
Lebanon 137949 0
Lesotho 1261 125
Liberia 8387955 970249
Libya 27577 148960
Lithuania 12298 0
Luxembourg 11 0
Macedonia 137128 97081
Madagascar 3809 1
Malawi 8715 20018
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Malaysia 7488 0
Mali 1234262 170449
Mauritania 1301285 49495
Mauritius 957 0
Mexico 100336 7
Moldova 117947 2
Mongolia 20871 0
Montenegro 15346 0
Morocco 37243 1
Mozambique 8568641 1290792
Myanmar (Burma) 4670140 5977
Namibia 24586 5941
Nepal 67911 4
Netherlands 1248 0
New Zealand 178 0
Nicaragua 963277 167896
Niger 103884 4450
Nigeria 784252 8183
Norway 128 0
Oman 617 3
Pakistan 1150752 115255
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Panama 5298 378
Papua New Guinea 6216 0
Paraguay 1412 8
Peru 135147 163
Philippines 1342935 5
Poland 250920 1
Portugal 1097 0
Qatar 850 0
Romania 298878 181
Rwanda 14000000 3395502
Saudi Arabia 9842 0
Senegal 488852 4740
Sierra Leone 4002207 486350
Singapore 1144 0
Slovak Republic 7142 0
Slovenia 33745 0
Solomon Islands 1029 0
Somalia 4314763 106944
South Africa 310877 15756
South Sudan 1253674 3657
Spain 7711 1
196
Sri Lanka 3452460 84973
Sudan 14900000 1106037
Suriname 6254 3
Swaziland 1168 14
Sweden 563 0
Switzerland 742 0
Syria 175851 15
Tajikistan 730136 20209
Tanzania 16325 2041
Thailand 10923 3
Togo 721286 301583
Trinidad and Tobago 3349 0
Tunisia 37077 16
Turkey 2380255 745
Turkmenistan 18933 28
UAE 3305 0
USSR 3334482 1054
Uganda 2599700 612369
Ukraine 1450375 27
United Kingdom 2980 0
United States 32934 1
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Uruguay 11283 1486
Uzbekistan 378320 48
Venezuela 60667 143
Vietnam 12100000 43160
Yemen 64756 1140
Yugoslavia 3080136 945673
Zambia 57631 16649
Zimbabwe 416665 206636
Table B.2: Number of refugees and returnees by host country
Afghanistan 617713 0
Albania 36992 440817
Algeria 219465 66596
Angola 451149 5897
Argentina 85175 3286
Armenia 3770602 73502
Australia 622607 5666
Austria 480252 8522
Azerbaijan 1763314 469
Bahrain 2238 11
Bangladesh 1868225 110223
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Belarus 6428 22
Belgium 311613 5815
Benin 387296 166408
Bolivia 13314 29
Botswana 122186 41622
Brazil 135424 385
Bulgaria 25266 166
Burkina Faso 188474 40575
Burundi 5753812 658613
Cambodia 1730 814
Cameroon 2999400 293724
Canada 2605822 4073
Cape Verde 0 531
Central African Republic 1046663 196850
Chad 4311310 203554
Chile 21623 96
China 9129101 5212
Colombia 6208 446
Comoros 24 354
Congo Brazzaville 1498698 182349
Congo Kinshasa 13182927 2801057
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Costa Rica 837358 68881
Croatia 23941 1989
Cuba 11092 5268
Cyprus 17194 320
Czech Republic 32958 922
Czechoslovakia 0 0
Denmark 262976 4587
Djibouti 167073 56230
Dominican Republic 12526 3553
East Timor 14 0
Ecuador 1365469 1036
Egypt 293610 10064
El Salvador 4592 1066
Equatorial Guinea 40000 0
Eritrea 7608 51
Estonia 533 0
Ethiopia 4956420 440417
Fiji 58 0
Finland 130377 1369
France 2874906 4547
Gabon 384009 15914
200
Gambia 220342 5993
Georgia 42528 324
Germany 6607726 108834
Ghana 718200 167732
Greece 117005 1725
Guatemala 392152 1143
Guinea 6577959 764077
Guinea-Bissau 259045 2877
Guyana 312 0
Haiti 8 7
Honduras 497965 121798
Hungary 81763 6059
India 4855507 116520
Indonesia 74746 47151
Iran 5789516 87120
Iraq 324477 259
Ireland 88533 983
Israel 97176 800
Italy 880152 5057
Ivory Coast 3058917 310109
Jamaica 499 128
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Japan 121477 1162
Jordan 1127386 10379
Kazakhstan 158900 4880
Kenya 3501917 196561
Korea, South 5756 4
Kuwait 13558 918
Kyrgyzstan 150759 4329
Laos 2 1
Latvia 765 5
Lebanon 52302 1603
Lesotho 95698 84
Liberia 1551344 448765
Libya 17746 22182
Lithuania 8817 6
Luxembourg 3872 618
Macedonia 64975 252523
Madagascar 206 19
Malawi 5811445 1026630
Malaysia 2298862 6206
Mali 309770 7676
Mauritania 619855 49758
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Mauritius 14 0
Mexico 1829473 43420
Moldova 1984 128
Mongolia 68 0
Montenegro 81402 1155
Morocco 13275 83
Mozambique 50918 151273
Myanmar (Burma) 0 1
Namibia 179637 26401
Nepal 2123172 14712
Netherlands 1039208 6927
New Zealand 40536 535
Nicaragua 165688 4074
Niger 580433 31216
Nigeria 392029 25754
Norway 389375 10374
Oman 989 524
Pakistan 4442744 456394
Panama 204844 2579
Papua New Guinea 266515 7279
Paraguay 3098 12
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Peru 26692 396
Philippines 85158 2550
Poland 156486 780
Portugal 7621 1052
Qatar 1669 12
Romania 15651 856
Rwanda 1849723 396204
Saudi Arabia 533115 30730
Senegal 1218520 98272
Sierra Leone 578130 176800
Singapore 1372 224
Slovak Republic 4893 157
Slovenia 3726 5400
Solomon Islands 5016 0
Somalia 24455 13
South Africa 1129246 43664
South Sudan 799682 2465
Spain 90871 1159
Sri Lanka 3364 9
Sudan 14908507 1018351
Suriname 157 13
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Swaziland 307409 17821
Sweden 1687804 11262
Switzerland 724649 49902
Syria 18712 817
Tajikistan 6968 11064
Tanzania 11537379 1930075
Thailand 2690339 100486
Togo 356901 2622
Trinidad and Tobago 357 1
Tunisia 6055 149021
Turkey 215396 21923
Turkmenistan 177209 13035
UAE 16302 4217
USSR 1482479 1114
Uganda 9379924 761704
Ukraine 44048 184
United Kingdom 1942225 11654
United States 9840636 7792
Uruguay 3200 94
Uzbekistan 217306 26
Venezuela 1476584 1710
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Vietnam 203152 0
Yemen 1101637 36270
Yugoslavia 3077602 187904
Zambia 4080387 369443
Zimbabwe 1565472 151543
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B.2 Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models
Table B.3: Summary Statistics When Returnees> 0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 3925 3269.92 25608.87 1 776521
Polity, Origin 3925 1.179 5.108 -10 10
Polity, Host 3925 2.904 5.842 -10 10
Polity Change, Origin 3898 .253 1.897 -16 14
Polity Change, Host 3924 .132 1.608 -16 15
Particip. Dem., Origin 3925 .223 .135 .013 .774
Particip. Dem., Host 3925 .314 .191 .013 .81
Particip. Dem. Change, Origin 3923 .007 .035 -.373 .241
Particip. Dem. Change, Host 3925 .003 .024 -.276 .241
Respect for HR, Origin 3925 -.689 .985 -2.703 2.868
Respect for HR, Host 3925 .045 1.151 -2.703 4.699
Change in HR, Origin 3924 .077 .18 -.604 .87
Change in HR, Host 3925 .025 .145 -.876 .87
GDPPC (logged), Origin 3925 6.525 1.24 4.19 10.032
GDPPC (logged), Host 3925 7.371 1.553 4.19 11.647
GDPPC Growth (logged), Origin 3913 4.659 .246 -.127 8.149
GDPPC Growth (logged), Host 3904 4.666 .249 1.992 5.979
Engagement Rate, Origin 3843 .359 .075 .119 .61
Engagement Rate, Host 3847 .37 .08 .121 .722
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin 3809 .001 .008 -.06 .061
Change in Eng. Rate, Host 3814 .002 .011 -.095 .087
Civil Conflict, Origin 119246 .467 .499 0 1
Civil Conflict, Host Only 119246 .076 .264 0 1
Civil Conflict, Host 119246 .15 .357 0 1
Civil Conflict, Origin Only 119246 .393 .488 0 1
Conflict Duration 119246 4.174 8.012 0 51
Post-conflict Duration 119246 3.607 5.854 0 26
Peace Agreement 72431 .289 .453 0 1
Ceasefire 72431 .227 .419 0 1
Government Victory 72431 .181 .385 0 1
Rebel Victory 72431 .099 .299 0 1
Low Activity 72431 .301 .459 0 1
Hosting Duration 3925 7.687 6.27 0 24
Population (logged), Origin 3925 16.446 1.089 13.096 21.004
Population (logged), Host 3925 16.594 1.392 12.988 21.014
Minimum Distance 3925 4.672 3.501 0 9.747
Refugees (logged) 3925 5.635 3.605 0 14.041
Years since last repatriation 3925 3.281 5.328 0 24
Years since last repatriation2 3925 39.151 94.956 0 576
Years since last repatriation3 3925 601.427 1896.479 0 13824
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B.3 Alternative Specifications
Table B.4: Effect of Terrorism on Refugee Return
(Model 1B) (Model 2B) (Model 3B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Terrorist Events, Origin -0.014 0.477*** -0.034 0.455*** -0.100* 0.633***
(0.032) (0.080) (0.037) (0.088) (0.040) (0.127)
Terrorist Events, Host 0.001 -0.150† -0.024 -0.177† 0.048 -0.172†
(0.031) (0.081) (0.040) (0.103) (0.037) (0.090)
Terrorist Events, Origin X Host 0.013 0.013
(0.013) (0.023)
Civil Conflict X Terrorist Events, Origin 0.154** -0.200
(0.048) (0.136)
Civil Conflict X Terrorist Events, Host -0.132* 0.041
(0.059) (0.133)
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.240* -1.762*** -0.240* -1.770*** -0.605*** -1.537***
(0.105) (0.267) (0.105) (0.268) (0.146) (0.368)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.639*** 0.581* 0.645*** 0.601** 0.977*** 0.522
(0.130) (0.234) (0.130) (0.229) (0.191) (0.377)
Polity, Origin -0.076*** -0.014 -0.076*** -0.016 -0.075*** -0.020
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022)
Polity, Host -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007 -0.012 -0.010
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.120† -0.296† 0.121† -0.293† 0.088 -0.264†
(0.066) (0.159) (0.066) (0.158) (0.066) (0.158)
Respect for HR, Host 0.381*** 0.118 0.383*** 0.123 0.387*** 0.118
(0.060) (0.138) (0.060) (0.137) (0.059) (0.134)
Minimum Distance -0.053*** -0.748*** -0.053*** -0.750*** -0.052** -0.740***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.016) (0.045) (0.016) (0.044)
Refugees -0.360*** 0.249*** -0.360*** 0.249*** -0.360*** 0.249***
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.037)
Hosting Duration -0.119*** -0.058** -0.119*** -0.058** -0.118*** -0.050*
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020)
GDPPC, Origin 0.025 -0.378*** 0.024 -0.380*** 0.020 -0.382***
(0.044) (0.111) (0.044) (0.112) (0.044) (0.108)
GDPPC, Host 0.471*** 0.385*** 0.472*** 0.389*** 0.464*** 0.380***
(0.044) (0.098) (0.044) (0.098) (0.044) (0.096)
Population, Origin 0.108** -0.313** 0.110** -0.309* 0.123** -0.293**
(0.038) (0.113) (0.038) (0.113) (0.038) (0.108)
Population, Host 0.253*** 0.420*** 0.254*** 0.422*** 0.247*** 0.423***
(0.039) (0.091) (0.039) (0.091) (0.039) (0.085)
Constant -7.070*** 5.634* -7.093*** 5.570* -7.089*** 5.133*
(0.864) (2.382) (0.865) (2.379) (0.866) (2.321)
ln(a) 2.233*** 2.232*** 2.228***
0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
N 144543 3931 144543 3931 144543 3931
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.5: Alternate Variable Specifications
(Model 4B) (Model 5B) (Model 6B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civilian Casualties -0.028 -0.243***
(0.017) (0.039)
ICC, Origin -0.247* -0.991***
(0.102) (0.213)
ICC, Host -0.015 -0.006
(0.138) (0.249)
ICC, Host Only 0.080 (0.291)
(0.146) (0.291)
ICC, Origin -0.189† -0.968***
(0.106) (0.220)
ICC, Both -0.591* -1.091**
(0.262) (0.403)
Civil conflict, Origin -0.317** -1.460*** -0.317** -1.459***
(0.104) (0.244) (0.104) (0.244)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.684*** 0.698* 0.678*** 0.657* 0.689*** 0.670**
(0.129) (0.276) (0.125) (0.258) (0.126) (0.260)
Polity, Origin -0.082*** 0.025 -0.078*** 0.034 -0.078*** 0.035
(0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022)
Polity, Host -0.016† -0.041* -0.017† -0.042* -0.018† -0.043*
(0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.106† -0.860*** 0.038 -0.911*** 0.041 -0.907***
(0.062) (0.155) (0.060) (0.140) (0.060) (0.140)
Respect for HR, Host 0.423*** 0.364** 0.417*** 0.326** 0.422*** 0.329**
(0.054) (0.127) (0.054) (0.123) (0.054) (0.123)
Minimum Distance -0.058*** -0.762*** -0.054*** -0.742*** -0.055*** -0.743***
(0.016) (0.049) (0.016) (0.048) (0.016) (0.048)
Refugees -0.408*** 0.235*** -0.405*** 0.237*** -0.406*** 0.236***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.035) (0.024) (0.035)
Hosting Duration -0.087*** -0.017 -0.085*** -0.009 -0.085*** -0.009
(0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin 0.015 -0.165† 0.018 -0.158† 0.018 -0.159†
(0.040) (0.100) (0.040) (0.096) (0.040) (0.096)
GDPPC, Host 0.496*** 0.441*** 0.484*** 0.394*** 0.484*** 0.396***
(0.043) (0.095) (0.044) (0.097) (0.044) (0.097)
Population, Origin 0.101** -0.222† 0.127** -0.106 0.129** -0.102
(0.038) (0.118) (0.040) (0.122) (0.040) (0.124)
Population, Host 0.273*** 0.441*** 0.271*** 0.417*** 0.272*** 0.416***
(0.039) (0.096) (0.041) (0.096) (0.041) (0.096)
Constant -7.584*** 2.036 -7.887*** 0.796 -7.951*** 0.722
(0.868) (2.491) (0.888) (2.428) (0.892) (2.458)
ln(a) 2.326*** 2.305*** 2.307***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063)
N 144087 3925 144087 3925 144087 3925
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.6: CIRI on Refugee Return
(Model 7B) (Model 8B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
CIRI, Origin 0.087*** -0.049
(0.023) (0.065)
CIRI, Host 0.161*** 0.191**
(0.027) (0.064)
CIRI Change, Origin -0.083*** 0.088
(0.024) (0.078)
CIRI Change, Host 0.010 0.029
(0.028) (0.066)
Polity, Origin -0.077*** 0.053* -0.067*** 0.056*
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.022)
Polity, Host -0.011 -0.025 0.008 0.010
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.020)
Minimum Distance -0.062*** -0.812*** -0.063*** -0.800***
(0.017) (0.054) (0.016) (0.054)
Refugees -0.426*** 0.228*** -0.415*** 0.227***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039)
Hosting Duration -0.091*** -0.070** -0.102*** -0.077**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.024)
GDPPC, Origin 0.042 -0.293* 0.037 -0.431**
(0.042) (0.116) (0.043) (0.136)
GDPPC, Host 0.556*** 0.481*** 0.652*** 0.547***
(0.042) (0.095) (0.041) (0.096)
Population, Origin 0.159*** -0.110 0.097* -0.052
(0.039) (0.128) (0.039) (0.140)
Population, Host 0.279*** 0.506*** 0.182*** 0.376***
(0.040) (0.098) (0.036) (0.094)
Constant -10.226*** -0.416 -7.322*** 1.766
(0.969) (2.770) (0.892) (2.631)
ln(a) 2.336*** 2.329***
(0.065) (0.065)
N 126865 3384 124714 3314
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation”
omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.7: Types of Terrorism on Refugee Return
(Model 9B) (Model 10B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Domestic Terr., Origin 0.093** 0.369***
(0.035) (0.081)
Domestic Terr., Host 0.044 -0.021
(0.037) (0.097)
Foreign Terr., Origin -0.060 -0.198
(0.070) (0.165)
Foreign Terr., Host -0.034 0.045
(0.061) (0.133)
Civil conflict, Origin -0.406*** -1.789*** -0.347** -1.564***
(0.108) (0.259) (0.106) (0.251)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.586*** 0.509* 0.680*** 0.628*
(0.128) (0.238) (0.128) (0.259)
Polity, Origin -0.086*** -0.002 -0.083*** 0.017
(0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022)
Polity, Host -0.016† -0.025 -0.016† -0.039†
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.130* -0.537*** 0.052 -0.834***
(0.063) (0.143) (0.062) (0.144)
Respect for HR, Host 0.428*** 0.321* 0.427*** 0.374**
(0.056) (0.141) (0.057) (0.140)
Minimum Distance -0.061*** -0.778*** -0.059*** -0.771***
(0.016) (0.050) (0.016) (0.050)
Refugees -0.397*** 0.238*** -0.407*** 0.230***
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.037)
Hosting Duration -0.092*** -0.034† -0.087*** -0.016
(0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin -0.024 -0.337** 0.021 -0.152
(0.043) (0.107) (0.041) (0.100)
GDPPC, Host 0.474*** 0.408*** 0.496*** 0.431***
(0.043) (0.098) (0.045) (0.106)
Population, Origin 0.088* -0.267* 0.095* -0.246*
(0.038) (0.116) (0.039) (0.117)
Population, Host 0.258*** 0.422*** 0.278*** 0.436***
(0.040) (0.097) (0.040) (0.099)
Constant -6.670*** 4.592† -7.550*** 2.691
(0.877) (2.494) (0.894) (2.489)
ln(a) 2.288*** 2.323***
(0.063) (0.064)
N 144087 144087
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation”
omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.9: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI
(Model 17B) (Model 18B) (Model 19B) (Model 20B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin -0.098** -0.271*
(0.035) (0.117)
GDPPC, Host 0.534*** 0.567***
(0.035) (0.084)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.592*** -0.911***
(0.074) (0.268)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.349*** -1.568***
(0.098) (0.229)
Engagement Rate, Origin 1.710** -5.205*
(0.606) (2.040)
Engagement Rate, Host 6.025*** 5.731***
(0.569) (1.682)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -17.669*** -48.019***
(2.860) (8.630)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -8.559** 20.762**
(2.761) (6.907)
Minimum Distance -0.035* -0.779*** 0.083*** -0.559*** 0.044** -0.715*** 0.075*** -0.628***
(0.016) (0.066) (0.012) (0.043) (0.014) (0.057) (0.012) (0.052)
Refugees -0.401*** 0.227*** -0.309*** 0.237*** -0.330*** 0.221*** -0.296*** 0.230***
(0.018) (0.041) (0.014) (0.043) (0.014) (0.041) (0.014) (0.045)
Hosting Duration -0.081*** -0.040* -0.068*** -0.059** -0.101*** -0.069** -0.071*** -0.032
(0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007) (0.021)
Population, Origin 0.113** 0.004 -0.000 -0.286* 0.069† 0.029 0.016 -0.289†
(0.037) (0.130) (0.035) (0.137) (0.038) (0.145) (0.037) (0.159)
Population, Host 0.195*** 0.411*** 0.170*** 0.418*** 0.117*** 0.401*** 0.154*** 0.459***
(0.033) (0.090) (0.030) (0.109) (0.032) (0.087) (0.031) (0.115)
Constant -6.440*** -1.225 7.443*** 17.094*** -4.094*** 0.728 -1.676* 4.852*
(0.796) (2.146) (0.852) (2.768) (0.775) (2.186) (0.687) (2.055)
ln(a) 2.337*** 2.224*** 2.232*** 2.225***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.065)
N 167205 4689 165206 4648 152509 4360 147851 4326
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.10: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI
(Model 21B) (Model 22B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.167† -1.061***
(0.090) (0.282)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.321** -0.884**
(0.116) (0.311)
Civil Conflict, Host Only -0.165 -1.406**
(0.129) (0.434)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.104 -1.210***
(0.092) (0.301)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.620*** -1.777***
(0.176) (0.419)
Minimum Distance 0.077*** -0.618*** 0.078*** -0.608***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.013) (0.042)
Refugees -0.293*** 0.242*** -0.294*** 0.243***
(0.014) (0.042) (0.014) (0.041)
Hosting Duration -0.058*** -0.004 -0.058*** -0.005
(0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020)
Population, Origin 0.168*** -0.075 0.162*** -0.096
(0.044) (0.173) (0.043) (0.168)
Population, Host 0.131*** 0.439*** 0.127*** 0.422***
(0.033) (0.123) (0.032) (0.116)
Constant -3.706*** 1.693 -3.583*** 2.331
(0.804) (2.724) (0.780) (2.581)
ln(a) 2.225*** 2.222***
(0.060) (0.059)
N 113572 4569 113572 4569
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.11: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns,
Without AFG and ERI
(Model 23B) (Model 24B) (Model 25B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.015* -0.068***
(0.007) (0.016)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin -0.004 -0.181***
(0.011) (0.031)
Peace Agreement -1.500*** 0.401
(0.122) (0.342)
Ceasefire 0.243* 0.839*
(0.123) (0.331)
Govt. Victory -0.826*** -0.119
(0.113) (0.290)
Rebel Victory -0.511** -0.173
(0.189) (0.463)
Low Activity -0.348* -1.170***
(0.136) (0.354)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.335** -0.941** -0.282* -0.870** -0.282* -1.153***
(0.118) (0.312) (0.113) (0.286) (0.126) (0.289)
Minimum Distance 0.073*** -0.639*** 0.083**** -0.611*** 0.064*** -0.725***
(0.013) (0.046) (0.013) (0.045) (0.015) (0.049)
Refugees -0.294*** 0.233*** -0.289*** 0.192*** -0.310*** 0.254***
(0.014) (0.042) (0.014) (0.041) (0.016) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.058*** -0.001 -0.069*** -0.016 -0.037*** -0.124***
(0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025)
Population, Origin 0.138** -0.243 0.119** -0.489*** 0.036 -0.156
(0.044) (0.166) (0.039) (0.139) (0.049) (0.168)
Population, Host 0.138*** 0.470*** 0.125*** 0.446*** 0.160*** 0.458***
(0.033) (0.121) (0.031) (0.101) (0.035) (0.095)
Constant -3.330*** 3.903 -2.758*** 8.671*** -1.062 3.568
(0.810) (2.559) (0.749) (2.227) (0.955) (3.057)
ln(a) 2.229*** 2.181*** 1.944***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.067)
N 113572 4569 113572 4569 71328 2486
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.12: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn, Without AFG and ERI
(Model 26B) (Model 27B) (Model 28B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.716*** -0.017
(0.186) (0.400)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.056 -1.269***
(0.126) (0.355)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.203 -0.985*
(0.222) (0.457)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.024*** -0.087***
(0.007) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.061*** -0.017
(0.015) (0.052)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.538*** 0.298 0.492** 0.135
(0.156) (0.286) (0.158) (0.310)
Polity, Origin -0.076*** 0.046 -0.073*** 0.050† -0.072*** 0.061†
(0.012) (0.032) (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.032)
Polity, Host -0.014 -0.042† -0.014 -0.040† -0.011 -0.025
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.046 -0.746*** -0.043 -0.835*** -0.067 -0.508***
(0.068) (0.153) (0.064) (0.149) (0.066) (0.149)
Respect for HR, Host 0.414*** 0.440** 0.436*** 0.527*** 0.412*** 0.465***
(0.067) (0.139) (0.066) (0.132) (0.065) (0.134)
Minimum Distance -0.073*** -0.799*** -0.080*** -0.824*** -0.067** -0.834***
(0.021) (0.057) (0.020) (0.054) (0.021) (0.054)
Refugees -0.404*** 0.198*** -0.407*** 0.162*** -0.401*** 0.163***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.060*** 0.016 -0.056*** 0.031 -0.070*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin -0.070 -0.292* -0.055 -0.251† -0.088† -0.416**
(0.050) (0.123) (0.052) (0.131) (0.050) (0.143)
GDPPC, Host 0.495*** 0.473*** 0.486*** 0.441*** 0.501*** 0.521***
(0.048) (0.103) (0.048) (0.097) (0.049) (0.104)
Population, Origin 0.136** -0.318* 0.112* -0.411** 0.136** -0.368*
(0.049) (0.144) (0.050) (0.144) (0.049) (0.144)
Population, Host 0.270*** 0.463*** 0.286*** 0.529*** 0.270*** 0.508**
(0.046) (0.092) (0.044) (0.092) (0.045) (0.099)
Constant -7.854*** 3.682 -7.710*** 3.969 -7.953*** 4.316†
(1.033) (2.620) (1.047) (2.597) (1.027) (2.612)
ln(a) 2.246*** 2.228*** 2.255***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
N 86987 3177 86987 3177 86987 3177
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.14: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without Values Above
95th Percentile
(Model 35B) (Model 36B) (Model 37B) (Model 38B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin -0.053† -0.171†
(0.031) (0.099)
GDPPC, Host 0.512*** 0.485***
(0.034) (0.075)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.626*** -0.829***
(0.072) (0.204)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.392*** -1.709***
(0.097) (0.288)
Engagement Rate, Origin 1.393** -4.032*
(0.521) (1.606)
Engagement Rate, Host 5.797*** 3.447*
(0.518) (1.404)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -15.633*** -39.427***
(2.845) (10.020)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -8.786*** 17.492*
(2.550) (7.121)
Minimum Distance -0.016 -0.550*** 0.083*** -0.422*** 0.061*** -0.466*** 0.084*** -0.449***
(0.015) (0.039) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.041) (0.011) (0.031)
Refugees -0.388*** 0.283*** -0.290*** 0.293*** -0.320*** 0.265*** -0.281*** 0.268***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.033) (0.012) (0.031)
Hosting Duration -0.084*** -0.050** -0.068*** -0.049** -0.104*** -0.057** -0.075*** -0.028
(0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.017)
Population, Origin 0.117*** 0.033 0.051† -0.030 0.090** 0.054 0.063* -0.069
(0.033) (0.107) (0.029) (0.102) (0.034) (0.132) (0.031) (0.121)
Population, Host 0.177*** 0.338*** 0.135*** 0.235*** 0.105*** 0.295*** 0.132*** 0.304***
(0.029) (0.073) (0.025) (0.066) (0.030) (0.086) (0.028) (0.086)
Constant -6.408*** -2.449 7.512*** 14.297*** -4.079*** 0.488 -2.098*** 1.970
(0.720) (1.852) (0.799) (2.486) (0.700) (2.127) (0.598) (1.777)
ln(a) 2.159*** 1.997*** 2.085*** 2.041***
(0.056) (0.049) (0.058) (0.053)
N 171461 5075 169348 5035 154860 4494 150116 4463
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.15: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th
Percentile
(Model 39B) (Model 40B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.143† -0.719**
(0.074) (0.235)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.179† -0.174
(0.104) (0.293)
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.007 -0.382
(0.124) (0.438)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.079 -0.781**
(0.079) (0.264)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.451** -0.856*
(0.146) (0.374)
Minimum Distance 0.087*** -0.422*** 0.087*** -0.421***
(0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.029)
Refugees -0.274*** 0.288*** -0.274*** 0.288***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.013) (0.030)
Hosting Duration -0.064*** -0.012 -0.064*** -0.013
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016)
Population, Origin 0.179*** -0.032 0.177*** -0.031
(0.039) (0.148) (0.038) (0.145)
Population, Host 0.082** 0.205* 0.082** 0.207*
(0.028) (0.092) (0.028) (0.091)
Constant -3.132*** 2.725 -3.132*** 2.725
(0.697) (2.341) (0.689) (2.293)
ln(a) 2.028*** 2.031***
(0.056) (0.056)
N 119057 4976 119057 4976
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.16: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns,
Without Values Above 95th Percentile
(Model 41B) (Model 42B) (Model 43B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.017*** -0.054***
(0.005) (0.010)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.009 -0.124***
(0.010) (0.027)
Peace Agreement -1.478*** 0.232
(0.125) (0.313)
Ceasefire 0.272* 0.984***
(0.123) (0.270)
Govt. Victory -0.790*** -0.362
(0.111) (0.275)
Rebel Victory -0.717*** 0.284
(0.157) (0.419)
Low Activity -0.426** -1.069**
(0.135) (0.344)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.207* -0.304 -0.178† -0.281 -0.091 -0.077
(0.105) (0.285) (0.104) (0.285) (0.120) (0.264)
Minimum Distance 0.085*** -0.436*** 0.091*** -0.439*** 0.072*** -0.484***
(0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.032) (0.015) (0.035)
Refugees -0.273*** 0.287*** -0.270*** 0.249*** -0.295*** 0.293***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.013) (0.031) (0.015) (0.030)
Hosting Duration -0.065*** -0.011 -0.072*** -0.016 -0.037*** -0.077***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.019)
Population, Origin 0.179*** -0.075 0.153*** -0.318* 0.069 -0.063
(0.038) (0.141) (0.037) (0.132) (0.045) (0.136)
Population, Host 0.093** 0.250** 0.090** 0.273** 0.130*** 0.252**
(0.029) (0.094) (0.028) (0.091) (0.035) (0.090)
Constant -3.265*** 2.717 -2.839*** 6.631** -1.148 3.084
(0.712) (2.269) (0.692) (2.081) (0.907) (2.639)
ln(a) 2.023*** 2.013*** 1.752***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.070)
N 119057 4976 119057 4976 72358 2546
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.17: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn, Without Values Above 95th Percentile
(Model 44B) (Model 45B) (Model 46B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.795*** 0.482
(0.179) (0.404)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.067 -1.026**
(0.117) (0.326)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.222 -0.606
(0.208) (0.416)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.021** -0.076***
(0.006) (0.011)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.551*** 0.452† 0.538*** 0.426
(0.146) (0.255) (0.146) (0.265)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.068*** 0.015
(0.014) (0.047)
Polity, Origin -0.078*** 0.015 -0.074*** 0.025 -0.075*** 0.027
(0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.028) (0.011) (0.030)
Polity, Host -0.017† -0.056** -0.018† -0.055** -0.015 -0.041†
(0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.062 -0.538*** -0.001 -0.616*** -0.044 -0.357*
(0.064) (0.133) (0.060) (0.131) (0.063) (0.140)
Respect for HR, Host 0.379*** 0.331** 0.390*** 0.379** 0.365*** 0.308**
(0.065) (0.125) (0.064) (0.120) (0.063) (0.119)
Minimum Distance -0.063** -0.629*** -0.067** -0.649*** -0.054** -0.646***
(0.021) (0.044) (0.020) (0.043) (0.021) (0.043)
Refugees -0.387*** 0.267*** -0.392*** 0.224*** -0.386*** 0.233***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
Hosting Duration -0.066*** 0.012 -0.064*** 0.024 -0.076*** -0.001
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015)
GDPPC, Origin -0.061 -0.235* -0.044 -0.178 -0.077† -0.340**
(0.046) (0.107) (0.049) (0.118) (0.047) (0.124)
GDPPC, Host 0.520*** 0.525*** 0.510*** 0.498*** 0.533*** 0.603***
(0.048) (0.095) (0.048) (0.091) (0.047) (0.093)
Population, Origin 0.152*** -0.269* 0.132** -0.343** 0.150** -0.322**
(0.045) (0.124) (0.046) (0.121) (0.046) (0.122)
Population, Host 0.247*** 0.361*** 0.261*** 0.417*** 0.247*** 0.398***
(0.043) (0.080) (0.042) (0.082) (0.043) (0.088)
Constant -8.004*** 2.256 -7.879*** 2.398 -8.111*** 2.654
(0.962) (2.264) (0.973) (2.263) (0.967) (2.346)
ln(a) 2.133*** 2.113*** 2.137***
(0.067) (0.069) (0.070)
N 89294 3323 89294 3323 89294 3323
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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B.6 All Directed Dyads
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Table B.19: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, All Directed Dyads
(Model 53B) (Model 54B) (Model 55B) (Model 56B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin 0.321*** 0.157
(0.038) (0.155)
GDPPC, Host 0.262*** 0.310**
(0.037) (0.097)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.703*** -1.055***
(0.071) (0.264)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.406*** -1.738***
(0.095) (0.283)
Engagement Rate, Origin 2.811*** -6.765***
(0.608) (1.946)
Engagement Rate, Host 3.889*** 0.817
(0.495) (1.511)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -14.166*** -39.968**
(3.128) (13.047)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -11.343*** 4.791
(2.969) (13.200)
Minimum Distance 0.162*** -0.715*** 0.165*** -0.575*** 0.171*** -0.647*** 0.175*** -0.570***
(0.015) (0.062) (0.013) (0.041) (0.015) (0.055) (0.015) (0.053)
Refugees -0.508*** 0.189*** -0.428*** 0.244*** -0.447*** 0.200*** -0.422*** 0.189***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.019) (0.039) (0.020) (0.041) (0.018) (0.039)
Hosting Duration -0.129*** -0.084*** -0.113*** -0.080*** -0.153*** -0.096*** -0.122*** -0.054*
(0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.022) (0.012) (0.026) (0.010) (0.026)
Population, Origin -0.135*** -0.540*** -0.143*** -0.412** -0.160*** -0.461** -0.148*** -0.582**
(0.041) (0.164) (0.036) (0.138) (0.039) (0.160) (0.044) (0.189)
Population, Host 0.043 0.397*** 0.034 0.391*** 0.000 0.396*** 0.024 0.406***
(0.029) (0.087) (0.029) (0.101) (0.032) (0.096) (0.030) (0.099)
Constant -0.733 7.789** 13.227*** 21.380*** 2.249** 11.697*** 3.572*** 10.974***
(0.807) (2.869) (0.843) (2.795) (0.793) (2.859) (0.829) (3.231)
ln(a) 2.512*** 2.378*** 2.487*** 2.424***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.069) (0.066)
N 732934 5233 724271 5187 641242 4638 622068 4604
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.20: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return
(Model 57B) (Model 58B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.170† -0.722*
(0.093) (0.300)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.079 -0.630*
(0.113) (0.306)
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.066 -1.389***
(0.134) (0.410)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.109 -0.957**
(0.096) (0.321)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.403* -1.223**
(0.162) (0.419)
Minimum Distance 0.143*** -0.642*** 0.144*** -0.635***
(0.016) (0.044) (0.016) (0.042)
Refugees -0.371*** 0.257*** -0.372*** 0.260***
(0.018) (0.044) (0.018) (0.041)
Hosting Duration -0.091*** -0.018 -0.092*** -0.019
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.020)
Population, Origin 0.082† -0.297 0.084† -0.280
(0.050) (0.194) (0.047) (0.179)
Population, Host 0.023 0.391** 0.020 0.380**
(0.031) (0.122) (0.031) (0.116)
Constant -0.206 6.141* -0.226 6.101*
(0.823) (2.775) (0.783) (2.575)
ln(a) 2.299*** 2.295***
(0.062) (0.061)
N 342523 5245 342523 5245
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.21: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns
(Model 59B) (Model 60B) (Model 61B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.018** -0.053***
(0.006) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin -0.007 -0.183***
(0.013) (0.032)
Peace Agreement -1.728*** 0.290
(0.139) (0.394)
Ceasefire 0.356** 0.841*
(0.137) (0.339)
Govt. Victory -0.756*** -0.297
(0.115) (0.269)
Rebel Victory -0.711*** 0.229
(0.156) (0.402)
Low Activity -0.582*** -1.213***
(0.144) (0.355)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.110 -0.747** -0.064 -0.615* -0.056 -1.018***
(0.114) (0.287) (0.112) (0.282) (0.127) (0.283)
Minimum Distance 0.137*** -0.660*** 0.149*** -0.632*** 0.129*** -0.744***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.016) (0.043) (0.017) (0.050)
Refugees -0.367*** 0.264*** -0.368*** 0.210*** -0.378*** 0.257***
(0.018) (0.044) (0.018) (0.041) (0.019) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.092*** -0.017 -0.102*** -0.028 -0.071*** -0.120***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.023)
Population, Origin 0.074 -0.353† 0.046 -0.560*** -0.019 -0.296†
(0.048) (0.183) (0.041) (0.144) (0.050) (0.152)
Population, Host 0.035 0.436*** 0.020 0.409*** 0.060† 0.438***
(0.032) (0.124) (0.029) (0.103) (0.034) (0.095)
Constant -0.247 6.298* 0.450 10.472** 1.800† 6.277*
(0.836) (2.735) (0.756) (2.212) (0.986) (2.926)
ln(a) 2.295*** 2.264*** 1.995***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.069)
N 342523 5245 342523 5245 235650 5245
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.22: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn
(Model 62B) (Model 63B) (Model 64B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.769*** 0.077
(0.200) (0.378)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.055 -1.308***
(0.131) (0.333)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.408† -0.454
(0.223) (0.439)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.022** -0.090***
(0.007) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.056** 0.004
(0.017) (0.052)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.635*** 0.530† 0.603*** 0.443
(0.162) (0.278) (0.165) (0.294)
Polity, Origin -0.059*** 0.013 -0.055*** 0.027 -0.056*** 0.027
(0.013) (0.033) (0.013) (0.032) (0.013) (0.034)
Polity, Host -0.026* -0.015 -0.025* -0.011 -0.022* 0.004
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.053 -0.967*** -0.014 -1.019*** -0.058 -0.783***
(0.067) (0.147) (0.065) (0.155) (0.069) (0.168)
Respect for HR, Host 0.368*** 0.387** 0.384*** 0.469*** 0.360*** 0.387**
(0.076) (0.146) (0.075) (0.141) (0.074) (0.138)
Minimum Distance 0.047† -0.848*** 0.039 -0.864*** 0.050† -0.882***
(0.029) (0.060) (0.027) (0.058) (0.029) (0.060)
Refugees -0.470*** 0.210*** -0.469*** 0.178*** -0.469*** 0.184***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Hosting Duration -0.092*** 0.033† -0.090*** 0.043* -0.100*** 0.018
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin 0.081 -0.455*** 0.085 -0.422** 0.054 -0.595***
(0.064) (0.131) (0.065) (0.142) (0.065) (0.146)
GDPPC, Host 0.425*** 0.580*** 0.413*** 0.550*** 0.436*** 0.638***
(0.055) (0.108) (0.055) (0.106) (0.055) (0.110)
Population, Origin 0.062 -0.386* 0.038 -0.462** 0.046 -0.458**
(0.061) (0.163) (0.061) (0.166) (0.063) (0.175)
Population, Host 0.162*** 0.366*** 0.180*** 0.436*** 0.161*** 0.394***
(0.043) (0.097) (0.043) (0.096) (0.044) (0.102)
Constant -5.281*** 6.527* -5.055*** 6.463* -5.021*** 7.698**
(1.074) (2.745) (1.105) (2.823) (1.101) (2.881)
ln(a) 2.339*** 2.309*** 2.351***
(0.073) (0.075) (0.073)
N 255087 2678 255087 2678 255087 2678
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.24: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample
(Model 71B) (Model 72B) (Model 73B) (Model 74B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin -0.040 -0.106
(0.040) (0.130)
GDPPC, Host 0.521*** 0.532***
(0.036) (0.085)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.833*** -1.864**
(0.151) (0.625)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.225*** -1.276***
(0.110) (0.252)
Engagement Rate, Origin 0.411 -4.777*
(0.615) (1.882)
Engagement Rate, Host 6.234*** 5.228**
(0.589) (1.866)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -20.129*** -53.777***
(3.224) (8.499)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -5.788* 20.391**
(2.894) (7.826)
Minimum Distance -0.051** -0.831*** 0.069*** -0.622*** 0.037* -0.719*** 0.072*** -0.652***
(0.017) (0.065) (0.012) (0.044) (0.015) (0.056) (0.014) (0.053)
Refugees -0.366*** 0.264*** -0.286*** 0.275*** -0.300*** 0.268*** -0.271*** 0.251***
(0.020) (0.046) (0.015) (0.046) (0.015) (0.045) (0.015) (0.047)
Hosting Duration -0.086*** -0.064** -0.064*** -0.068** -0.108*** -0.090*** -0.071*** -0.040†
(0.008) (0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.023)
Population, Origin 0.150*** -0.128 0.069† -0.329* 0.149*** -0.118 0.094* -0.347*
(0.044) (0.147) (0.038) (0.140) (0.042) (0.149) (0.040) (0.154)
Population, Host 0.169*** 0.397*** 0.150*** 0.444*** 0.096** 0.345** 0.135*** 0.441***
(0.033) (0.093) (0.031) (0.115) (0.035) (0.109) (0.032) (0.123)
Constant -6.955*** 0.684 7.009*** 20.556*** -4.747*** 4.232 -2.801*** 6.195**
(0.849) (2.335) (0.988) (3.487) (0.951) (2.924) (0.742) (2.163)
ln(a) 2.263*** 2.173*** 2.207*** 2.199***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066)
N 137230 4835 135662 4793 123044 4271 119600 4237
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.25: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample
(Model 75B) (Model 76B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.174* -0.798**
(0.085) (0.292)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.284** -0.621*
(0.108) (0.302)
Civil Conflict, Host Only -0.164 -1.321**
(0.126) (0.409)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.129 -1.004**
(0.088) (0.314)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.555*** -1.269**
(0.156) (0.417)
Minimum Distance 0.071*** -0.639*** 0.073*** -0.630***
(0.013) (0.044) (0.013) (0.042)
Refugees -0.273*** 0.274*** -0.274*** 0.274***
(0.014) (0.043) (0.014) (0.041)
Hosting Duration -0.071*** -0.031 -0.071*** -0.031
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021)
Population, Origin 0.159*** -0.175 0.157*** -0.178
(0.047) (0.194) (0.045) (0.180)
Population, Host 0.114*** 0.415*** 0.110*** 0.395***
(0.032) (0.124) (0.031) (0.116)
Constant -3.195*** 3.865 -3.115*** 4.272
(0.807) (2.851) (0.773) (2.660)
ln(a) 2.196*** 2.191***
(0.059) (0.059)
N 116819 5016 116819 5016
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.26: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 5
Year Risk Sample
(Model 77B) (Model 78B) (Model 79B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.020*** -0.057***
(0.005) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.002 -0.172***
(0.011) (0.031)
Peace Agreement -1.377*** 0.239
(0.125) (0.364)
Ceasefire 0.344** 0.983**
(0.126) (0.350)
Govt. Victory -0.761*** -0.315
(0.108) (0.269)
Rebel Victory -0.664*** 0.170
(0.152) (0.385)
Low Activity -0.447*** -1.313***
(0.134) (0.359)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.321** -0.764** -0.261* -0.658* -0.251* -0.955***
(0.110) (0.285) (0.105) (0.278) (0.124) (0.276)
Minimum Distance 0.068*** -0.660*** 0.078*** -0.633*** 0.056*** -0.749***
(0.013) (0.045) (0.013) (0.044) (0.015) (0.049)
Refugees -0.270*** 0.282*** -0.269*** 0.222*** -0.282*** 0.278***
(0.014) (0.044) (0.014) (0.042) (0.015) (0.036)
Hosting Duration -0.072*** -0.031 -0.081*** -0.036† -0.050*** -0.132***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.023)
Population, Origin 0.159*** -0.212 0.124** -0.497*** 0.056 -0.187
(0.046) (0.183) (0.040) (0.145) (0.049) (0.162)
Population, Host 0.128*** 0.476*** 0.109*** 0.432*** 0.153*** 0.470***
(0.032) (0.124) (0.030) (0.103) (0.035) (0.092)
Constant -3.425*** 3.428 -2.557*** 9.136*** -1.347 4.195
(0.818) (2.745) (0.735) (2.224) (0.955) (3.053)
ln(a) 2.194*** 2.151*** 1.900***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.068)
N 116819 5016 116819 5016 66442 5016
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.27: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn, 5 Year Risk Sample
(Model 80B) (Model 81B) (Model 82B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.769*** 0.081
(0.178) (0.382)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.077 -1.268***
(0.122) (0.343)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.502* -0.315
(0.207) (0.461)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.023*** -0.090***
(0.007) (0.013)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.058*** 0.002
(0.015) (0.053)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.672*** 0.588* 0.657*** 0.539†
(0.145) (0.273) (0.149) (0.306)
Polity, Origin -0.068*** 0.030 -0.064*** 0.043 -0.067*** 0.044
(0.012) (0.033) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.034)
Polity, Host -0.017 -0.039† -0.018 -0.039† -0.015 -0.024
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin 0.118† -0.729*** 0.034 -0.839*** 0.012 -0.538***
(0.070) (0.147) (0.067) (0.155) (0.067) (0.151)
Respect for HR, Host 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.483*** 0.538*** 0.463*** 0.480***
(0.064) (0.139) (0.064) (0.136) (0.063) (0.141)
Minimum Distance -0.074*** -0.818*** -0.078*** -0.832*** -0.071*** -0.859***
(0.021) (0.055) (0.021) (0.054) (0.021) (0.055)
Refugees -0.367*** 0.231*** -0.371*** 0.193*** -0.365*** 0.208***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.040)
Hosting Duration -0.092*** -0.012 -0.087*** 0.006 -0.099*** -0.027
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin 0.004 -0.184 0.016 -0.143 -0.020 -0.316*
(0.050) (0.127) (0.053) (0.139) (0.052) (0.148)
GDPPC, Host 0.517*** 0.469*** 0.505*** 0.431*** 0.527*** 0.533***
(0.048) (0.102) (0.048) (0.100) (0.049) (0.107)
Population, Origin 0.126* -0.399** 0.111* -0.459** 0.126* -0.448**
(0.050) (0.144) (0.051) (0.147) (0.053) (0.152)
Population, Host 0.250*** 0.410*** 0.270*** 0.490*** 0.257*** 0.464***
(0.044) (0.091) (0.043) (0.092) (0.044) (0.100)
Constant -7.788*** 5.513* -7.826*** 4.968† -7.974*** 5.830*
(1.025) (2.669) (1.048) (2.732) (1.055) (2.780)
ln(a) 2.239*** 2.213*** 2.253***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.072)
N 87116 3308 87116 3308 87116 3308
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.29: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample
(Model 89B) (Model 90B) (Model 91B) (Model 92B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
GDPPC, Origin -0.072† -0.172
(0.039) (0.130)
GDPPC, Host 0.514*** 0.525***
(0.036) (0.086)
GDPPC Growth, Host -0.673*** -0.884**
(0.081) (0.277)
GDPPC Growth, Origin -1.274*** -1.341***
(0.100) (0.225)
Engagement Rate, Origin 0.828 -4.260*
(0.596) (1.851)
Engagement Rate, Host 5.869*** 4.945**
(0.594) (1.839)
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin -16.248*** -50.459***
(2.987) (8.314)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host -5.383† 21.953**
(2.846) (7.472)
Minimum Distance -0.048** -0.820*** 0.069*** -0.605*** 0.038* -0.714*** 0.069*** -0.651***
(0.016) (0.064) (0.012) (0.044) (0.015) (0.056) (0.013) (0.052)
Refugees -0.392*** 0.258*** -0.303*** 0.269*** -0.322*** 0.259*** -0.289*** 0.246***
(0.020) (0.045) (0.015) (0.044) (0.016) (0.045) (0.015) (0.047)
Hosting Duration -0.075*** -0.054* -0.062*** -0.067** -0.098*** -0.078** -0.066*** -0.035
(0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007) (0.023)
Population, Origin 0.143*** -0.104 0.049 -0.327* 0.127** -0.124 0.074† -0.342*
(0.042) (0.144) (0.038) (0.140) (0.041) (0.148) (0.040) (0.155)
Population, Host 0.186*** 0.408*** 0.162*** 0.440*** 0.115*** 0.360*** 0.150*** 0.447***
(0.033) (0.095) (0.030) (0.115) (0.035) (0.109) (0.032) (0.122)
Constant -6.899*** 0.424 6.686*** 16.262*** -4.734*** 3.859 -2.674*** 5.936**
(0.837) (2.277) (0.885) (2.650) (0.926) (2.858) (0.733) (2.143)
ln(a) 2.271*** 2.170*** 2.210*** 2.195***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064)
N 147716 5014 146103 4969 132737 4444 129096 4410
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.30: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample
(Model 93B) (Model 94B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Origin -0.155† -0.744*
(0.086) (0.289)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.278** -0.616*
(0.108) (0.298)
Civil Conflict, Host Only -0.145 -1.292**
(0.124) (0.402)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.105 -0.942**
(0.088) (0.308)
Civil Conflict, Both -0.545*** -1.209**
(0.157) (0.412)
Minimum Distance 0.071*** -0.641*** 0.072*** -0.633***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.013) (0.041)
Refugees -0.288*** 0.265*** -0.288*** 0.265***
(0.015) (0.043) (0.014) (0.042)
Hosting Duration -0.066*** -0.026 -0.066*** -0.026
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.020)
Population, Origin 0.153** -0.190 0.151*** -0.192
(0.047) (0.193) (0.045) (0.180)
Population, Host 0.121*** 0.417*** 0.117*** 0.400***
(0.031) (0.122) (0.031) (0.115)
Constant -3.235*** 4.015 -3.164*** 4.379†
(0.801) (2.819) (0.768) (2.637)
ln(a) 2.191*** 2.186***
(0.058) (0.057)
N 119246 5165 119246 5165
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.31: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 10
Year Risk Sample
(Model 95B) (Model 96B) (Model 97B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.019*** -0.056***
(0.005) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.002 -0.175***
(0.011) (0.031)
Peace Agreement -1.459*** 0.242
(0.125) (0.366)
Ceasefire 0.280* 0.863*
(0.122) (0.339)
Govt. Victory -0.741*** -0.230
(0.109) (0.265)
Rebel Victory -0.705*** 0.198
(0.154) (0.390)
Low Activity -0.445*** -1.302***
(0.134) (0.358)
Civil Conflict, Host -0.312** -0.749** -0.253* -0.645* -0.261* -0.997***
(0.109) (0.281) (0.105) (0.274) (0.124) (0.267)
Minimum Distance 0.067*** -0.660*** 0.077*** -0.634*** 0.057*** -0.747***
(0.013) (0.045) (0.013) (0.043) (0.015) (0.048)
Refugees -0.285*** 0.274*** -0.284*** 0.215*** -0.302*** 0.263***
(0.015) (0.043) (0.014) (0.041) (0.016) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.067*** -0.026 -0.075*** -0.030† -0.041*** -0.118***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023
Population, Origin 0.157*** -0.213 0.121** -0.501*** 0.044 -0.184
(0.046) (0.183) (0.039) (0.145) (0.050) (0.170)
Population, Host 0.135*** 0.473*** 0.117*** 0.433*** 0.166*** 0.483***
(0.032) (0.123) (0.029) (0.102) (0.035) (0.093)
Constant -3.499*** 3.456 -2.627*** 9.135*** -1.347 3.765
(0.809) (2.711) (0.730) (2.207) (0.964) (3.139)
ln(a) 2.189*** 2.145*** 1.913***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.065)
N 119246 5165 119246 5165 68984 2608
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table B.32: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Re-
turn, 10 Year Risk Sample
(Model 98B) (Model 99B) (Model 100B)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only 0.725*** 0.065
(0.182) (0.372)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only -0.106 -1.268***
(0.122) (0.342)
Civil Conflict, Both 0.321 -0.448
(0.211) (0.456)
Conflict Duration, Origin -0.025*** -0.093***
(0.007) (0.012)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin 0.068*** 0.00
(0.015) (0.051)
Civil Conflict, Host 0.580*** 0.504† 0.562*** 0.440
(0.149) (0.274) (0.152) (0.301)
Polity, Origin -0.076*** 0.032 -0.070*** 0.049 -0.073*** 0.047
(0.012) (0.033) (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033)
Polity, Host -0.014 -0.038† -0.015 -0.039† -0.012 -0.023
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin -0.017 -0.910*** -0.084 -0.984*** -0.124† -0.718***
(0.064) (0.143) (0.062) (0.148) (0.064) (0.146)
Respect for HR, Host 0.409*** 0.417** 0.426*** 0.492*** 0.408*** 0.434**
(0.067) (0.135) (0.066) (0.132) (0.065) (0.134)
Minimum Distance -0.080*** -0.812*** -0.085*** -0.826*** -0.076*** -0.851***
(0.021) (0.054) (0.021) (0.052) (0.021) (0.053)
Refugees -0.399*** 0.212*** -0.401*** 0.181*** -0.393*** 0.190***
(0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.038)
Hosting Duration -0.067*** 0.011 -0.065*** 0.023 -0.078*** -0.005
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin -0.061 -0.290* -0.048 -0.241† -0.086† -0.421**
(0.050) (0.125) (0.052) (0.135) (0.051) (0.144)
GDPPC, Host 0.509*** 0.477** 0.498*** 0.441*** 0.518*** 0.535***
(0.048) (0.102) (0.048) (0.099) (0.049) (0.104)
Population, Origin 0.114* -0.424** 0.102† -0.473** 0.113* -0.478**
(0.050) (0.150) (0.052) (0.153) (0.053) (0.156)
Population, Host 0.258*** 0.411*** 0.277*** 0.488*** 0.262*** 0.462***
(0.044) (0.093) (0.043) (0.092) (0.044) (0.100)
Constant -7.397*** 6.252* -7.477*** 5.548* -7.539*** 6.717*
(1.021) (2.652) (1.050) (2.721) (1.042) (2.733)
ln(a) 2.230*** 2.201*** 2.239***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
N 89411 3440 89411 3440 89411 1 3440
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Appendix C
Supplementary Material to The Effect of Leader
Turnover on Refugee Return
C.1 Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models
Table C.1: Summary statistics for Archigos Sample When Returnees> 0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 5212 3865.894 35278.85 1 1569248
Leader Change 5212 .176 .381 0 1
Regular Exit 5212 .16 .366 0 1
Irregular Exit 5212 .02 .139 0 1
Removed w/ Foreign Support 4154 .006 .074 0 1
Removed w/o Foreign Support 5189 .204 .403 0 1
Leader Death 5212 .007 .085 0 1
Minimum Distance, (logged km) 5212 4.815 3.452 0 9.763
Refugees (logged) 5212 5.815 3.562 0 14.603
Leader Change, Host 5212 .153 .36 0 1
Civil Conflict 5212 .444 .497 0 1
Electoral Democracy, Origin 5212 .372 .181 .068 .906
Electoral Democracy, Host 5212 .525 .254 .02 .94
GDPPC, Origin 5212 6.724 1.253 4.19 10.032
GDPPC, Host 5212 7.728 1.679 4.19 11.647
Population, Host 5212 16.608 1.417 12.349 21.014
Population, Origin 5212 16.414 1.095 11.188 21.044
Years since last return 5212 3.164 5.609 0 27
Years since last return2 5212 41.468 109.793 0 729
Years since last return3 5212 707.041 2427.199 0 19683
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample When Returnees> 0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returnees 3605 4962.195 41856.4 1 1569248
Leader Change 3605 .211 .408 0 1
Insider Change 3605 .123 .329 0 1
Outsider Change 3605 .088 .283 0 1
Regular Insider 3241 .123 .328 0 1
Irregular Insider 2872 .01 .1 0 1
Regular Outsider 3097 .082 .274 0 1
Irregular Outsider 2900 .02 .139 0 1
Insider change w/ and w/o FS 3288 .135 .342 0 1
Outsider Change w/ FS 2856 .005 .067 0 1
Outsider Change w/o FS 3147 .097 .295 0 1
Leader Death 3605 .01 .099 0 1
Minimum Distance, (logged km) 3605 4.825 3.484 0 9.763
Refugees (logged) 3605 5.687 3.668 0 14.603
Leader Change, Host 3605 .159 .366 0 1
Civil Conflict 3605 .428 .495 0 1
Electoral Democracy, Origin 3605 .36 .194 .068 .906
Electoral Democracy, Host 3605 .526 .26 .02 .921
GDPPC, Origin 3605 6.456 1.199 4.19 10.032
GDPPC, Host 3605 7.551 1.697 4.19 11.481
Population, Host 3605 16.605 1.41 13.228 20.994
Population, Origin 3605 16.306 1.087 13.096 21.004
Years since last return 3605 3 4.676 0 19
Years since last return2 3605 30.857 69.095 0 361
Years since last return3 3605 395.367 1139.976 0 6859
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C.2 Pairwise Comparisons
Figure C.1: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Policy Change
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Figure C.2: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy
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Figure C.3: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Stability & Policy
Change
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Figure C.4: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy & Policy
Change
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C.3 Binary Leader Change Models
Table C.3: ZiNB Results of Any Leader Changes
(Model 1C) (Model 2C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Leader Change -0.364*** 0.382† -0.468*** 0.284
(0.103) (0.200) (0.108) (0.218)
Minimum Distance -0.047** -0.794*** -0.031† -0.785***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.017) (0.054)
Refugees -0.493*** 0.249*** -0.521*** 0.210***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.022) (0.038)
Civil Conflict -0.526*** -0.679** -0.616*** -1.392***
(0.093) (0.242) (0.105) (0.253)
Leader Change, Host 0.042 -0.164 0.081 0.009
(0.081) (0.227) (0.091) (0.258)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.101*** 0.416 -1.661*** -0.572
(0.271) (0.773) (0.254) (0.688)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.714** -0.077 0.278 -0.192
(0.220) (0.497) (0.238) (0.460)
GDPPC, Origin -0.038 -0.245* 0.096* -0.207
(0.042) (0.123) (0.046) (0.138)
GDPPC, Host 0.470*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.369***
(0.041) (0.095) (0.044) (0.098)
Population, Origin 0.135** -0.004 0.105* -0.192
(0.045) (0.156) (0.045) (0.140)
Population, Host 0.190*** 0.398*** 0.153*** 0.353***
(0.036) (0.103) (0.037) (0.102)
Constant -6.601*** -0.687 -5.760*** 4.827*
(0.829) (2.127) (0.895) (2.284)
N 170388 5212 116568 3605
ln(a) 2.348*** 2.357***
(0.056) (0.063)
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.4 Interacting Civil Conflict with Turnover Types
Table C.4: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers Interacted with Civil
Conflict
(Model 3C) (Model 4C) (Model 5C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -1.454*** -0.230
(0.160) (0.335)
Outsider Change -0.243* 1.637***
(0.122) (0.378)
Insider Change X Civil Conflict 1.581*** 0.397
(0.290) (0.546)
Outsider Change X Civil Conflict 0.805*** -1.503**
(0.232) (0.520)
Regular Exit -0.871*** 0.829**
(0.120) (0.267)
Irregular Exit 0.302 -1.878*
(0.410) (0.757)
Regular Exit X Civil Conflict 1.097*** -0.803†
(0.201) (0.431)
Irregular Exit X Civil Conflict 0.639 1.696†
(0.471) (0.869)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. -0.697 -0.550
(0.546) (0.959)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.764*** 0.559*
(0.112) (0.249)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. X Civil Conflict 1.472* -1.325
(0.682) (1.028)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. X Civil Conflict 1.212*** 0.221
(0.178) (0.435)
Civil Conflict -0.804*** -1.188*** -0.720*** -0.556* -0.778*** -0.776**
(0.110) (0.260) (0.096) (0.252) (0.097) (0.237)
Leader Death 1.075*** -0.191 0.618* -0.784 0.912*** -0.649
(0.227) (0.570) (0.257) (0.668) (0.229) (0.708)
Minimum Distance -0.023 -0.747*** -0.044** -0.777*** -0.047** -0.783***
(0.017) (0.054) (0.016) (0.057) (0.016) (0.056)
Refugees -0.517*** 0.204*** -0.489*** 0.241*** -0.490*** 0.254***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.018) (0.036) (0.018) (0.036)
Leader Change, Host 0.101 0.081 0.045 -0.157 0.040 -0.161
(0.088) (0.246) (0.080) (0.225) (0.081) (0.228)
Electoral Democracy, Origin 0.257 -1.704*** -0.361 -0.981*** 0.449 -1.093***
(0.232) (0.610) (0.269) (0.764) (0.265) (0.752)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.278 -0.278 0.713** -0.122 0.750*** -0.005
(0.237) (0.454) (0.220) (0.490) (0.219) (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin 0.122** -0.195 -0.022 -0.237* -0.032 -0.248*
(0.045) (0.131) (0.042) (0.121) (0.042) (0.120)
GDPPC, Host 0.479*** 0.322*** 0.469*** 0.448*** 0.469*** 0.457***
(0.044) (0.096) (0.041) (0.097) (0.041) (0.094)
Population, Origin 0.095* -0.170 0.128** -0.009 0.128** -0.019
(0.041) (0.126) (0.043) (0.148) (0.043) (0.149)
Population, Host 0.147*** 0.346*** 0.186*** 0.395*** 0.187*** 0.385***
(0.037) (0.096) (0.035) (0.099) (0.035) (0.101)
Constant -5.544*** 4.634* -6.519*** -0.397 -0.023 -6.410***
(0.874) (2.180) (0.808) (2.033) (0.812) (2.049)
ln(a) 2.335*** 2.335*** 2.344***
(0.064) (0.055) (0.056)
N 116568 3605 170388 5212 170388 5212
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.5: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers Inter-
acted with Civil Conflict
(Model 6C) (Model 7C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider Change -0.300* 1.750***
(0.127) (0.388)
Regular Exit, Insider Change -1.566*** -0.239
(0.168) (0.344)
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change 0.088 -1.786***
(0.603) (0.537)
Irregular Exit, Insider Change -0.923† -4.282***
(0.539) (1.034)
Regular Exit, Outsider Change X Civil conflict 0.432 -1.672*
(0.307) (0.777)
Regular Exit, Insider Change X Civil conflict 1.316*** 0.195
(0.333) (0.564)
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change X Civil conflict 0.985 2.044**
(0.674) (0.678)
Irregular Exit, Insider Change X Civil conflict 1.766* 4.928***
(0.689) (1.352)
W/o Foreign Supp., Outsider -0.227† 1.665***
(0.124) (0.379)
W/ Foreign Supp., Outsider -1.545* -0.986
(0.750) (1.035)
Insider Change -1.452*** -0.227
(0.159) (0.334)
W/o Foreign Supp., Outsider X Civil conflict 0.690** -1.425**
(0.235) (0.535)
W/ Foreign Supp., Outsider X Civil conflict 3.267* -0.541
(1.337) (1.244)
Insider Change X Civil conflict 1.578*** 0.395
(0.289) (0.546)
Civil conflict -0.798*** -1.184*** -0.807*** -1.194***
(0.110) (0.261) (0.110) (0.261)
Leader Death 0.815*** 0.166 1.073*** -0.190
(0.237) (0.566) (0.227) (0.574)
Minimum Distance -0.023 -0.748*** -0.024 -0.750***
(0.017) (0.054) (0.017) (0.054)
Refugees -0.518*** 0.201*** -0.516*** 0.205***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036)
Leader Change, Host 0.117 0.114 0.100 0.075
(0.088) (0.244) (0.088) (0.246)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.653*** -0.373 -1.699*** -0.366
(0.234) (0.609) (0.232) (0.609)
Electoral Democracy, Host3 0.259 -0.31 0.272 -0.309
(0.238) (0.462) (0.237) (0.455)
GDPPC, Origin 0.122** -0.202 0.122** -0.199
(0.045) (0.132) (0.045) (0.131)
GDPPC, Host 0.488*** 0.328*** 0.480*** 0.328***
(0.044) (0.096) (0.044) (0.096)
Population, Host 0.102* -0.169 0.098* -0.168
(0.043) (0.130) (0.041) (0.125)
Population, Host 0.148*** 0.340*** 0.147*** 0.349***
(0.037) (0.096) (0.037) (0.096)
Constant -5.727*** 4.765* -5.602*** 4.572*
(0.887) (2.224) (0.879) (2.188)
ln(a) 2.334*** 2.331***
(0.064) (0.064)
N 116515 3605 116515 3605
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.5 Removing Outliers - Afghanistan & Eritrea
Table C.6: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without AFG and ERI
(Model 8C) (Model 9C) (Model 10C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -1.076*** -0.092
(0.147) (0.292)
Outsider Change 0.014 1.167***
(0.107) (0.278)
Regular Exit -0.686*** 0.536*
(0.110) (0.220)
Irregular Exit 0.996*** 0.600
(0.231) (0.425)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. -0.198 -2.012*
(0.896) (0.882)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.537*** 0.520*
(0.106) (0.207)
Leader Death 0.801*** -0.233 0.075 -0.904 0.306 -0.901
(0.224) (0.519) (0.243) (0.557) (0.225) (0.582)
Minimum Distance -0.021 -0.740*** -0.024 -0.754*** -0.025 -0.755***
(0.016) (0.054) (0.016) (0.055) (0.016) (0.055)
Refugees -0.508*** 0.198*** -0.505*** 0.200*** -0.507*** 0.202***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.022) (0.039) (0.022) (0.039)
Leader Change, Host 0.072 -0.028 0.030 -0.152 0.020 -0.165
(0.084) (0.205) (0.087) (0.218) (0.087) (0.216)
Civil Conflict -0.556*** -1.539*** -0.640*** -1.648*** -0.578*** -1.660***
(0.111) (0.254) (0.109) (0.251) (0.111) (0.253)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.558*** 0.223 -1.365*** 0.020 -1.434*** 0.063
(0.236) (0.606) (0.256) (0.665) (0.254) (0.658)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.288 -0.004 0.331 0.157 0.323 0.118
(0.246) (0.467) (0.246) (0.473) (0.246) (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin 0.065 -0.264* 0.054 -0.281* 0.041 -0.291*
(0.043) (0.119) (0.043) (0.122) (0.043) (0.121)
GDPPC, Host 0.484*** 0.336*** 0.483*** 0.346*** 0.482*** 0.353***
(0.045) (0.101) (0.045) (0.103) (0.045) (0.104)
Population, Origin 0.130*** -0.046 0.139*** -0.057 0.139*** -0.048
(0.039) (0.111) (0.040) (0.111 (0.040) (0.111
Population, Host 0.156*** 0.349*** 0.148*** 0.316*** 0.149*** 0.317***
(0.038) (0.090) (0.038) (0.088) (0.038) (0.089)
Constant -6.059*** 2.445 -6.081*** 3.265 -5.998*** 3.129
(0.895) (2.232) (0.903) (2.302) (0.907) (2.309)
ln(a) 2.329*** 2.332*** 2.334***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
N 113830 3255 113830 3255 113830 3255
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.7: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, Without
AFG and ERI
(Model 11C) (Model 12C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider -0.173 1.387***
(0.112) (0.304)
Regular Exit, Insider -1.312*** -0.178
(0.156) (0.317)
Irregular Exit, Outsider 0.860** 0.552
(0.286) (0.456)
Irregular Exit, Insider 0.585 0.726
(0.368) (0.762)
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support -0.002 1.252***
(0.107) (0.279)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support -0.379 -2.027*
(0.995) (0.888)
Insider Change -1.077*** -0.090
(0.147) (0.292)
Leader Death 0.626** 0.171 0.800*** -0.235
(0.239) (0.489) (0.224) (0.516)
Minimum Distance -0.020 -0.733*** -0.022 -0.741***
(0.016) (0.054) (0.016) (0.054)
Refugees -0.507*** 0.195*** -0.508*** 0.198***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.022) (0.038)
Leader Change, Host 0.091 0.009 0.072 -0.028
(0.085) (0.203) (0.084) (0.204)
Civil Conflict -0.640*** -1.530*** -0.570*** -1.547***
(0.111) (0.252) (0.111) (0.255)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.494*** 0.156 -1.547*** 0.227
(0.236) (0.601) (0.236) (0.602)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.280 -0.037 0.277 -0.056
(0.246) (0.467) (0.246) (0.464)
GDPPC, Origin 0.068 -0.271* 0.064 -0.266*
(0.043) (0.120) (0.043) (0.119)
GDPPC, Host 0.493*** 0.341*** 0.486*** 0.339***
(0.045) (0.102) (0.045) (0.100)
Population, Origin 0.140*** -0.039 0.134*** -0.043
(0.039) (0.112) (0.039) (0.110)
Population, Host 0.151*** 0.327*** 0.156*** 0.348***
(0.038) (0.088) (0.038) (0.089)
Constant -6.217*** 2.748 -6.130*** 2.458
(0.900) (2.222) (0.896) (2.216)
ln(a) 2.327*** 2.327***
(0.070) (0.070)
N 112538 3231 113777 3255
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.6 Removing Outliers - Dropping Returnees Above 95th Per-
centile
Table C.8: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without Values Above
95th Percentile
(Model 13C) (Model 14C) (Model 15C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -0.960*** 0.105
(0.133) (0.187)
Outsider Change 0.079 0.876***
(0.101) (0.224)
Regular Exit -0.631*** 0.511**
(0.104) (0.171)
Irregular Exit 0.995*** 0.164
(0.216) (0.360)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. 0.558 -1.131
(0.736) (0.814)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.466*** 0.462**
(0.099) (0.159)
Leader Death 0.694** -0.525 0.075 -0.871† 0.259 -0.859
(0.223) (0.527) (0.234) (0.523) (0.220) (0.543)
Minimum Distance 0.004 -0.465*** 0.002 -0.467*** 0.001 -0.469***
(0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.036) (0.016) (0.036)
Refugees -0.505*** 0.254*** -0.500*** 0.258*** -0.503*** 0.260***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027)
Leader Change, Host 0.102 0.073 0.079 0.054 0.073 0.054
(0.077) (0.151) (0.078) (0.153) (0.079) (0.152)
Civil Conflict -0.604*** -1.301*** -0.665*** -1.328*** -0.609*** -1.355***
(0.098) (0.224) (0.098) (0.224) (0.098) (0.224)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.703*** -0.564 -1.457*** -0.549 -1.535*** -0.526
(0.218) (0.520) (0.232) (0.543) (0.230) (0.540)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.136 -0.916* 0.162 -0.839* 0.163 -0.846*
(0.234) (0.402) (0.235) (0.413) (0.236) (0.413)
GDPPC, Origin 0.111** -0.144 0.099* -0.166† 0.089* -0.168†
(0.039) (0.095) (0.039) (0.095) (0.040) (0.095)
GDPPC, Host 0.471*** 0.306*** 0.468*** 0.305*** 0.466*** 0.309***
(0.041) (0.069) (0.041) (0.070) (0.041) (0.070)
Population, Origin 0.153*** 0.029 0.163*** 0.025 0.162*** 0.028
(0.033) (0.082) (0.034) (0.083) (0.034) (0.083)
Population, Host 0.109**t 0.124† 0.105** 0.108 0.106** 0.107
(0.034) (0.067) (0.034) (0.068) (0.034) (0.068)
Constant -5.868*** 2.662 -5.963*** 3.058† -5.857*** 3.013
(0.807) (1.839) (0.809) (1.857) (0.810) (1.863)
ln(a) 2.182*** 2.179*** 2.182***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.069)
N 116387 3424 116387 3424 116387 3424
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.9: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers,Without
Values Above 95th Percentile
(Model 16C) (Model 17C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider -0.132 1.097***
(0.108) (0.253)
Regular Exit, Insider -1.191*** 0.079
(0.142) (0.199)
Irregular Exit, Outsider 0.848** 0.141
(0.261) (0.361)
Irregular Exit, Insider 0.609† 0.266
(0.349) (0.704)
Outsider Change, W/o Foreign Supp. 0.044 0.958***
(0.101) (0.228)
Outsider Change, W/ Foreign Supp. 0.463 -1.166
(0.766) (0.798)
Insider Change -0.963*** 0.102
(0.133) (0.186)
Leader Death 0.546* -0.139 0.695** -0.518
(0.234) (0.525) (0.223) (0.527)
Minimum Distance 0.003 -0.464*** 0.003 -0.466***
(0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.035)
Refugees -0.501*** 0.255*** -0.504*** 0.254***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027)
Leader Change, Host 0.115 0.089 0.101 0.069
(0.078) (0.153) (0.077) (0.152)
Civil Conflict -0.680*** -1.270*** -0.614*** -1.303***
(0.099) (0.225) (0.098) (0.225)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.622*** -0.580 -1.682*** -0.564
(0.219) (0.517) (0.219) (0.519)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.137 -0.894* 0.127 -0.960*
(0.235) (0.400) (0.235) (0.401)
GDPPC, Origin 0.113** -0.160† 0.111** -0.145
(0.039) (0.095) (0.039) (0.096)
GDPPC, Host 0.478*** 0.305*** 0.471*** 0.308***
(0.041) (0.069) (0.041) (0.068)
Population, Origin 0.166*** 0.048 0.157*** 0.028
(0.034) (0.083) (0.034) (0.082)
Population, Host 0.109** 0.123† 0.110** 0.125†
(0.034) (0.067) (0.034) (0.067)
Constant -6.126*** 2.444 -5.932*** 2.688
(0.813) (1.850) (0.810) (1.838)
ln(a) 2.175*** 2.180***
(0.069) (0.069)
N 115097 3402 116334 3424
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.7 All Possible Dyads
Table C.10: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, All Directed Dyads
(Model 18C) (Model 19C) (Model 20C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -0.793*** 0.510
(0.170) (0.503)
Outsider Change 0.257* 1.125**
(0.118) (0.359)
Regular Exit -0.530*** 0.288
(0.115) (0.239)
Irregular Exit 1.157*** 0.112
(0.204) (0.456)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. 0.299 -1.495***
(0.443) (0.454)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.320** 0.410†
(0.100) (0.222)
Leader Death 0.457† -1.461* 0.255 -1.201† 0.392 -1.366†
(0.259) (0.715) (0.249) (0.723) (0.244) (0.734)
Minimum Distance 0.173*** -0.722*** 0.174*** -0.717*** 0.175*** -0.711***
(0.015) (0.057) (0.015) (0.058) (0.015) (0.057)
Refugees -0.694*** 0.126*** -0.662*** 0.152*** -0.665*** 0.154***
(0.026) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035)
Leader Change, Host 0.163† 0.052 0.081 -0.153 0.075 -0.157
(0.118) (0.359) (0.080) (0.213) (0.079) (0.210)
Civil Conflict -0.733** -1.504**** -0.741*** -1.088*** -0.669*** -1.106***
(0.105) (0.254 (0.095) (0.265) (0.094) (0.256)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.262*** -1.896* -0.556† -1.597† -0.640* -1.573†
(0.261) (0.756) (0.285) (0.942) (0.282) (0.937)
Electoral Democracy, Host -0.650** -1.246* -0.305 -0.932 -0.315 -0.961
(0.242) (0.538) (0.224) (0.595) (0.223) (0.584)
GDPPC, Origin 0.422*** 0.066 0.333*** 0.191 0.323*** 0.179
(0.046) (0.145) (0.042) (0.136) (0.042) (0.134)
GDPPC, Host 0.316*** 0.291** 0.282*** 0.356*** 0.277*** 0.345***
(0.041) (0.095) (0.041) (0.097) (0.041) (0.096)
Population, Origin -0.086* -0.513*** -0.128** -0.591*** -0.131** -0.581***
(0.039) (0.127) (0.040) (0.156) (0.041) (0.158)
Population, Host 0.022 0.379*** 0.033 0.414*** 0.033 0.406***
(0.033) (0.085) (0.030) (0.081) (0.030) (0.081)
Constant -1.252 9.966*** -0.653 8.697*** -0.469 8.789***
(0.883) (2.577) (0.806) (2.600) (0.813) (2.625)
ln(a) 2.589*** 2.564*** 2.568***
(0.065) (0.059) (0.059)
N 448052 3734 720254 5352 720254 5352
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.11: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, All
Directed Dyads
(Model 21C) (Model 22C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider 0.049 1.182**
(0.130) (0.399)
Regular Exit, Insider -1.212*** -0.31
(0.158) (0.305)
Irregular Exit, Outsider 1.048*** 0.176
(0.263) (0.431)
Irregular Exit, Insider 0.986* 1.030
(0.415) (0.927)
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support 0.244* 1.240***
(0.120) (0.372)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support 0.480 -1.580*
(0.857) (0.658)
Insider Change -0.792*** 0.517
(0.170) (0.503)
Leader Death 0.063 -0.253 0.461† -1.447*
(0.270) (0.509) (0.259) (0.713)
Minimum Distance 0.165*** -0.745*** 0.173*** -0.724***
(0.016) (0.059) (0.015) (0.057)
Refugees -0.669*** 0.162*** -0.695*** 0.126***
(0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.035)
Leader Change, Host 0.173† 0.088 0.161† 0.048
(0.090) (0.231) (0.090) (0.234)
Civil Conflict -0.863*** -1.629*** -0.740*** -1.491***
(0.110) (0.274) (0.106) (0.255)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.200*** -1.936* -1.234*** -1.859*
(0.250) (0.760) (0.262) (0.756)
Electoral Democracy, Host -0.594* -0.804† -0.672** -1.318*
(0.233) (0.474) (0.243) (0.540)
GDPPC, Origin 0.412*** 0.008 0.422*** 0.061
(0.048) (0.150) (0.046) (0.145)
GDPPC, Host 0.335*** 0.326*** 0.318*** 0.295**
(0.041) (0.096) (0.041) (0.095)
Population, Origin -0.018 -0.256† -0.080* -0.504***
(0.044) (0.145) (0.039) (0.128)
Population, Host 0.020 0.340*** 0.022 0.381***
(0.034) (0.089) (0.033) (0.085)
Constant -2.406** 6.139* -1.357 9.818***
(0.903) (2.549) (0.888) (2.582)
ln(a) 2.544*** 2.589***
(0.066) (0.065)
N 448052 3734 448052 3734
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.8 5 Year Risk Sample
Table C.12: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample
(Model 23C) (Model 24C) (Model 25C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -1.038*** -0.549
(0.186) (0.387)
Outsider Change -0.059 0.846**
(0.117) (0.305)
Regular Exit -0.638*** 0.398†
(0.113) (0.238)
Irregular Exit 0.986*** -0.338
(0.225) (0.399)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. 0.386 -1.474**
(0.516) (0.565)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.359*** 0.524*
(0.104) (0.237)
Leader Death 0.742** 0.027 0.653* -0.406 0.690** -0.572
(0.260) (0.664) (0.267) (0.721) (0.250) (0.728)
Minimum Distance -0.035* -0.782*** -0.056** -0.805*** -0.057** -0.800***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.017) (0.058) (0.018) (0.057)
Refugees -0.511*** 0.208*** -0.468*** 0.251*** -0.471*** 0.256***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039)
Leader Change, Host 0.116 0.045 0.040 -0.261 0.037 -0.242
(0.098) (0.264) (0.088) (0.234) (0.089) (0.234)
Civil Conflict -0.480*** -1.346*** -0.441*** -0.633* -0.406*** -0.719**
(0.111) (0.289) (0.101) (0.287) (0.100) (0.276)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -2.054*** -1.264 -1.058** 0.187 -1.161*** 0.149
(0.310) (0.824) (0.345) (1.050) (0.340) (1.020)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.267 -0.067 0.718** 0.060 0.706** 0.059
(0.252) (0.486) (0.229) (0.525) (0.227) (0.505)
GDPPC, Origin 0.079 -0.171 -0.057 -0.206 -0.074 -0.222†
(0.051) (0.141) (0.046) (0.134) (0.046) (0.132)
GDPPC, Host 0.470*** 0.361*** 0.455*** 0.473*** 0.450*** 0.465***
(0.046) (0.097) (0.042) (0.100) (0.042) (0.098)
Population, Origin 0.157*** -0.242† 0.191*** -0.076 0.197*** -0.056
(0.046) (0.136) (0.049) (0.165) (0.049) (0.166)
Population, Host 0.151*** 0.386*** 0.175*** 0.383** 0.175*** 0.373***
(0.039) (0.104) (0.036) (0.104) (0.037) (0.107)
Constant -6.310*** 5.139* -7.235*** 0.623 -7.146*** 0.623
(0.931) (2.307) (0.875) (2.248) (0.873) (2.232)
ln(a) 2.294*** 2.299*** 2.308***
(0.066) (0.057) (0.058)
N 86927 3347 136565 4940 136565 4940
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.13: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample
(Model 26C) (Model 27C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider -0.386** 1.077**
(0.126) (0.339)
Regular Exit, Insider -1.375*** -0.765†
(0.212) (0.445)
Irregular Exit, Outsider 0.885** 0.052
(0.273) (0.447)
Irregular Exit, Insider 0.725† 0.668
(0.379) (0.841)
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support -0.111 0.940**
(0.117) (0.309)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support 0.330 -1.877**
(0.792) (0.664)
Insider Change -1.039*** -0.545
(0.186) (0.386)
Leader Death 0.853*** 0.450 0.743** 0.027
(0.248) (0.619) (0.260) (0.663)
Minimum Distance -0.034† -0.775*** -0.036* -0.785***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.018) (0.054)
Refugees -0.511*** 0.203*** -0.510*** 0.210***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.039)
Leader Change, Host 0.142 0.105 0.112 0.033
(0.097) (0.255) (0.098) (0.262)
Civil Conflict -0.570*** -1.358*** -0.495*** -1.350***
(0.111) (0.288) (0.112) (0.288)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.981*** -1.477† -2.019*** -1.267
(0.316) (0.836) (0.310) (0.819)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.257 -0.121 0.256 -0.128
(0.253) (0.493) (0.252) (0.485)
GDPPC, Origin 0.087† -0.180 0.079 -0.178
(0.051) (0.142) (0.051) (0.141)
GDPPC, Host 0.485*** 0.378*** 0.472*** 0.369***
(0.046) (0.100) (0.046) (0.097)
Population, Origin 0.168*** -0.233† 0.166*** -0.230†
(0.048) (0.141) (0.047) (0.136)
Population, Host 0.145*** 0.360*** 0.152*** 0.389***
(0.039) (0.101) (0.039) (0.104)
Constant -6.539*** 5.475* -6.488*** 4.928*
(0.937) (2.279) (0.936) (2.301)
ln(a) 2.289*** 2.292***
(0.067) (0.066)
N 86927 3347 86927 3347
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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C.9 10 Year Risk Sample
Table C.14: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 10 Year Risk Sample
(Model 28C) (Model 29C) (Model 30C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Insider Change -1.050*** -0.538
(0.186) (0.385)
Outsider Change -0.061 0.880**
(0.116) (0.304)
Regular Exit -0.643*** 0.428†
(0.113) (0.235)
Irregular Exit 0.978*** -0.347
(0.228) (0.400)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. 0.349 -1.470*
(0.522) (0.571
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. -0.373*** 0.544*
(0.105) (0.237)
Leader Death 0.737** 0.005 0.627* -0.413 0.697** -0.577
(0.252) (0.658) (0.258) (0.722) (0.242) (0.731)
Minimum Distance -0.032† -0.776*** -0.054** -0.800*** -0.054** -0.796***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.017) (0.058) (0.017) (0.056)
Refugees -0.522*** 0.210*** -0.479*** 0.252*** -0.481*** 0.257***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039)
Leader Change, Host 0.115 0.041 0.045 -0.262 0.042 -0.243
(0.097) (0.263) (0.087) (0.235) (0.088) (0.234)
Civil Conflict -0.526*** -1.319*** -0.482*** -0.599* -0.448*** -0.690*
(0.111) (0.287) (0.101) (0.286) (0.101) (0.276)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -2.025*** -1.192 -1.006** 0.287 -1.114*** 0.232
(0.302) (0.819) (0.336) (1.031) (0.331) (1.002)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.293 -0.049 0.719** 0.057 0.709** 0.061
(0.251) (0.485) (0.230) (0.525) (0.228) (0.504)
GDPPC, Origin 0.087† -0.185 -0.050 -0.222† -0.065 -0.235†
(0.049) (0.141) (0.044) (0.129) (0.044) (0.127)
GDPPC, Host 0.479*** 0.357*** 0.464*** 0.471*** 0.460*** 0.462***
(0.045) (0.098) (0.042) (0.101) (0.042) (0.099)
Population, Origin 0.150** -0.229† 0.179*** -0.068 0.183*** -0.051
(0.046) (0.135) (0.047) (0.159) (0.047) (0.160)
Population, Host 0.155*** 0.382*** 0.182*** 0.385*** 0.182*** 0.375***
(0.039) (0.104) (0.036) (0.104) (0.037) (0.107)
Constant -6.357*** 4.994* -7.205*** 0.505 -7.110*** 0.534
(0.929) (2.310) (0.866) (2.219) (0.865) (2.206)
ln(a) 2.315*** 2.323*** 2.317***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.066)
N 94261 3383 146677 4987 146677 4987
Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table C.15: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, 10
Year Risk Sample
(Model 31C) (Model 32C)
Pr(0) Count Pr(0) Count
Regular Exit, Outsider -0.374** 1.119***
(0.125) (0.337)
Regular Exit, Insider -1.388*** -0.755†
(0.211) (0.441)
Irregular Exit, Outsider 0.884** 0.049
(0.277) (0.447)
Irregular Exit, Insider 0.727† 0.673
(0.386) (0.850)
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support -0.111 0.975**
(0.117) (0.308)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support 0.294 -1.880**
(0.798) (0.666)
Insider Change -1.051*** -0.534
(0.186) (0.384)
Minimum Distance -0.030† -0.769*** -0.033† -0.779***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.018) (0.054)
Leader Death 0.793** 0.460 0.738** 0.005
(0.249) (0.612) (0.252) (0.658)
Refugees -0.522*** 0.205*** -0.522*** 0.212***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.038
Leader Change, Host 0.140 0.101 0.112 0.029
(0.097) (0.254) (0.098) (0.262)
Civil Conflict -0.618*** -1.329*** -0.542*** -1.322***
(0.110) (0.286) (0.111) (0.286)
Electoral Democracy, Origin -1.954*** -1.408† -1.993*** -1.195
(0.307) (0.828) (0.302) (0.813)
Electoral Democracy, Host 0.287 -0.100 0.281 -0.110
(0.252) (0.492) (0.252) (0.484)
GDPPC, Origin 0.094† -0.194 0.087† -0.191
(0.050) (0.142) (0.050) (0.141)
GDPPC, Host 0.492*** 0.375*** 0.481*** 0.365***
(0.045) (0.100) (0.046) (0.097)
Population, Origin 0.163*** -0.219 0.158*** -0.218
(0.047) (0.140) (0.046) (0.135)
Population, Host 0.149*** 0.356*** 0.157*** 0.386***
(0.039) (0.101) (0.039) (0.104)
Constant -6.590*** 5.316* -6.531*** 4.787*
(0.933) (2.277) (0.933) (2.304)
ln(a) 22.312*** 22.315***
2 (0.066) 2(0.066)
N 94261 3383 94261 3383
Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
from presentation.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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